Title: Principia mathematica, vol. 2 (of 3)
Author: Alfred North Whitehead
Bertrand Russell
Release date: March 20, 2026 [eBook #78255]
Language: English
Original publication: Cambridge: University Press, 1910
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/78255
Credits: Richard Tonsing, Laura Natal and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital Library.) In memoriam of Greg Newby.
PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
London: FETTER LANE, E.C.
C. F. CLAY, MANAGER
Edinburgh: 100, PRINCES STREET
Berlin: A. ASHER AND CO.
Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS
New York: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
Bombay and Calcutta:
MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.
All rights reserved
BY
ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, Sc.D., F.R.S.
Fellow and late Lecturer of Trinity College, Cambridge
AND
BERTRAND RUSSELL, M.A., F.R.S.
Lecturer and late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge
VOLUME II
Cambridge
at the University Press
1912
Cambridge:
PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A.
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
[Pg v]
| PAGE | |
| PREFATORY STATEMENT OF SYMBOLIC CONVENTIONS | ix |
| PART III. CARDINAL ARITHMETIC. | |
| Summary of Part III | 3 |
| SECTION A. DEFINITION AND LOGICAL PROPERTIES OF CARDINAL NUMBERS | 4 |
| *100. Definition and elementary properties of cardinal numbers | 13 |
| *101. On 0 and 1 and 2 | 19 |
| *102. On cardinal numbers of assigned types | 24 |
| *103. Homogeneous cardinals | 36 |
| *104. Ascending cardinals | 42 |
| *105. Descending cardinals | 52 |
| *106. Cardinals of relational types | 60 |
| SECTION B. ADDITION, MULTIPLICATION AND EXPONENTIATION | 66 |
| *110. The arithmetical sum of two classes and of two cardinals | 75 |
| *111. Double similarity | 88 |
| *112. The arithmetical sum of a class of classes | 97 |
| *113. On the arithmetical product of two classes or of two cardinals | 105 |
| *114. The arithmetical product of a class of classes | 124 |
| *115. Multiplicative classes and arithmetical classes | 135 |
| *116. Exponentiation | 143 |
| *117. Greater and less | 171 |
| General note on cardinal correlators | 185 |
| SECTION C. FINITE AND INFINITE | 187 |
| *118. Arithmetical substitution and uniform formal numbers | 193 |
| *119. Subtraction | 201 |
| *120. Inductive cardinals | 207 |
| *121. Intervals | 233 |
| *122. Progressions | 253 |
| *123. |
268 |
| *124. Reflexive classes and cardinals | 278 |
| *125. The axiom of infinity | 289 |
| *126. On typically indefinite inductive cardinals | 293[Pg vi] |
| PART IV. RELATION-ARITHMETIC. | |
| Summary of Part IV | 301 |
| SECTION A. ORDINAL SIMILARITY AND RELATION-NUMBERS | 303 |
| *150. Internal transformation of a relation | 306 |
| *151. Ordinal similarity | 319 |
| *152. Definition and elementary properties of relation-numbers | 330 |
| *153. The relation-numbers |
334 |
| *154. Relation-numbers of assigned types | 339 |
| *155. Homogeneous relation-numbers | 344 |
| SECTION B. ADDITION OF RELATIONS, AND THE PRODUCT OF TWO RELATIONS | 347 |
| *160. The sum of two relations | 351 |
| *161. Addition of a term to a relation | 357 |
| *162. The sum of the relations of a field | 362 |
| *163. Relations of mutually exclusive relations | 369 |
| *164. Double likeness | 376 |
| *165. Relations of relations of couples | 386 |
| *166. The product of two relations | 396 |
| SECTION C. THE PRINCIPLE OF FIRST DIFFERENCES, AND THE MULTIPLICATION AND EXPONENTIATION OF RELATIONS | 403 |
| *170. On the relation of first differences among the sub-classes of a given class | 411 |
| *171. The principle of first differences (continued) | 423 |
| *172. The product of the relations of a field | 428 |
| *173. The product of the relations of a field (continued) | 443 |
| *174. The associative law of relational multiplication | 447 |
| *176. Exponentiation | 458 |
| *177. Propositions connecting |
471 |
| SECTION D. ARITHMETIC OF RELATION-NUMBERS | 473 |
| *180. The sum of two relation-numbers | 477 |
| *181. On the addition of unity to a relation-number | 482 |
| *182. On separated relations | 487 |
| *183. The sum of the relation-numbers of a field | 496 |
| *184. The product of two relation-numbers | 501 |
| *185. The product of the relation-numbers of a field | 505 |
| *186. Powers of relation-numbers | 507 |
| PART V. SERIES. | |
| Summary of Part V. | 513 |
| SECTION A. GENERAL THEORY OF SERIES | 516 |
| *200. Relations contained in diversity | 518 |
| *201. Transitive relations | 525 |
| *202. Connected relations | 533 |
| *204. Elementary properties of series | 547 |
| *205. Maximum and minimum points | 559 |
| *206. Sequent points | 577 |
| *207. Limits | 594 |
| *208. The correlation of series | 605[Pg vii] |
| SECTION B. ON SECTIONS, SEGMENTS, STRETCHES, AND DERIVATIVES | 612 |
| *210. On series of classes generated by the relation of inclusion | 615 |
| *211. On sections and segments | 624 |
| *212. The series of segments | 651 |
| *213. Sectional relations | 668 |
| *214. Dedekindian relations | 684 |
| *215. Stretches | 691 |
| *216. Derivatives | 700 |
| *217. On segments of sums and converses | 710 |
| SECTION C. ON CONVERGENCE, AND THE LIMITS OF FUNCTIONS | 715 |
| *230. On convergents | 720 |
| *231. Limiting sections and ultimate oscillation of a function | 727 |
| *232. On the oscillation of a function as the argument approaches a given limit | 737 |
| *233. On the limits of functions | 745 |
| *234. Continuity of functions | 753 |
[Pg viii]
p. 5, line 20, delete "."
p. 34, line 20, for "" read "
."
p. 36, line 7 and line 10, for "" read "
."
p. 44, line 17, for "" read "
."
p. 112, in *2·52, in place of "" read "
."
p. 129, in *5·11, in place of reference to "" read reference to "
."
p. 129, in *5·12, in place of reference to "" read reference to "*2·51."
p. 144, *10·23 should be "."
p. 157, line 11, for "*10" read "*9."
p. 184, last line of Dem. of *14·111, for second "" read "
."
p. 228, in *23·81, for "" read "
."
p. 242, in *25·37, for "" read "
."
p. 242, in *25·412, for "" read "
."
p. 253, 2nd and 4th lines of Dem. of *31·16, for "*21·35" read "*23·35."
p. 259, in note to *32·35, for "*32·2" read "*32·3."
p. 263, in *33·16, 4th line of Dem., for "*20·34" read "*22·34."
p. 265, in *33·26, 2nd line of Dem., for "*21·34" read "*23·34."
p. 275, in *34·6, 4th line of Dem., for first "" read "
."
p. 289, 1st line, for "" read "
."
p. 322, in *40·18, enunciation, for "" read "
".
p. 329, in *40·69, Dem., for "" read "
" (3 times).
p. 387, in *55·224, 1st line of Dem., for "" read "
" (twice).
p. 388, in *55·281, for third "" read "
."
p. 410, in *60·53, last line of Dem., for "" read "
."
p. 453, in *71·25, Dem., 1st line, for "" read "
."
" " 2nd line, for
""
read "."
" " 3rd line, for
"" read "
."
" " 6th line, for
"" read "
" and for
"" read "
."
" " 7th line, for
"" read "
."
p. 465, in *72·16, Dem., 1st line, for last "" read "
."
p. 483, in *73·44, Dem., 1st line, for second "" read "
."
p. 485, in *73·511, for "" read "
."
p. 522, in *81·23, enunciation and 2nd line of Dem., for "" read "
."
p. 592, in *91·33, Dem., 1st line, for "" read "
."
p. 614, in *93·36, Dem., for "" read "
" throughout.
p. 628, in *95·21, Dem., line 6, for "" read "
."
ERRATA TO VOLUME II
p. 82, last line but one, for "" and "
" read "
" and "
."
p. 101, *112·23, enunciation, the second time two dots occur, read one dot.
p. 573, *205·7, enunciation, for "" read "
."
[Pg ix]
THE purpose of the following observations is to bring together in one discussion various explanations which are required in applying the theory of types to cardinal arithmetic. It is convenient to collect these observations, since otherwise their dispersion throughout the several numbers of Part III makes it difficult to see what is their total effect. But although we have placed these observations at the beginning, they are to be read concurrently with the text of Part III, at least with so much of the text as consists of explanations of definitions. The earlier portion of what follows is merely a résumé of previous explanations; it is only in the later portions that the application to cardinal arithmetic is made.
I. General Observations on Types.
Three different kinds of typical ambiguity are involved in our propositions, concerning:
(1) the functional hierarchy,
(2) the propositional hierarchy,
(3) the extensional hierarchy.
The relevance of these must be separately considered.
We often speak as though the type represented by small Latin letters
were not composed of functions. It is, however, compatible with all
we have to say that it should be composed of functions. It is to
be observed, further, that, given the number of individuals, there
is nothing in our axioms to show how many predicative functions of
individuals there are, i.e. their number is not a function
of the number of individuals: we only know that their number
, where "
" stands for the
class of individuals.
In practice, we proceed along the extensional hierarchy after the early numbers of the book. If we have started from individuals, the result of this is to exclude functions wholly from our hierarchy; if we have started with functions of a given type, all functions of other types are excluded. Thus a fresh extensional hierarchy, wholly excluding every other, starts from each[Pg x] type of function. When we speak simply of "the extensional hierarchy," we mean the one which starts from individuals.
It is to be observed that when we have the assertion of a propositional
function, say "," the
must be of some definite
type, i.e. we only assert that
is true whatever
may be within some one type. Thus e.g. "
" does not
assert more than that this assertion holds for any
of a given
type. It is true that symbolically the same assertion holds in other
types, but other types cannot be included under one assertion-sign,
because no variable can travel beyond its type.
The process of rendering the types of variables ambiguous is begun in
*9, where we take the first step in regard to the propositional
hierarchy. Before *9, our variables are elementary propositions.
These are such as contain no apparent variables. Hence the only
functions that occur are matrices, and these only occur through
their values. The assumption involved in the transition from Section
A to Section B (Part I) is that, given "," where
is an elementary proposition, we may substitute for
"
," where
is any matrix. Thus instead
of "
," which contained one variable
of a given
type, we have "
," which contains
several variables of several types (any finite number of variables and
types is possible). This assumption involves some rather difficult
points. It is to be remembered that no value of
contains
as a constituent, and therefore
is not a
constituent of
even if
is a value of
. Thus we
pass, above, from an assertion containing no function as a constituent
to one containing one or more functions as constituents. The assertion
"
" concerns any elementary proposition, whereas
"
" concerns any of a certain
set of elementary propositions, namely any of those that are values
of
. Different types of functions give different sorts of ways
of picking out elementary propositions.
Having assumed or proved "," where
is elementary and
therefore involves no ambiguity of type, we thus assert
where the types of the arguments and the number of them are wholly
arbitrary, except that they must belong to the functional hierarchy
including individuals. (The assumption that propositions are incomplete
symbols excludes the possibility that the arguments to
are
propositions.) The noteworthy point is that we thus obtain an assertion
in which there may be any finite number of variables and the variables
have unlimited typical ambiguity, from an assertion containing one
variable of a perfectly definite type. All this is presupposed before
we embark on the propositional hierarchy.
It should be observed that all elementary propositions are values
of predicative functions of one individual, i.e. of
, where
is individual.[Pg xi] Thus we need not
assume that elementary propositions form a type; we may replace
by "
" in "
." In this way, propositions as
variables wholly disappear.
In extending statements concerning elementary propositions so as
formally to apply to first-order propositions, we have to assume afresh
the primitive proposition *1·11 (*1·1 is never used), i.e. given
"" and "
," we have
"
" which is practically *9·12. This was asserted in
*1·11 for any case in which
and
are elementary
propositions. There was here already an ambiguity of type, owing to the
fact that x need not be an individual, but might be a function of any
order. E.g. we might use *1·11 to pass from
where
replaces the
of *1·11, and
,
replace
and
. Thus
*1·11, even before its extension in *9, already states a fresh
primitive proposition for each fresh type of functions considered.
The novelty in *9 is that we allow
and
to contain one
apparent variable. This may be of any functional type (including
Indiv); thus we get another set of symbolically identical primitive
propositions. In passing, as indicated at the end of *9, to more
than one apparent variable, we introduce a new batch of primitive
propositions with each additional apparent variable.
Similar remarks apply to the other primitive propositions of *9.
What makes the above process legitimate is that nothing in the
treatment of functions of order presupposes functions
of higher order. We can deal with each new type of functions as it
arises, without having to take account of the fact that there are later
types. From symbolic analogy we "see" that the process can be repeated
indefinitely. This possibility rests upon two things:
(1) A fresh interpretation of our constants—,
, !,
(
)., (
).—at each fresh stage;
(2) A fresh assumption, symbolically unchanged, of the primitive propositions which we found sufficient at an earlier stage—the possibility of avoiding symbolic change being due to the fresh interpretation of our constants.
The above remarks apply to the axiom of reducibility as well as to our other primitive propositions. If, at any stage, we wish to deal with a class defined by a function of the 30,000th type, we shall have to repeat our arguments and assumptions 30,000 times. But there is still no necessity to speak of the hierarchy as a whole, or to suppose that statements can be made about "all types."
We come now to the extensional hierarchy. This starts from some
one point in the functional hierarchy. We usually suppose it to
start from[Pg xii] individuals, but any other starting-point is equally
legitimate. Whatever type of functions (including
we start from, all higher types of functions are excluded from the
extensional hierarchy, and also all lower types (if any). Some
complications arise here. Suppose we start from
.
Then if
is any predicative function of individuals,
. But identity between a function
and a class does not have the usual properties of identity; in
fact, though every function is identical with some class, and
vice versa, the number of functions is likely to be greater than
the number of classes. This is due to the fact that we may have
without
having
.
In the extensional hierarchy, we prove the extension from classes to classes of classes, and so on, without fresh primitive propositions (*20, *21). The primitive propositions involved are those concerning the functional hierarchy.
From all these various modes of extension we "see" that whatever can be proved for lower types, whether functional or extensional, can also be proved for higher types[1]. Hence we assume that it is unnecessary to know the types of our variables, though they must always be confined within some one definite type.
Now although everything that can be proved for lower types can be
proved for higher types, the converse does not hold. In Vol. I. only
two propositions occur which can be proved for higher but not for
lower types. These are and
. These
can be proved for any type except that of individuals. It is to be
observed that we do not state that whatever is true for
lower types is true for higher types, but only that whatever
can be proved for lower types can be proved for higher types.
If, for example,
, then this
proposition is false for any higher type; but this proposition,
, is one which cannot be proved
logically; in fact, it is only ascertainable by a census, not by logic.
Thus among the propositions which can be proved by logic, there are
some which can only be proved for higher types, but none which can only
be proved for lower types.
The propositions which can be proved in some types but not in others
all are or depend upon existence-theorems for cardinals. We can prove
Exactly similar remarks would apply to the functional hierarchy. In
both cases, the possibility of proving these propositions depends upon
the axiom of reducibility and the definition of identity. Suppose there
is only one individual,
. Then
,
are two different functions, which, by the[Pg xiii] axiom of reducibility, are
equivalent to two different predicative functions. Hence there are at
least two predicative functions of
, and at least two classes
,
. This argument fails both for classes and
functions if either we deny the axiom of reducibility or we suppose
that there may be two different individuals which agree in all their
predicates, i.e. that the definition of identity is misleading.
The statement that what can be proved for lower types can be proved
for higher types requires certain limitations, or rather, a more exact
formulation. Taking as a primitive idea, put
Then consider the proposition
. We
can prove
Thus
can be proved in the lowest type
in which it is significant, and disproved in any other. The difficulty,
however, is avoided if Indiv is replaced by a variable
, and
by
. Then we have
and this holds whatever the type of
may be. Thus in order
that our principle about lower and higher types may be true, it is
necessary that any relation there may be between two types occurring in
a proposition should be preserved; in other words, when one constant
type is defined in terms of another (as
and
), the definition must be restored before the type is
varied, so that when one type is varied, so is the other. With this
proviso, our principle about higher and lower types holds.
With the above proviso, the truth of our statement is manifest. For we have shown that the same primitive propositions, symbolically, which hold for the lowest type concerned in our reasoning, hold also for subsequent types; and therefore all our proofs can be repeated symbolically unchanged.
The importance of this lies in the fact that, when we have proved a proposition for the lowest significant type, we "see" that it holds in any other assigned significant type. Hence every proposition which is proved without the mention of any type is to be regarded as proved for the lowest significant type, and extended by analogy to any other significant type.
By exactly similar considerations we "see" that a proposition which
can be proved for some type other than the lowest significant type
must hold for any type in the direct descent from this. E.g.
suppose we can prove a proposition (such as ) for the
type
(where
); then
merely writing
for
, we have
a proposition which is proved concerning
, namely
, and here, by what was said
before,
) may be replaced by any higher type.
Thus given a typically ambiguous relation , such that,
if
is a type,
is a type (
or
is such a relation), we "see" that, if we can prove[Pg xiv]
, we can also prove
, where
is any type, and
is composed of typically ambiguous
symbols. Similarly if we can prove
, we can
prove
, where
is any type. But we
cannot in general prove
or
, and these may be in fact untrue. e.g.
we have
.
Thus more generally, when a proposition containing several ambiguities
can be proved for the types ,
,
..., but not for lower types, it is to be regarded as a function of
, and then it becomes true for any type; that is, given
we shall also have
where
is any type. In this way, all demonstrable
propositions are in the first instance about
, and
when so expressed remain true if any other type is substituted for
.
When a proposition containing typically ambiguous symbols can be proved to be true in the lowest significant type, and we can "see" that symbolically the same proof holds in any other assigned type, we say that the proposition has "permanent truth." (We may also say, loosely, that it is "true in all types.") When a proposition containing typically ambiguous symbols can be proved to be false in the lowest significant type, and we can "see" that it is false in any other assigned type, we say that it has "permanent falsehood." Any other proposition containing typically ambiguous symbols is said to be "fluctuating," or to have "fluctuating truth-value," as opposed to "permanent truth-value," which belongs to propositions that have either permanent truth or permanent falsehood.
In what follows, ambiguities concerned with the propositional hierarchy will be ignored, since they never lead to fluctuating propositions. Thus disjunction and negation and their derivatives will not receive explicit typical determination, but only such typical determination as results from assigning the types of the other typically ambiguous symbols involved.
[Pg xv]
It is convenient to call the symbolic form of a propositional function simply a "symbolic form." Thus, if a symbolic form contains symbols of ambiguous type it represents different propositional functions according as the types of its ambiguous symbols are differently adjusted. The adjustment is of course always limited by the necessity for the preservation of meaning. It is evident that the ideas of "permanent truth-value" and "fluctuating truth-value" apply in reality to symbolic forms and not to propositions or propositional functions. Ambiguity of type can only exist in the process of determination of meaning. When the meaning has been assigned to a symbolic form and a propositional function thereby obtained, all ambiguity of type has vanished.
To "assert a symbolic form" is to assert each of the propositional functions arising for the set of possible typical determinations which are somewhere enumerated. We have in fact enumerated a very limited number of types starting from that of individuals, and we "see" that this process can be indefinitely continued by analogy. The form is always asserted so far as the enumeration has arrived; and this is sufficient for all purposes, since it is essentially impossible to use a type which has not been arrived at by successive enumeration from the lower types.
The only difficulties which arise in Cardinal Arithmetic in connection
with the ambiguities of type of the symbols are those which enter
through the use of the symbol , or of the symbol
, which
is
. For it may happen that a class
in one type has no class similar to it in some lower type (cf.
*102·72·73). All fallacious reasoning in cardinal or ordinal arithmetic
in connection with types, apart from that due to the mere absence
of meaning in symbols, is due to this fact—in other words to the
fact that in some types
is true, and
in other types
may not be true. The
fallacy consists in neglecting this latter possibility of the failure
of
for a limited number of types, that
is, in taking the "fluctuating" form
as
though it possessed a "permanent" truth-value.
A fluctuating form however often possesses what is here termed
a "stable" truth-value, which is as important as the permanent
truth-value of other forms. For example, anticipating our definitions
of elementary arithmetic, consider . There is no
abstract logical proof that there are two individuals; so suppose 2 and
3 refer to classes of individuals, but 5 refers to classes of a high
enough type, then with these determinations
cannot be
proved. But
has a stable truth-value, since
it can always be proved when all the types are high enough. In this
case the fact that our empirical census of individuals (at least of the
"relative" individuals of ordinary life) has outrun the capacity of
logical proof, makes the fluctuation in the truth-value of the form to
be entirely unimportant.
In order to make this idea precise, it is necessary to have a convention as to the order in which the types of symbols in a symbolic form are assigned. The rule we adopt is that the types of the real variables are to be first assigned, and then those of the constant symbols. The types of the apparent variables, if any, will then be completely determinate.
[Pg xvi]
A symbolic form has a stable truth-value if, after any assignment of types to the real variables, types can be assigned to the constant symbols so that the truth-value of the proposition thus obtained is the same as the truth-value of any proposition obtained by modifying it by the assignment of higher types to some or all of the constant symbols. This truth-value is the stable truth-value.
II. Formal Numbers.
The conventions, which we shall give below as to the assignment of types, practically restrict our interpretation of fluctuating symbolic forms to types in which the forms possess their stable truth-value. The assumption that these truth-values are stable never enters into the reasoning. But we judge a truth-value to be stable when any method of raising the types of the constant symbols by one step leaves it unaltered.
In practice the fluctuation of truth-values only enters into our consideration through a limited number of symbols called "formal numbers."
Formal numbers may be "constant" or "functional."
A constant formal number is any constant symbol for which
there is a constant such that, in whatever type the
constant symbol is determined, it is, in that type, identical with
. In other words if
be a constant
symbol, then
is a formal number provided that "truth" is
the permanent truth-value of
, for some
constant
.
The functional formal numbers are defined by enumeration; they
are
where in each formal number the symbols
,
,
,
occurring in it are called the arguments of the
functional form even when they are complex symbols. The argument of
is
, and those of
are
and
,
and those of
are 1 and 2.
Thus among the constant formal numbers are
The references which support this statement are
*101·11·21·32.*123·36.*110·42.*113·23.*116·23.
Among the functional formal numbers are
It will be observed that e.g.
is both a constant
and a functional formal number, so that the two classes are not
mutually exclusive. In fact they possess an indefinite number of
members in common.
All the formal numbers, with the exception of and
, are members of
without any hypothesis
[cf. *100·41·01.*110·42.*112·101.*113·23.*114·1.*116·23, note to
*119·12, and *120·411].
A functional formal number consists of two parts, namely, its argument
or arguments, and the constant "form." An argument of a functional
formal number may be a complex symbol, and may be constant or variable.
Thus is an argument of
,
[Pg xvii]and of (
and of (
;
also
is an argument of (
.
The constant form is constituted by the other symbols which
are constants. Two occurrences of functional formal numbers are only
occurrences of the same formal number if the arguments and also the
constant forms are identical in symbolism. Thus two occurrences of
are occurrences of the same formal number, even if
they are determined to be in different types; but
and
are different formal numbers. Also
and
are different formal numbers because their
"forms" are different, though the arguments
and 1 are the
same and (in the same type) the entity denoted is the same. Thus the
distinction between formal numbers depends on the symbolism and not
on the entity denoted, and in considering them it is symbolic analogy
and not denotation which is to be taken into account. For example
two different occurrences of the same formal number will not denote
the same entity, if in the two occurrences the ambiguity of type is
determined differently.
The functional formal numbers are divided into three sets: (i) the
primary set consisting of the forms ,
,
, (ii) the
argumental set consisting only of
, (iii) the
arithmetical set consisting of
,
,
, and
.
A functional formal number has at most two arguments. But an argument
of a functional formal number may itself be a functional formal
number, and will accordingly possess either one or two arguments,
which in their turn may be functional formal numbers, and so on. The
whole set of arguments and of arguments of arguments, thus obtained,
is called the set of components of the original formal
number. Thus ,
,
, and
are
components of (
; and
,
and
are components of
; and
,
and
are components of
. The two arguments of (
are
and
, and those of
are
and
,
and those of
are
and
.
[Pg xviii]
Addition, multiplication, exponentiation, and subtraction will be
called the arithmetical operations; and in ,
,
,
,
and
will each be said to be subjected to these respective operations.
The arithmetical components of an arithmetical formal number
(i.e. one belonging to the arithmetical set) consist of those of
its components which do not appear in the capacity of components of a
component which does not belong to the arithmetical set. Thus
,
,
,
are arithmetical components of
; and
and
are arithmetical components of
, but
is not one; and
and
are
arithmetical components of
, but
is not one; and
and
are arithmetical components of
, but
and
and
are
components of
and are therefore
not arithmetical components of
. Only arithmetical formal numbers possess arithmetical
components.
A formal number of the arithmetical set having no components
which are formal numbers of the argumental set is called a
pure arithmetical formal number. For example
and
are pure, but
and
are not pure.
There are many types involved in the consideration of a formal
number. For example, in there is the type of
and of
; in
there
is the type of
, the type of
, and the type
of
; and so on for more complex formal numbers. The type of a
formal number as a whole in any occurrence is called its actual
type. This is the type of the entity which it then represents.
The other types involved in a formal number in any occurrence are called its subordinate types.
The actual types are not indicated in the symbolism for the various
formal numbers as stated above. They can be indicated relatively
to the type of the variable by writing
,
, (
,
(
, (
, by the notation of *65.
Even when the actual type of a complex formal number, such as
, is settled—so for instance that we have
—the meaning of the symbol
is not completely determined, for the type of
remains ambiguous. It follows, however, from
that the subordinate types make no difference to the value of a formal number, so long as the components are not null.
We can therefore make a formal number definite as soon as its actual type is definite by securing that its components are not null. This is done by the convention II T (below) combined with the definitions
*110·03·04.*113·04·05.*116·03·04.
When the subordinate types are adjusted in accordance with these definitions and conventions, they will be said to be normally adjusted.
[Pg xix]
But in order to state this convention we require a definition
of what is here called the adequacy of the actual type of a
formal number. The general idea of adequacy is simple enough, namely
that, given the subordinate types of
, the actual type of
should be high enough to enable us logically to prove
when such a proof is possible for types which are
not too low. For example, all types except the lowest for which it has
meaning are adequate for the constant formal number 2. It is rather
difficult however to state the meaning of adequacy with precision in a
manner adapted to all formal numbers. Fortunately the definition of the
lowest type which corresponds to this general idea of adequacy is not
important for our purposes. It will be sufficient to define as adequate
some types which certainly do have the property in question.
The method of definition which we adopt is to replace the formal
number by another one
so related to
that with the same actual type for both we can prove
, whenever
is not equal to
in all types. If
be functional,
we need only consider its argument, or its two arguments, and can
dismiss from consideration the other components; then we replace these
arguments by others so that the
has the required property.
Thus:
(i) The actual types of ,
,
, and
are adequate when we can logically prove
(ii) The actual types of ,
,
, and
are adequate when we can
logically prove
It will be noticed that ,
,
and
are the greatest classes of the same type as
,
, and
respectively, and that
and
are the
greatest cardinal numbers of the same type as
and
respectively. These definitions hold even when any of
,
,
,
are complex symbols.
The remaining formal numbers which are not functional must certainly
be constant. The difficulty which arises here is that if
be such a formal number and
occurs in its symbolism,
we have no logical method of deciding as to the truth or falsehood of
in any type. But we replace
by
which is the greatest existent
cardinal of the same type as
in that occurrence. Thus:
(iii) If be a formal number which is not functional, an
adequate actual type of
is one for which we can logically
prove
, where
is derived from
by replacing any occurrence of
in
by
. Accordingly if
does not occur in
, an adequate type is any actual type for
which we can logically prove
.
In the case of members of the primary and argumental groups we have
substituted the of the appropriate type in the place of
each variable. When the actual type is adequate we have
In the case of members of the arithmetical group (except in the
case of , we have substituted for each argument the
largest cardinal number which can be obtained in the type of that
argument, namely the
for the
of
the appropriate type. Accordingly we are sure (except in the case of
that for all other values of the arguments which are
existent cardinal numbers the formal number is not null.
It will be noticed that normal adjustment only concerns the subordinate
types. For example *110·03 secures that in
the actual type of[Pg xx]
is adequate, and *110·23
shows that any adequate actual type of
will do.
But nothing is said about the actual type of
.
We make the following definition: When the subordinate types of
a formal number are normally adjusted, and the actual type is adequate,
the types of the formal number are said to be arithmetically
adjusted.
We notice that for the primary set, the arithmetical adjustment of types means the same thing as the adequate adjustment of the actual type. Also if the arguments of a formal number of the arithmetical set are simple symbols, the two ideas come to the same thing.
In the case of variable formal numbers of the primary set, it follows
from *117·22·32 that when their types are arithmetically adjusted they
are not equal to for any values of their variables.
Also in the case of those variable formal numbers which are of the
pure arithmetical set (excluding ) it follows
from *100·4·52·42.*113·23.*116·23 that, working from the ultimate
components reached by successive analysis upwards, for all values
of such ultimate components which are members of
they can be reduced to the case of the formal numbers of the primary
group; and that therefore they are not equal to
when their
types are arithmetically adjusted. For example in
,
,
,
,
are these ultimate components;
let them be existent cardinal numbers. Hence when the types are
arithmetically adjusted, the actual type of
is
adequate and
is an existent cardinal; we can
therefore substitute
for it. By the same
reasoning we can substitute
for
, and again
for
.
A definite standard arithmetical adjustment of types for any formal
number can always be found by making every use of ,
whether explicit or concealed in
or in some other symbol,
to be homogeneous. Proofs which apply to any arithmetical adjustment
of types start by dealing with this standard type, and then by the use
of *104·21.*106·21·211·212·213 the extension is made to the adjacent
higher classical and relational types. We then "see" that by the
analogy of symbolism this extension can always be formally proved at
each stage, so that we are dealing with the stable truth-value. For
some constant formal numbers a lower existential type can be found than
that indicated by this method.
III. Classification of Occurrences of Formal Numbers.
A symbolic form of any of the kinds [cf. *117·01·04·05·06]
is called an arithmetical inequality.
[Pg xxi]
These forms only arise when we are comparing cardinal numbers in respect to the relation of being "greater than" or "less than." It might seem natural to include equations among these arithmetical inequalities. Their use however, even as between cardinal numbers, is not so exclusively arithmetical, and it is convenient to consider them separately under another heading during our preliminary investigations.
In the arithmetical inequalities as above written, and
,
or any symbols replacing
and
, are called the opposed
sides of the inequality, and either of
or
is called
a side of the inequality.
Symbolic forms of the kinds and
, where either
or
is a formal number,
will be called equations and inequations respectively; and
and
are called the opposed sides of the
equation or inequation, and either of them is simply a side of
the equation or inequation.
When we reach the exclusively arithmetical point of view, it will be convenient to put together equations, inequations and arithmetical inequalities as one sort of symbolic form. Their separation here is for the sake of investigations into the exceptions due to the failure of existence theorems in low types. It is unnecessary to consider arithmetical inequalities in this connection.
The ways in which a symbol can occur in a symbolic form are
named as follows:
The occurrence of in
is called an
argumental occurrence,
The occurrence of as an argument of an arithmetical formal
number (which may be a component of another formal number) or as one
side of an arithmetical inequality is called an arithmetical
occurrence,
The occurrence of as one side of an equation is called an
equational occurrence,
The occurrence of in "
" is called an
attributive occurrence,
Any other occurrence of is called a logical
occurrence, so also is
.
It is obvious that a pair of opposed sides of an equation or inequation
must be of the same type. Furthermore, if be a formal
number, and *20·18 is applied so as to give
[Pg xxii]the equational occurrence of
must be of the same type as its occurrence in
), otherwise the inference is fallacious. Accordingly substitution in
arithmetical formulae can only be undertaken when the conventions as to the
relations of ambiguous types secure this identity. This question is considered
later in this prefatory statement, and the result appears in the text as
*118·01.
At this point some examples will be useful; they will also be referred to subsequently in connection with the conventions limiting ambiguities of type.
*100·35.
Here the formal numbers are and
, each of which has three occurrences. The
first occurrence of
is logical, its second is
equational, and its third is attributive.
*100·42 (in the demonstration).
Here and
are the only formal
numbers, and all their occurrences are equational.
*100·44 (in the demonstration).
Here and
are the only formal
numbers; the first occurrence of
is logical, its
second is equational; both the occurrences of
are
equational.
*100·511.
Here the formal numbers are and
. The first occurrence of
is logical, the second is argumental, the third is
equational; the only occurrence of
is
equational.
*100·521.
Here and
are the only
formal numbers;
has two occurrences, the first
logical, the second argumental;
has one
occurrence, which is equational.
*101·28 (in the demonstration).
Here the formal numbers are 1 and . The first occurrence
of 1 is argumental, the second is attributive; the occurrence of
is attributive.
*101·38.
Here the formal numbers are 0, 1, and 2, and their occurrences are all logical.
*110·54.
Here the formal numbers are
The occurrence of
) and that of
(
are both equational, and they must be of the same type since they are
opposed sides of the same equation. The occurrences of the other formal
numbers[Pg xxiii] are as arithmetical components of a more complex arithmetical
formal number and are therefore arithmetical.
*116·63.
The formal numbers are ,
,
, and (
. Each
formal number occurs once only. The occurrences of
and
are arithmetical, and those of the other two
are equational.
*117·108.
The formal numbers are and
,
each with three occurrences. The first two occurrences of each formal
number are arithmetical, the last occurrence of each is equational.
*120·53 (in the demonstration).
Here the formal numbers are ,
,
,
,
.
Each formal number has one occurrence. Those of
,
and
are equational, and those of
and
are arithmetical.
*120·53 (in the demonstration).
Here the formal numbers are ,
,
,
,
. The first occurrence of
is equational, its second occurrence is logical; the first two
occurrences of
are equational, its third occurrence
is arithmetical; the only occurrence of
is
arithmetical; the only occurrences of
and of
are equational.
IV. The Conventions and
.
Two occurrences of a formal number with the same actual type are said to be bound to each other.
The choice of types for formal numbers, when they are not made definite in terms of variables by the notation of *65, is limited by the following conventions, which enable us to dispense largely with the elaboration produced by the definition of types.
. All logical occurrences of the same formal number
are in the same type; argumental occurrences are bound to logical and
attributive occurrences; and, if there are no argumental occurrences,
equational occurrences are bound to logical occurrences.
This rule only applies, so far as meaning permits, to those types which remain ambiguous after the assignment of types to the real variables.
It will be noticed that if there are no argumental or logical
occurrences of a formal number, does not in any way apply
to the assignment of types to the occurrences in the form of that
formal number.
[Pg xxiv]
The identification of types in argumental and attributive occurrences
by is rendered necessary to secure the use of the
equivalence
where
is a formal number. Without the convention, this
application of *37·1 would be fallacious. The only one of our
examples to which this part of the convention applies is *101·28
(demonstration), where it secures that the two occurrences of 1 are
in the same type. It is relevant however to the symbolism in the
demonstration of *100·521.
It will be found in practice that this convention relates the types of occurrences in the same way as would naturally be done by anyone who was not thinking of the convention at all. To see how the convention works, we will run through the examples which have already been given above.
In *100·35, directs the logical and equational
occurrences of
to be in the same type, and
similarly for
. Also "meaning" secures that the
equational types of
and
are
the same. Thus these four occurrences are all in one type, which has
no necessary relation to the types of the attributive occurrences of
and
. Thus, using the notation
of *65·04 to secure typical definiteness, *100·35 is to mean
The types of these attributive occurrences are settled by the necessity of "meaning."
In *100·42 (demonstration), since all the occurrences of formal numbers
are equational, produces no limitation of types.
In *100·44 (demonstration), secures that the two
occurrences of
are in the same type. Also we
notice that the first occurrence of
is really (cf.
*65·04)
, since "
" occurs,
and thus "meaning" requires this relation of types, and the second
occurrence of
is in the type of the occurrences of
.
In *100·511, directs that the logical and argumental
occurrences are to have the same type. In *100·521,
directs that the two occurrences of
are to have the
same type. In *101·28 both occurrences of 1 are to be in the same type.
In *101·38,
directs that all the occurrences of 2 are to
have the same type.
The convention in no way limits the types in *110·54, nor
in *116·63, nor in *117·108.
In the first example from *120·53 (in the demonstration) convention
has no application.
In the second example from *120·53 (in the demonstration) convention
directs that the two occurrences of
shall be in the same type; and the[Pg xxv] necessity of "meaning" secures that
the first occurrence of
shall also be in this type.
The same necessity secures that
shall be in the
same type as
; and it also secures that in
"
"
the first occurrence of
and that of
shall have a common type,
which is otherwise unfettered; also nothing has been decided as to the
types of
and
in
.
We now come to conventions embodying the outcome of arithmetical ideas. The term "arithmetical" is here used to denote investigations in which the interest lies in the comparison of formal numbers in respect to equality or inequality, excluding the exceptional cases—whenever the cases are exceptional—due to the failure of existence in low types. The thorough-going arithmetical point of view, which we adopt later in the investigation on Ratio and Quantity and also in this volume in *117 and *126 and some earlier propositions, would sweep aside as uninteresting all investigation of the exact ways in which the failure of existence theorems is relevant to the truth of propositions, thus concentrating attention exclusively on stable truth-values. But the logical investigation has its own intrinsic interest among the principles of the subject. It is obvious however that it should be restrained to a consideration of the theorems of purely logical interest. In practice this extrusion of uninteresting cases of the failure of arithmetical theorems, even amid the logical investigations of the first part of this volume, is effected by securing that all arithmetical occurrences of formal numbers have their actual types adequate.
As far as formal numbers of the primary group, i.e.
,
,
,
are concerned, the arithmetical adjustment of types
is secured formally in the symbolism by the definitions *110·03·04
for addition, and *113·04·05 for multiplication, and *116·03·04 for
exponentiation, and *117·02·03 for arithmetical inequalities, and
*119·02·03 for subtraction.
We save the symbolic elaboration which would arise from the extension of similar definitions to other formal numbers by the following convention:
. Whenever a formal number
occurs, so that,
if it were replaced by
, the actual type
of
would by definition have to be adequate,
then the actual type of
is also to be adequate.
For example in , if
were replaced by
, then by *110·04 the actual
type of
is adequate. Hence by
the
actual type of
is to be adequate: accordingly so
long as
and
are simple variables and members of
, we can always assume
for the type of the occurrence of
.
It is essential to notice that so long as the argument of an argumental
formal number, or the arguments of an arithmetical formal number, are
adjusted arithmetically, the exact types chosen make no difference.
This follows for argumental formal numbers from *102·862·87·88,
for addition from[Pg xxvi] *110·25, for multiplication from *113·26, for
exponentiation from *116·26, for subtraction from *119·61·62. Thus
(remembering also *100·511) in any definite type a formal number has
one definite meaning provided that any subordinate formal number which
occurs in its symbolism is determined existentially. The convention
directs us always to take this definite meaning for any
pure arithmetical formal number.
The convention does not determine completely the meaning of an
arithmetical formal number which is not pure. For example,
is a pure arithmetical formal number when
,
,
are determined in type; and convention
directs that the type of
is to be adequate. But
is an arithmetical formal
number which is not pure, and convention
directs that
the type of the domain of
is to be adequate, but does
not affect the type of
. Thus it is easy to see
that
secures the adequacy of the actual types of all
arithmetical components of any arithmetical formal numbers which
occur, but does not affect the actual type of a formal number which
occurs as the argument of an argumental formal number. But in this
case convention
will bind the actual type of this occurrence
of the argument to any logical or attributive occurrence of the same
formal number. For example, if
and
occur in the same form, then
these two occurrences of
must have the same actual
type. In practice argumental formal numbers are useful as components
of arithmetical formal numbers for the very purpose of avoiding the
automatic adjustment of types directed by
.
The meaning of is best explained by examples. Among our
previous examples we need only consider those in which arithmetical
formal numbers occur.
In *110·54 the convention or definitions direct us to determine the
types of and
adequately when
forming
, also to determine
and
adequately when forming
.
The convention does not apply to the types of
and
. These types must be identical
in order to secure meaning.
In *116·63 the convention directs us to adjust the types of
and
adequately; it does not
affect the types of
and
, which must be identical to secure meaning. If we
replace
,
,
by formal numbers, by 2,
, and 1 for example, we get "
."
The convention now directs that 1 is to be determined adequately. It
so happens that any type is adequate for it, since
can
be proved in any type. Then adequate types for
and
are types for which we can prove
and
. Thus if
is the
type of
in both cases, an adequate type for
is
, and for
is
.
In *117·108 we find arithmetical occurrences in arithmetical
inequalities. Thus directs us to take the first
two occurrences of
and the first[Pg xxvii] two of
with adequate actual types. The type of
and
in
is not affected by it. It is evident that the
conventions
,
are not sufficient to secure
the truth of this proposition as thus symbolized. It is essential
that in the equation the type be adjusted adequately for both formal
numbers. In fact the general arithmetical convention, that types
of equational as well as of arithmetical occurrences are adjusted
arithmetically, is here used.
V. Some Important Principles.
Principle of Arithmetical Substitution. In *120·53, the
application of needs a consideration of the whole
question of arithmetical substitution. Consider the first of the two
examples. We have
It is obvious that unless we can pass with practical immediateness
from "" to
"
" by *20·18, arithmetic
is made practically impossible by the theory of types. But a difficulty
arises from the application of
. Suppose we assign the
types of our real variables first. Then the types of
,
,
,
can be arbitrarily assigned, and
there is no necessary connection between them which arises from the
preservation of meaning. Thus
may be in a type which is
not an adequate type for
. Assume that this is
the case. But the equational use of
is in the
same type as
, and by
the arithmetical use
of
in
is in an
adequate type. Thus, on the face of it, the reasoning, appealing to
*20·18, by which the substitution was justified, is fallacious; for the
two occurrences of
in fact mean different things.
In order to generalize our solution of this difficulty it is convenient
to define the term "arithmetical equation." An arithmetical
equation is an equation between purely arithmetical formal numbers
whose actual types are both determined adequately. Then it is evident
that from "," where
and
are formal numbers and
occurs arithmetically in
,
we cannot infer
unless the equation
is arithmetical. For otherwise the
in the equation cannot be
identified with the
in
.
When we have "," where
is a formal
number and
is a number in a definite type, and wish to pass
to "
," or "
" and wish to pass
to "
," the occurrence of
in
being
arithmetical, the type of
may not be an adequate type for
. Accordingly the
in "
" cannot be
identified with the
in
. The type of the
in the equation ought to be freed from dependence on that of
.
Accordingly the transition is only legitimate when we can write instead
[Pg xxviii]
where in both cases the equation is arithmetical. For now all the
symbols are subject to the same rules.
If this modification can be made without altering the truth-value of the asserted propositions, the substitution is legitimate, otherwise it is not.
It is obvious that in the above our immediate passage is to or from
. But is easy to see that, the occurrence of
being arithmetical, we always have
In order to prove this, we have only to prove
The demonstration of the first of these propositions runs as follows:
In the above demonstration the step to (3) is legitimate since by the
hypothesis is a determination of
in an
adequate type.
Similar proofs hold for the other propositions, using *113·204 and *116·204 and *117·12 and *103·13.
We must also consider the circumstances under which we can pass from
"" to "
," where the latter equation
is arithmetical. In other words, using *65·01 we require the hypothesis
necessary for
We have
Now in (4) the occurrences of and
,
which are in the same type, may be chosen to be in any type we like.
Hence we deduce
[Pg xxix]
Hence is the requisite condition. Now since
can be in any type, we can also choose it in any existential
type for
. Thus with
applying to the
arithmetical occurrence of
in
, we have, where
is a formal number and
is a number in a definite
type,
In the last proposition by the equation
is arithmetical. These equations are summed up in *118·01.
These three fundamental theorems embody the principle of arithmetical
substitution. The hypothesis is really less than is
assumed in ordinary life, the usual tacit assumption being
. In fact unless
,
is necessarily false.
Principle of Identification of Types. Suppose we have proved
"" and "
,"
where
is a formal number
whose occurrence in "
" is
in an entirely ambiguous type, and
is the same formal
number
with its type related to that of
by *65·01.
Then since the type of the
in "
"
is ambiguous, we can write "
"
and thence infer "
."
The principle is: An entirely undetermined type in an asserted symbolic form can be identified with any type ambiguous or otherwise in any other asserted symbolic form or in the same symbolic form.
For example in *100·42 (demonstration) considered above, since
occurs, the first occurrences of
and
are of the same
type, and so are their second occurrences in
.
But the two types are not determined by our
conventions to have any necessary connection. In fact the type
in
is entirely arbitrary.
Accordingly it can be identified with the other type, and thus the
inference to the next line, viz. to "
,"
is justified.
In the case of arithmetical equations, it is important to notice that
we have
Hence if
and
are formal numbers,
Thus if we have "
"
and "
,"
we can infer from the former proposition
"
"
and from this and the latter proposition, we infer
"
,"
so the general principle of identification can be employed when the
in the first proposition is an arithmetical equation.
For example, in an example given above, *100·44 (demonstration),
viz.
[Pg xxx]
the equation
is arithmetical.
Accordingly we are justified in asserting the propositional function
where
in
"
" has all along been
presupposed by the necessity of meaning.
Thus the inference follows,
This proof loses its point when is looked on as a variable
with necessarily the same type throughout. For then the proposition
collapses into
But if be a formal number necessarily a member of
, the proposition is really
With this presupposition we should have in the first line of the
demonstration
though with "
" a single variable, the line is formally correct
as it stands in the text.
Recognition of Particular Cases. It is important to notice
the conditions under which can be recognized as a
particular case of
, where
is a real variable and
is a formal number. In the first place obviously we must
substitute
for
, wherever it occurs
in
, and thus obtain
.
Then we may find that by the application of our conventions, we can
replace this by
. For example we have
*100·42.
Now put for
, we obtain
Now by , even when
is a formal number, the
identity of types of the two occurrences of
is
equally secured in
Thus this is a particular case of *100·42. Such deductions can be made in general without any explicit formal statement.
[Pg xxxi]
Ambiguity of . It follows (cf. *100·02 and *103·02)
from the typical ambiguity of
that
is also typically ambiguous. Hence "
" according to our methods of interpretation would not
necessitate that
and
should be of the same type.
We shall always interpret "
" as standing
for "
" and therefore as not
necessarily identifying the types of
and
. Similarly for
,
, and
.
For example
*110·402.
Here the and
need not be of the same type. Again
*110·41.
Here the identification of the types of and
requires
the hypothesis "
."
VI. Conventions and
.
General Arithmetical Convention. Conventions and
are always applied, but the following convention is not
used at first. This convention limits the remaining ambiguity of type
by sweeping away the exceptional cases in low types, due to the failure
of existence theorems. The convention will be cited as
.
. All equations involving pure arithmetical formal
numbers are to be arithmetical.
We have seen that from an arithmetical equation the analogous equation
in any other type can be deduced. Thus with all
equations between formal numbers are so determined in type that their
truth in "any type" is deducible. Thus in the few early propositions
where
is introduced, the fact is noted by stating that
the equations hold "in any type." These propositions are *103·16,
*110·71·72.
The effect of applying to other propositions in *100
is to render some of the hypotheses (usually logical forms affirming
existence) unnecessary, but also materially to limit the scope of the
propositions. Take for example
*100·35.
If we apply to this, we can write
For the equational occurrences of and
are by
and
to be with
adequate actual types. But if
is a small class in a high
type, an adequate actual type for
will be a high
type, whereas
may hold in a low type.
Thus with
, for the sake of simplicity we abandon the
statement of the minimum of hypothesis necessary for our propositions.
The enunciation of no other proposition in *100 is affected.
The enunciation of no proposition in *101 is affected by ,
though it would unduly limit the scope of *101·34. In *110,
would unduly limit the scope of such propositions as
*110·22·23·24·25·251·252·3·31·32·331·34·35·351·44·51·54
and of many others, without altering their enunciations. There is no
proposition in *110 whose enunciation it would alter. is
already[Pg xxxii] applied to *110·71·72; if
is removed from these
propositions, then
must be added as an
hypothesis to both of them. The effect of
on *113 and
*116 is entirely analogous to that on *110; in neither of these two
numbers is there any proposition to which
is applied in
the text.
As regards *117, is applied throughout, so that
the propositions are all in the form suitable for subsequent
investigations in which the interest is purely arithmetical. It is
important however to analyse the effect of AT on the enunciations
for the sake of logical investigations, especially in connection
with *120. First,
can only affect propositions in
which equations or inequations occur, and among such propositions
it does not affect the enunciations of those in which both sides
of the equations are not formal numbers, so that the equations are
not arithmetical after the application of AT. These propositions
are *117·104·14·24·241·243·31·551. These propositions, which are
characterized by the presence of a single letter on one side of any
equation involved, can be recognized at a glance. The propositions
involving arithmetical equations whose enunciations are unaltered
by the removal of
are *117·21·54·592. Propositions
involving inequations whose enunciations are unaltered by the removal
of
are *117·26·27. Finally the only propositions of *117
whose enunciations are altered by the removal of
are
*117·108·211·23·25.
In *120, which is devoted to those properties of inductive cardinals
which are of logical interest, is never used. None of
the propositions *117·108·211·23·25·3 are cited in it, except *117·25
in the demonstration of *120·435 for a use where
is not
relevant. The application of AT to *120 would simplify the hypotheses
of *120·31·41·451·53·55, and limit the scopes of the propositions.
One other convention, which we will call "," is
required in certain propositions where the hypothesis implies that
there are types in which every inductive cardinal exists, i.e.
in which
is not an inductive class. Among such hypotheses
are
,
,
(or typically definite forms of these hypotheses), or
or
. When such hypotheses
occur, we shall assume that
induct is, whenever
significance permits, to be determined in a type in which every
inductive cardinal exists, i.e. in which the axiom of infinity
holds (cf. *120·03·04). The statement of this convention is as follows:
. When the hypothesis of a proposition implies
that there is a type in which every inductive cardinal exists, every
occurrence of "
" in this proposition is to
be taken (if conditions of significance permit) in a sufficiently high
type to insure the existence of every inductive cardinal.
It is to be observed that this convention would be unnecessary if we confined ourselves to one extensional hierarchy, for in any one such hierarchy[Pg xxxiii] all types are inductive or all are non-inductive, so that if every inductive cardinal exists in one type in the hierarchy, the same holds for any other type in the hierarchy. But when we no longer confine ourselves to one extensional hierarchy, this result may not follow. For example, it may be the case that the number of individuals is inductive, but the number of predicative functions of individuals is not inductive; at any rate, no logical reason can be given against this possibility, which can only be rejected on empirical grounds, if at all.
The way in which this convention is used may be illustrated by the
demonstration of *122·33. In the second line of this demonstration, we
show that the hypothesis implies
It will be seen that these definitions do not suffice to determine
the type of
. Hence in (1), the
on the left may not
be of the same type as the
on the right. Now the use
of *122·473, which occurs in the next line of the demonstration of
*122·33, requires that the
on the left and the
on the right should be of the same type. This requires that the
should not be taken in a type in which we have
. Hence in order to apply
*120·473, we must choose a type in which all inductive cardinals
exist. Since "
" occurs in the hypothesis, we know
that all inductive cardinals exist in the type of
. But it is
unnecessary to restrict ourselves to the type of
, since any
other type in which all inductive cardinals exist will equally secure
the validity of the demonstration. Thus the convention
secures the restriction required, and no more.
The convention is often relevant when "
"
without any typical determination occurs in the hypothesis.
Whenever this is the case, if "
" occurs in the
proposition in a way which leaves its type undetermined so far as
conditions of significance are concerned, it is to be taken in a type
in which all its members exist.
VII. Final Working Rule in Arithmetic.
It is now (whenever is used, together with
when necessary) possible finally to sweep aside all consideration
of types in connection with inductive numbers. For by combining
*126·121 *126·122 and *120·4232·4622, we see that it is always possible to
take the type high enough so that no definitely determined inductive
number shall be null (
, and that all the inductive
reasoning can take place within this type. Furthermore we have already
seen that the arithmetical operations are independent of the types
of the components, so long as they are existential. Thus, as far as
the ordinary[Pg xxxiv] arithmetic of finite numbers is concerned, all the
conventions (including AT), and the necessity for hypotheses as to the
existence of inductive numbers, are finally superseded by the following
single rule:
Rule of Indefinite Numbers. The type assigned to any symbol
which represents an inductive number is such that the symbol is not
equal to .
We make the definition
*126·01.
Wherever this symbol "" for the class of "indefinite
inductive cardinal numbers" is used, the above rule is adhered to.
In other words, "
" can always be replaced
by "
," where
is a homogeneous or ascending cardinal, and
is the appropriate constant, or is a variable, as the case
may be. In the latter case, a symbolic form such as
can be replaced by
Furthermore by *120·4622 it follows that with this rule the result of
proceeding by induction in one type and then transforming to another
type is the same as that of proceeding by induction in the latter type.
Thus for example there is no advantage to be gained by discriminating
between and
; for
,
,
,
,
,
,
and
, and so on.
[Pg 1]
Hence all discrimination of the types of indefinite inductive numbers may be dropped; and the types are entirely indefinite and irrelevant.
[1] But cf. next page for a more exact statement of this principle.
[Pg 3]
SUMMARY OF PART III.
IN this Part, we shall be concerned, first, with the definition and general logical properties of cardinal numbers (Section A); then with the operations of addition, multiplication and exponentiation, of which the definitions and formal laws do not require any restriction to finite numbers (Section B); then with the theory of finite and infinite, which is rendered somewhat complicated by the fact that there are two different senses of "finite," which cannot (so far as is known) be identified without assuming the multiplicative axiom. The theory of finite and infinite will be resumed, in connection with series, in Part V, Section E.
It is in this Part that the theory of types first becomes practically relevant. It will be found that contradictions concerning the maximum cardinal are solved by this theory. We have therefore devoted our first section in this Part (with the exception of two numbers giving the most elementary properties of cardinals in general, and of 0 and 1 and 2, respectively) to the application of types to cardinals. Every cardinal is typically ambiguous, and we confer typical definiteness by the notations of *63, *64, and *65. It is especially where existence-theorems are concerned that the theory of types is essential. The chief importance of the propositions of the present part lies, not only, as throughout the book, in the hypotheses necessary to secure the conclusions, but also in the typical ambiguity which can be allowed to the symbols consistently with the truth of the propositions in all the cases thereby included.
[Pg 4]
Summary of Section A.
The Cardinal Number of a class , which we will denote by
"
," is defined as the class of all classes similar
to
, i.e. as
.
This definition is due to Frege, and was first published in his
Grundlagen der Arithmetik[2]; its symbolic expression and use
are to be found in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik[3]. The chief
merits of this definition are (1) that the formal properties which
we expect cardinal numbers to have result from it; (2) that unless
we adopt this definition or some more complicated and practically
equivalent definition, it is necessary to regard the cardinal number of
a class as an indefinable. Hence the above definition avoids a useless
indefinable with its attendant primitive propositions.
It will be observed that, if is any object, 1 is not the cardinal
number of
, but that of
. This obviates a confusion
which otherwise is liable to arise in dealing with classes. Suppose we
have a class
consisting of many terms; we say, nevertheless,
that it is one class. Thus it seems to be at once one and many.
But in fact it is
that is many, and
that is
one. In regard to zero, the analogous point is still clearer. Suppose
we say "there are no Kings of France." This is equivalent to "the class
of Kings of France has no members," or, in our language, "the class
of Kings of France is a member of the class 0." It is obvious that we
cannot say "the King of France is a member of the class 0," because
there is no King of France. Thus in the case of 0 and 1, as more
evidently in all other cases, a cardinal number appertains to a class,
not to the members of the class.
For the purposes of formal definition, we subject the formula
to some simplification. It will be seen that, according to this
formula, "
" is a relation, namely the relation of a
cardinal number to any class of which it is the number. Thus for
example 1 has to
the relation
; so has[Pg 5] 2
to
, provided
. The relation
is, in fact, the relation
;
for
. Hence for formal purposes of definition we put
The class of cardinal numbers is the class of objects which are the
cardinal numbers of something or other, i.e. of objects which,
for some , are equal to
. We call the
class of cardinal numbers
; thus we have
For purposes of formal definition, we replace this by the simpler
formula
In the present section, we shall be concerned with what we may call the
purely logical properties of cardinal numbers, namely those which do
not depend upon the arithmetical operations of addition, multiplication
and exponentiation, nor upon the distinction of finite and infinite[4].
The chief point to be dealt with, as regards both importance and
difficulty, is the relation of a cardinal number in one type to the
same or an associated cardinal number in another type. When a symbol is
ambiguous as to type, we will call it typically ambiguous; when,
either always or in a given context, it is unambiguous as to type, we
will call it typically definite. Now the symbol ""
is typically ambiguous; the only limitation on its type is that its
domain and converse domain must both consist of classes. When we have
,
and
need not be of the
same type, in fact, in any type of classes, there are classes similar
to some of the classes of any other type of classes. For example, we
have
, whatever types
and
may belong to. This ambiguity of "
" is derived from that
of
, which in turn is derived from that of 1. We
denote (cf. *65·01) by "
" all the unit classes which
are of the same type as
. Then (according to the definition
*70·01)
will be the class of
those one-one relations whose domain is of the same type as
and whose converse domain is of the same type as
. Thus
"
" is typically definite as soon
as
and
are given. Suppose now, instead of having
merely
, we have
then we know not only that
, but also that
belongs to the same type as
, and
belongs to the same type as
. When the ambiguous symbol
"
" is rendered typically definite by having its domain
defined as being of the same type as
, and its converse
domain defined as being of the same type as
, we write it
"
," because generally, in accordance
with *65·1, if
is a typically ambiguous relation, we write
[Pg 6]
for the typically definite relation that
results when the domain of
is to consist of terms of the same
type as
, and the converse domain is to consist of terms of
the same type as
. Thus we have
Here everything is typically definite if
and
(or
their types) are given.
Passing now to the relation "," it will be seen that
it shares the typical ambiguity of "
." In order to
render it typically definite, we must derive it from a typically
definite "
." So long as nothing is added to give typical
definiteness, "
" will mean all the classes
belonging to some one (unspecified) type and similar to
. If
is a member of the type to which these classes are to belong,
then
is contained in the type of
. For
this case, it is convenient to introduce the following two notations,
already defined in *65. When a typically ambiguous relation
is to
be rendered typically definite as to its domain only, by deciding that
every member of the domain is to be contained in the type of
, we write "
" in place of
. When we further
wish to determine
as having members of the converse domain
contained in the type of
, we write "
" in
place of
; and when we wish members of the converse domain to be
members of the type of
, we write "
"
in place of
. Thus
(cf. *65·2), and in particular, since
,
Thus "
" is only significant when
is of the same type as
, and then it means "classes
of the same type as
and similar to
(which is of
the same type as
)."
"" will mean "classes of the same type as
and similar to
." As soon as the types of
and
are known, this is a typically definite symbol, being
in fact equal to
. Hence so
long as we only wish to consider "
," typical
definiteness is secured by writing "
" in place of
"
."
When we come to the consideration of ,
"
" is no longer a sufficient determination,
although it suffices to determine the type. Suppose we put
we have also, in virtue of the definitions in *65,
Thus
is definite as to type, but is the domain of
a relation whose converse domain is ambiguous as to type; and it will
appear that there are some propositions about
whose truth or falsehood depends upon the determination chosen
for the converse domain of
. Hence if we
wish to have a symbol which is completely definite, we must write
[Pg 7]"
."
This point is important in connection with the contradictions as to the maximum cardinal. The following remarks will illustrate it further.
Cantor has shown that, if is any class, no class contained
in
is similar to
. Hence in particular
if
is a type, no class contained in
is similar
to
, which is the next type above
.
Consequently, if
, where
is
any class, we have
Now (cf. *63) we put
and we have
. Thus we
find
That is to say, no class of the same type as
has as many
members as
has. Hence also
and "
" is only significant when
; hence
Now the notation "" will apply with
equal justice to
or to
; but we have just seen that in the
first case we shall have
,
and in the second we shall have
.
Consequently "
" has not sufficient definiteness
to prevent practically important differences between the various
determinations of which it is capable.
A converse procedure to the above yields similar results. Let
be a class of classes; then
is of lower type
than
. Let us consider
. In
accordance with *63, we write
for the type containing
, i.e. for
. Then
the greatest number in the class
will be
; but neither this nor
any lesser member of the class will be equal to
, because, as before,
Hence
, which is a member
of
, is not a member of
; but
and
have an equal right to be called
. Hence again "
" is a symbol
not sufficiently definite for many of our purposes.
The solution of the paradox concerning the maximum cardinal is evident
in view of what has been said. This paradox is as follows: It results
from a theorem of Cantor's that there is no maximum cardinal, since,
for all values of ,
[Pg 8]
But at first sight it would seem that the class which contains
everything must be the greatest possible class, and must therefore
contain the greatest possible number of terms. We have seen, however,
that a class
must always be contained within some one type;
hence all that is proved is that there are greater classes in the next
type, which is that of
. Since there is always a
next higher type, we thus have a maximum cardinal in each type, without
having any absolutely maximum cardinal. The maximum cardinal in the
type of
is
But if we take the corresponding cardinal in the next type, i.e.
this is not as great as
,
and is therefore not the maximum cardinal of its
type. This gives the complete solution of the paradox.
For most purposes, what we wish to know in order to have a sufficient
amount of typical definiteness is not the absolute types of
and
, as above, but merely what we may call their
relative types. Thus, for example,
and
may be of the same type; in that case,
and
are respectively equal to
and
.
We will call cardinals which, for some
, are members
of the class
, homogeneous
cardinals, because the "
" from which they are derived
is a homogeneous relation. We shall denote the homogeneous cardinal
of
by "
," and we shall
denote the class of homogeneous cardinals (in an unspecified type) by
"
"; thus we put
Almost all the properties of
are the same
in different types. When further typical definiteness is required,
it can be secured by writing
,
in place of
,
. For although
and
were not wholly definite,
and
are wholly definite. Apart from the fact of being of different
types, the only property in which
and
differ when
and
are of different types is in regard to the magnitude
of the cardinals belonging to them. Thus suppose the whole
universe consisted (as monists aver) of a single individual. Let
us call the type of this individual "
." Then
will consist of 0 and 1,
i.e.
But in the next higher type, there will be two members, namely
and
. Thus
[Pg 9]
the members of
being
,
,
; and so on. (The greatest
cardinal in any except the lowest type is always a power of 2.)
The maximum of is
; but apart from this difference
of maximum and its consequences,
and
do not differ in any important
properties. Hence for most purposes
and
have as much typical definiteness as is
necessary.
Among cardinals which are not homogeneous we shall consider three
kinds. The first of these we shall call ascending cardinals. A
cardinal is called an ascending
cardinal if the type of
is
or
or
or etc. We write
for
,
for
, and so on. We put
We then have obviously
We also have (by what was said earlier)
The members of
will be all cardinals which exceed
but do not exceed
.
Let us recur in illustration to our previous hypothesis
of the universe consisting of a single individual. Then
will consist of those classes
which are similar to "
" but of the next higher type.
These are
and
. In our case
we had
. This leads to
or, introducing typical definiteness,
We have then
.
Also
And in the case supposed,
is the maximum of
, but
.
Hence
Generalizing, we see that
consists of the same numbers as
each raised one degree in type. Similar propositions
hold of
,
[Pg 10]
etc.
It is often useful to have a notation for what we may call "the same
cardinal in another type." Suppose is a typically definite
cardinal; then we will denote by
the same cardinal in
the next type, i.e.
Note that, if
is a cardinal,
;
and whether
is a typically definite cardinal or not,
is a cardinal in a definite type. If
is typically definite,
then
is wholly definite; if
is typically ambiguous,
has the same
kind of indefiniteness as belongs to
. The most
important case is when
is typically definite and
has
an assigned relation of type to
. We then put, as observed above,
If
is an
,
is an
and
is an
and so on.
will consist of all numbers which are of the form
for
some
which is a member of
;
i.e.
The second kind of non-homogeneous cardinals to be considered is called
the class of "descending cardinals." These are such as go into a lower
type; i.e. is a descending cardinal
if
is of a lower type than
. We put
We have obviously .
Hence .
Also ,
whence
,
whence
.
Since also , we find
this proposition not requiring any further typical definiteness, since
it holds however such definiteness may be introduced, remembering
that such definiteness is necessarily so introduced as to secure
significance. Further, in virtue of the fact that no class contained in
is similar to
, we have
[Pg 11]
Consequently
.
We can prove in just the same way
and this result can obviously be extended to all descending cardinals.
The third kind of non-homogeneous cardinals to be considered may be
called "relational cardinals." They are those applicable to classes of
relations having a given relation of type to a given class. Consider
for example . (We shall take this
as the definition of the product of the numbers of the members of
.) Suppose now that
consists of a single term: we
want to be able to say
We have in this case, if
,
and we know that
. But if
we put simply
our proposition, though not mistaken, requires care in interpretation.
Just as we put
,
so we want a notation giving typical definiteness to the proposition
. This is provided
as follows.
Using the notation of *64, put
Then we have, for example,
Hence
,
where
.
Similarly .
Thus the above definitions give us what is required.
In order to complete our notation for types, we should need to be able
to express the type of the domain or converse domain of , or of
any relation whose domain and converse domain have respectively given
relations of type to the domain and converse domain of
. Thus we
might put
("b" appears here as "d" written backwards)
[Pg 12]
This notation would enable us to deal with descending relational cardinals. But it is not required in the present work, and is therefore not introduced among the numbered propositions.
When a typically ambiguous symbol, such as "" or
"
," occurs more than once in a given context, it must not
be assumed, unless required by the conditions of significance, that
it is to receive the same typical determination in each case. Thus
e.g. we shall write "
,"
although, if
and
are of different types, the two
symbols "
" must receive different typical determinations.
Formulae which are typically ambiguous, or only partially definite as
to type, must not be admitted unless every significant interpretation
is true. Thus for example we may admit
because here "
" must mean "
," so that the only ambiguity remaining is as to the type of
, and the formula holds whatever type
may belong
to, provided "
" is significant, i.e.
provided
is a class. But we must not, from "
,"
allow ourselves to infer
For here the conditions of significance no longer demand that
"
" should mean "
": it
might just as well mean "
." And as we
saw, if
is a lower type than
, and
is
sufficiently large of its type, we may have
so that "
" is not admissible without
qualification. Nevertheless, as we shall see in *100, there are a
certain number of propositions to be made about a wholly ambiguous
or
.
[2] Breslau, 1884. Cf. especially pp. 79, 80.
[3] Jena, Vol. I. 1893, Vol. II. 1903. Cf. Vol. I. §§ 40-42, pp. 57, 58. The grounds in favour of this definition will be found at length in Principles of Mathematics, Part II.
[4] The definitions of the arithmetical operations, and of finite and infinite, are really just as purely logical as what precedes them; but if we are to draw a line between logic and arithmetic somewhere, the arithmetical operations seem the natural point at which to place the beginning of arithmetic.
Summary of *100.
In this number we shall be concerned only with such immediate consequences of the definition of cardinal numbers as do not require typical definiteness, beyond what the inherent conditions of significance may bestow. We introduce here the fundamental definitions:
The definition "" is required chiefly for the sake of the
descriptive function
. We have
This may be stated in various equivalent forms, which are given at the
beginning of this number (*100·1—·16). After a few propositions on
as a relation, we proceed to the elementary properties of
. We have
*100·3.
*100·31.
*100·321.
*100·33.
We proceed next to the elementary properties of . We have
*100·4.
*100·42.
*100·45.
*100·51.
Observe that when we have such a hypothesis as ","
the
, though it may be of any type, must be of some type;
hence the
cannot have the typical ambiguity which belongs
to
. If we put
, this
will hold only in the type of
; but "
" is
a typically ambiguous symbol, which[Pg 14] will represent in any type the
"same" number as
. Thus "
"
is an equation which is applicable to all possible typical
determinations of "
" and "
."
*100·52.
The hypothesis is unnecessary, but we cannot prove
this till later (*102).
We end the number with some propositions (*100·6—·64) stating that
various classes (such as ), which have already been
proved to be similar to
, have
members.
*100·01.
*100·02.
*100·1.
*100·11.
*100·12.
*100·13.
Dem.
*100·14.
*100·15.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 15]
*100·21.
Dem.
*100·22.
Note that it is fallacious to infer , for
reasons explained in the introduction to the present section.
*100·31.
*100·32.
Dem.
Note that
is not always true. We might be tempted to prove it as follows:
But the use of *10·1 here is only legitimate when the ""
concerned is a homogeneous relation. If
,
are descending cardinals, we may have
without having
.
Dem.
Note that we do not always have
For if the concerned is a descending
, and
and
are sufficiently great,
and
may both be
. For example, we have
But ,
so that
[Pg 16]
Thus "" is not always true when it is
significant.
Dem.
Thus the only case in which the implications in *100·321·33·34 cannot
be turned into equivalences is the case in which
and
are both
.
*100·36.
Dem.
*100·43.
Dem.
*100·45.
*100·5.
Dem.
[Pg 17]
*100·51.
Dem.
Here the last "" may be of a different type from the
others: the proposition holds however its type is determined.
Dem.
This proposition still holds when , but the proof is
more difficult, since it depends upon the proof that every null-class
of classes is an
, which in turn depends upon the proof
that
is not similar to
or to any class
contained in
.
Dem.
*100·53.
Dem.
[Pg 18]
*100·61.
*100·62.
*100·621.
*100·63.
*100·631.
Dem.
[Pg 19]
Summary of *101.
In the present number, we have to show that 0 and 1 and 2 as previously
defined are cardinal numbers in the sense defined in *100, and to add a
few elementary propositions to those already given concerning them. We
prove (*101·12·241) that 0 and 1 are not null, which cannot be proved,
with our axioms, for any other cardinal, except (in the case of finite
cardinals) when the type is specified as a sufficiently high one. Thus
we prove (*101·42·43) that and
exist; this follows from
and
.
We prove (*101·22·34) that 0 and 1 and 2 are all different from
each other. We prove (*101·15·28) that
and
, but we cannot prove
unless
we assume the existence of at least two individuals, or define the
first 2 in "
" as a 2 of some type other than
, where "
" stands for the type of
individuals.
It should be observed that, since 0 and 1 and 2 are typically
ambiguous, their properties are analogous to those of
"" rather than to those of
, where
.
For example, we have
*100·511.
but we shall not have
unless the "
" concerned is homogeneous, since in other
cases the symbols do not express a significant proposition. But in
*100·511 we may substitute 0 or 1 or 2, and the proposition remains
significant and true. In fact we have (*101·1·2·31)
where 0 and 1 and 2 have an ambiguity corresponding to that of
"
."
*101·13.
[Pg 20]
*101·14.
Dem.
Dem.
*101·16.
Dem.
*101·17.
Dem.
Dem.
*101·23.
Dem.
[Pg 21]
*101·24.
Dem.
*101·25.
Dem.
*101·26.
Dem.
*101·27.
Dem.
Dem.
*101·29.
Dem.
[Pg 22]
Dem.
*101·301.
In comparing *101·31 with *101·1·2·3, it should be observed that
and
are both classes, whereas in *101·1·2·3
there was no typical limitation beyond what was imposed by the
conditions of significance.
Dem.
*101·33.
Dem.
*101·35.
*101·36.
Dem.
[Pg 23]
*101·37.
Dem.
*101·4.
Dem.
When we are considering the lowest type occurring in a context, our
premisses do not suffice to prove . For every
other type, this can be proved. Thus
and
give the required result for
classes and relations respectively.
*101·41.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 24]
Summary of *102.
In this number, we shall consider a typically definite relation
"," i.e. we shall consider the relation, to a
class
which is given as of the same type as
, of
the class
of those classes
which are similar to
and of the same type as
. We shall then put
and the class of all such numbers as
for a given
and
we shall call
, so that
The notations here introduced for giving typical definiteness to
"" and "
" are those defined in *65 for any
typically ambiguous relation.
By *63·01·02 we have, if is a typically ambiguous symbol,
Thus . If we apply the
definitions to 1, "
" is meaningless unless
is a class;
we therefore write a Greek letter in place of
, and we have
If , we shall have
. Hence
The converse implication also holds, so that
Thus consists of all unit classes whose sole members
either are or are not members of
, i.e. for which
"
" is significant.
In "," the
hypothesis renders explicit the condition of significance; thus
"
" is always true when significant, and
always significant when
. On the interpretation of
negative statements concerning types, see the note at the end of this
number.
It should be noted that all the constant relations introduced in this
work are typically ambiguous. Consider e.g. ,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
. These[Pg 25] all have more or
less typical ambiguity, though all of them have what we will call
relative typical definiteness, i.e. when the type
of the relatum is given, that of the referent is given also. (In
regard to
, it is not true that, conversely, when the
type of the referent is given, that of the relatum is also given.)
But "
" and "
" have not even relative
definiteness. When the type of the relatum is given, that of the
referent becomes no more definite than before; the only restrictions
are that the relatum for "
" or "
" must be
a class, that the referent for "
" must be a class, and
that the referent for "
" must be a class of classes. When
a relation
has relative definiteness, it is enough to fix the
type of the relatum; and if further
,
so that
leads to a descriptive function, "
" has complete
typical definiteness as soon as the type of
is given. Now
the constant relations hitherto introduced, with the exception of
"
" and "
," have all been one-many
relations, and have been used almost exclusively in the form of
descriptive functions. Hence no special notation has been required to
give typical definiteness, since "
" in these circumstances,
has typical definiteness as soon as
is assigned. But with the
consideration of "
" and "
," which do not
have even relative definiteness, an explicit means of giving typical
definiteness becomes necessary. It should be observed, however, that
"
" has typical definiteness, when
is
known, as soon as the domain of "
" has typical
definiteness, since
must belong to the converse domain.
It is for the sake of this and similar cases that we introduced the
two definitions in *65, which only give typical definiteness to the
domain.
In virtue of the definitions in *65, if is a typically ambiguous
relation, and
is a referent,
becomes
; if,
further,
is a relatum,
becomes
. If
is a
referent for
, we have
,
and
. Thus
has a member of the type next above
that of
, i.e. of the type of
. Thus
as was proved in *65. Hence in particular
It is chiefly for this reason that it is worth while to introduce the
definition of .
We have, in virtue of the above, as will be proved in *102·46,
With regard to "," which is to be interpreted by
*65·04, some caution is necessary. This will mean some one of
those typically different relations called "
" which have
their domains composed of terms of the same type as
. But
it will not mean the logical sum of all such relations, because these
relations are of different types according as their converse[Pg 26] domains
differ in type, and therefore their logical sum is meaningless. Thus
for example if the type of
is lower than or equal to that of
, we shall have
whence, if "
" has its converse domain composed of
terms of the same type as
,
But if
is of higher type than
, we shall find
Thus "
" is indeterminate in a way that makes a
practical difference.
Exactly similar remarks apply to . We have
thus "
" shares the ambiguity of
"
." The question whether
depends upon the decision of this ambiguity. The
difficulty is that "
" stands for the domain of
any one determination of "
" which has its domain composed
of objects of the type of
; but it is the domain
of only one such determination of "
," because
different determinations are of different types, and therefore cannot
be taken together, even when their domains are all of the same type.
In consequence of this ambiguity, "
" is a symbol
which is as a rule better avoided, and "
" is
not often useful except as a descriptive function, in which case the
relatum supplies the requisite typical definiteness.
The peculiarity of "" is that it is
typically definite, and yet is capable of different meanings:
it is not wholly definite, being defined as the domain of a
relation whose converse domain is typically ambiguous. It results
that we cannot profitably make "
" half-definite, as
"
" does, but must make it completely definite,
as we do by taking
. For this
we adopt the notation
. We cannot adopt
the notation
, because that would
conflict with *65·11, nor
, because that
would conflict with *65·01, nor
, for
the same reason. But
has no previously
defined meaning. We may if we like regard "
" as
. Then the required
meaning of "
" would result from *65·04. But
as "
" so defined is not required, it is simpler to
regard "
" as a single symbol. We therefore
put
*102·01.
The present number begins with various propositions (*102·2—·27)
on a typically definite relation of similarity, i.e.
. We then have a set of propositions
(*102·3-·46) on "
." This is only
significant if
and
are of the same type; it then
denotes the class of those classes which are similar to
and
of the same type as
. We then have a set of propositions
(*102·5-·64) on
, i.e. on cardinals
consisting of classes of the same type as
which are similar
to classes of the same type as
. We next prove[Pg 27] (*102·71—·75)
that no sub-class of \alpha is similar to
, and
therefore (substituting
for
) no class of
the same type as
is similar to
, and therefore
*102*74.
This proves that is a cardinal, which is a proposition
constantly required. The remaining propositions of *102 are concerned
with
where
is a typically definite cardinal.
The most useful propositions in this number (apart from *102·74) are
*102·3.
*102·46.
*102·5.
*102·6.
*102·72.
This is used in proving ,
which is the proposition from which Cantor deduced that there is
no greatest cardinal. (If
,
,
and thus there is a rise of type.)
*102·84.
*102·85.
*102·01.
*102·11.
Here, if is a real variable, the conditions of significance
require
. But if
is a typically ambiguous
constant, such as
or
or
,
is a typically definite constant. It is chiefly for such
cases that propositions such as the above are useful.
Dem.
*102·13.
*102·21.
[Pg 28]
*102·22.
102·23.
*102·24.
Dem.
*102·25.
*102·26.
Dem.
Dem.
*102·31.
Dem.
[Pg 29]
*102·32.
Dem.
*102·34.
*102·35.
*102·36.
This proposition is true whenever it is significant, and is significant
whenever . When
belongs to some other
type, the above proposition is not significant.
*102·361.
*102·37.
Dem.
*102·4.
*102·41.
*102·42.
*102·43.
This inference is legitimate because, when is given,
"
" is typically definite. The
inference from "
" (which is true) to
"
" is not valid, because "
"
may hold only for some of the possible
determinations of the ambiguity of "
."
*102·44.
Dem.
[Pg 30]
*102·45.
Dem.
In using propositions, such as those of *100, in which we have a
typically ambiguous "" or "
," any significant
typical definiteness may be added, since, when a typically ambiguous
proposition is asserted, that includes the assertion of every possible
proposition resulting from determining the ambiguity.
*102·501.
*102·51.
Dem.
*102·52.
*102·53.
Dem.
*102·54.
*102·541.
Dem.
[Pg 31]
*102·55.
Dem.
The above proposition shows that, if every class of the same type as
is similar to some class of the same type as
,
then, given a class
of the same type as
, there
is a class
, of the same type as
, such that the
classes similar to
and of the same type as
are
the same as the classes similar to
and of the same type
as
; and conversely, given any class
, of the
same type as
, and similar to some class of the same type
as
, then there is a class
, of the same type
as
, such that the classes similar to
and of
the same type as
are the same as the classes similar to
and of the same type as
. We may express this by
saying that, if the cardinals which go from the type of
to the type of
are never null, then those that go from the
type of
to the type of
, with the exception of
(if
is one of them), are the same as those
that begin and end within the type of
. The latter are
what we call "homogeneous" cardinals. Thus our proposition is a step
towards reducing the general study of cardinals to that of homogeneous
cardinals.
*102·6.
Dem.
*102·61.
Dem.
[Pg 32]
*102·62.
Dem.
*102·63.
Dem.
The following propositions are part of Cantor's proof that there
is no greatest cardinal. They are inserted here in order to enable
us to prove that is a cardinal, namely what we call
a "descending" cardinal, i.e. one whose corresponding
"
" goes from a higher to a lower type.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 33]
Dem.
This proposition proves that no class of the same type as
is similar to
. Now
is the greatest class
of its type; thus there are classes of the type next above that of
which are too great to be similar to any class of the type
of
. Thus (as will be explicitly proved later) the maximum
cardinal in one type is less than that in the next higher type.
Cantor's proposition that there is no maximum cardinal only holds when
we are allowed to rise to continually higher types: in each type, there
is a maximum for that type, namely the number of members of the type.
Dem.
Dem.
*102·8.
Dem.
*102·81.
Dem.
[Pg 34]
*102·82.
*102·83.
Dem.
*102·84.
Dem.
*102·85.
*102·86.
Dem.
*102·861.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 35]
*102·863.
Dem.
Dem.
Note on negative statements concerning types. Statements
such as "" or "
"
are always false when they are significant. Hence when an object
belongs to one type, there is no significant way of expressing what
we mean when we say that it does not belong to some other type. The
reason is that, when, for example,
and
are said to be different, the statement is only significant if
interpreted as applying to the symbols, i.e. as meaning to
deny that the two symbols denote the same class. We cannot assert
that they denote different classes, since "
"
is not significant, but we can deny that they denote
the same class. Owing to this peculiarity, propositions dealing
with types acquire their importance largely from the fact that they
can be interpreted as dealing with the symbols rather than directly
with the objects denoted by the symbols. Another reason for the
importance of typically definite propositions is that, when they
are implications of which the hypothesis can be asserted, they can
be used for inference, i.e. for the assertion of the
conclusion. Where typically ambiguous symbols occur in implications,
on the contrary, the conditions of significance may be different
for the hypothesis and the conclusion, so that fallacies may arise
from the use of such implications in inference. E.g. it is
a fallacy to infer "
" from
the (true) propositions "
"
and "
." (The truth of the first
of these two requires that "
" should receive the
same typical determination in both its occurrences.) For these two
reasons hypothetical concerning types are often useful, in spite of the
fact that their hypotheses are always true when they are significant.
[Pg 36]
Summary of *103.
In this number, we shall consider cardinals generated by a
homogeneous relation of similarity. A "homogeneous" cardinal is
to mean all the classes similar to some class and
of the same type as
. The "homogeneous cardinal of
" will be defined as
;
we shall denote it by "
."
Then the class of homogeneous cardinals is the class of
all such cardinals as "
,"
i.e. it is
; this
we shall denote by "
." The symbol
"
" is typically definite as soon
as
is assigned; "
," on the
contrary, is typically ambiguous: it must be a
, but
otherwise its type may vary indefinitely. Homogeneous cardinals have,
however, many properties which do not require that the ambiguity of
"
" should be determined, and few which do
require this. They are important also as being the simplest kind of
cardinals, and as being a kind to which other kinds can usually be
reduced.
The chief advantage of homogeneous cardinals is that they are never
null (*103·13·22). This enables us to avoid by their means the explicit
exclusion of exceptional cases; thus throughout Section B we shall use
homogeneous cardinals in defining the arithmetical operations: the
arithmetical sum of and
, for
example, will be defined by means of
and
, in order to exclude such a
determination of the typical ambiguity of
and
as would make either of them null. It is true that
not only homogeneous cardinals, but also ascending cardinals (cf.
*104), are never null. But homogeneous cardinals are much the simplest
kind of cardinals that are never null, and are therefore the most
convenient.
The fact that no homogeneous cardinal is null is derived from
*103·12.
Other important propositions in this number are the following:
*103·2.
*103·26.
The above proposition is used constantly.
[Pg 37]
*103·27.
Thus to say that is the homogeneous cardinal of
is
equivalent to saying that
is a cardinal of which
is
a member.
*103·301.
*103·34.
*103·4.
*103·41.
*103·01.
*103·1.
*103·11.
This is a legitimate inference from *103·12 because, when is
given,
is typically definite.
*103·14.
Dem.
*103·15.
Dem.
[Pg 38]
In this proposition, the equation ""
must be supposed to hold in any type for which
it is significant. Otherwise, we might find a type for which
, without having
.
Dem.
*103·2.
*103·21.
In adducing a proposition, such as *100·2, which is concerned with an
"" entirely undetermined in type, any degree of typical
determination may be added to our "
," since an asserted
proposition containing an ambiguous "
" is only legitimate
if it is true for every possible determination of the ambiguity.
*103·23.
*103·24.
*103·25.
*103·26.
Dem.
*103·27.
Dem.
*103·28.
Dem.
[Pg 39]
*103·3.
Dem.
*103·301.
Note that although "" is not definite,
"
" is absolutely definite as soon as
is assigned.
Dem.
*103·31.
Dem.
*103·32.
Dem.
In the above proposition, the "" may be omitted, and we may
write (cf. *103·33, below)
For the is wholly arbitrary, so that any possible
determination of
makes the above proposition
true. We may proceed a step further, and write (*103·34, below)
[Pg 40]
But although we also have ,
provided the "
" on the right is suitably determined,
we do not have this always. For example, if "
"
is determined as
, and
"
" as
, then
.
Dem.
Dem.
Thus every cardinal except is a homogeneous cardinal
in the appropriate type. Note that although of course every
homogeneous cardinal is a cardinal, yet "
"
must not be asserted, because it is possible
to determine the ambiguity of "
" in such a way as to
make this false. Hence we do not get
.
*103·35.
The hypothesis of this proposition is satisfied, as will appear later,
if the type of is in what we may call the direct ascent from
that of
, i.e. if it can be reached from
by
a finite number of steps each of which takes us from a type
to either
or
.
Thus in such a case the cardinals (other than
) which go
from
to
are the same as those which begin
and end within
. It will also appear that in such a case
always is a member of
.
If two cardinals which are not equal must always be one greater
and the other less, then
is
the condition for
. In that case, we shall have
. But
there is no known proof that of two different cardinals one must be the
greater, except by assuming the multiplicative axiom and proving thence
(by Zermelo's theorem) that every class can be well-ordered (cf. *258).
*103·4.
Dem.
*103·41.
Dem.
[Pg 41]
*103·42.
Dem.
Dem.
*103·44.
Dem.
*103.5.
Dem.
*103·51.
Dem.
0 and 1 are the only cardinals of which the above property can be
proved universally with our assumptions. If (as is possible so far as
our assumptions go) the lowest type is a unit class, we shall have in
that type (though in no other) , so that in that
type
.
[Pg 42]
Summary of *104.
In this number we have to consider cardinals derived from a relation
of similarity which goes from the type of to that of
, or to that of
. The propositions to
be proved can be extended, by a mere repetition of the proofs, to
,
, etc. This extension must, however,
be made afresh in each instance; we cannot prove that it can be made
generally, because mathematical induction cannot be applied to the
series
Ascending cardinals, though less important than homogeneous
cardinals, yet have considerable importance in arithmetic, because
and
are defined as the cardinals of classes of higher types than those of
and
, and the same applies to the product of the
cardinals of members of a class of classes. In these cases, however, we
also need cardinals of relational types, which will be dealt with in
*106.
We have to deal, in this number, with three different sets of notions, namely
*104·01.
*104·02.
*104·03.
with similar definitions of , etc.
Thus
consists of all classes
similar to
but of the next higher type, i.e. it
is the cardinal number of
in the type next above that of
;
is the class
of all such cardinals as
, and is a
typically ambiguous symbol, though
is typically definite when
is given;
(if
is a cardinal which is not null) is the "same" cardinal in the
next higher type, so that, e.g., if
is 1 determined
as consisting of unit classes of individuals,
will be 1 determined as consisting of unit classes of classes of
individuals. (When
is not an existent cardinal,
is unimportant.)
The following are the most useful propositions in the present number:
*104·12.
[Pg 43]
*104·2.
*104·21.
*104·24.
*104·25.
*104·26.
*104·265.
*104·27.
*104·35.
*104·43.
*104·01.
This defines the cardinal number of in the next
type above that of
; thus
consists of all classes similar to
and of the next type above that of
.
*104·011.
Similar definitions are to be assumed for
, etc.
*104·02.
, like
, is typically ambiguous; but
is typically definite.
*104·021.
Similar definitions are to be assumed for , etc.
*104·03.
Here, if is a cardinal,
is the same cardinal
in the next higher type. For example, if
is couples of
individuals,
is couples of classes of individuals.
*104·031.
Similar definitions are to be assumed for , etc.
*104·1.
*104·101.
*104·102.
*104·11.
*104·111.
[Pg 44]
*104·112.
*104·12.
Dem.
*104·121.
Dem.
*104·122.
*104·123.
*104·13.
*104·14.
*104·141.
When the hypothesis "" is omitted, this proposition is
still true, but with a difference. E.g. let us put
Then
. Thus
. But we still have
Thus
, but
is not the same
cardinal as
in a higher type, i.e. there are classes
whose cardinal in one type is
, but whose cardinal in the next
higher type is not
.
*104·142.
*104·15.
*104·2.
Dem.
[Pg 45]
*104·201.
Dem.
It follows from this proposition that ascending cardinals
are never null. The proof has to be made separately for each kind
of ascending cardinal, i.e. ,
, etc.
*104·211.
*104·23.
Dem.
*104·231.
Dem.
*104·232.
*104·24.
*104·25.
This proposition holds for each possible determination of the typical
ambiguities, i.e. for every we have
[Pg 46]
*104·251.
*104·252.
*104·26.
Dem.
*104·261.
Dem.
*104·262.
Dem.
*104·263.
Dem.
[Pg 47]
*104·264.
Dem.
*104·265.
*104·27.
*104·28.
*104·29.
Dem.
*104·3.
Dem.
*104·31.
*104·311.
*104·32.
Dem.
[Pg 48]
*104·33.
Dem.
*104·34.
Dem.
*104·35.
*104·36.
Dem.
*104·37.
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned with the proof that, given
any two cardinals and
, of the same type, we can find
two mutually exclusive classes one of which has
terms while
the other has
terms. The proof requires that we should raise
the types of both
and
one degree above[Pg 49] that in which
they were originally given, i.e. that we should turn
and
into
and
. Thus, for example,
suppose the total number of individuals in the universe were finite (a
supposition which is consistent with our primitive propositions), and
suppose
were this number. Then unless
, a class of
individuals will be an existent sub-class of the only class
which consists of
individuals, and therefore we shall have
But if we consider classes of classes and
classes, we
shall always be able to find a
and a
such that
The existence of such a and
is important in
connection with the arithmetical operations, and is therefore proved
here.
*104·4.
Dem.
*104·41
Dem.
[Pg 50]
This proposition proves the desired conclusions provided ,
and
consists of at least three terms. The
following propositions deal with the cases in which this hypothesis is
not verified.
*104·411.
Dem.
*104·412.
Dem.
*104·413.
Dem.
*104·42.
[Pg 51]
*104·43.
Dem.
The above proposition gives the desired result. The following propositions re-state this result in other forms.
*104·44.
*104·45.
*104·46.
[Pg 52]
Summary of *105.
In this number, we consider cardinals generated by a relation of
similarity which goes from a higher to a lower type, i.e. given
any class of classes , we consider
in the type of members of
(which we shall call
) or in some lower type. Thus
e.g. we shall have
where "
" means "classes similar to
but of the next lower type." Similarly
and so on. We shall have generally
and so on. The chief difference between ascending and descending
cardinals is that
is one of the latter, but not one of the
former. Otherwise the propositions of the present number are mostly
analogous to corresponding propositions of *104.
On the analogy of the definitions in *104, we put
with similar definitions for
and
.
No proposition of the present number is ever referred to in the sequel, and the reader who is not interested in the subject may therefore omit it without detriment to what follows. The principal propositions proved are the following:
*105·25.
*105·251.
*105·26.
[Pg 53]
Thus or
, in any given
type, only differs from
in that type by the
addition of
.
*105·3.
*105·322.
*105·34.
*105·35.
*105·38.
We might write
which would be equivalent to the above. But we choose the above form
for the sake of uniformity. If
is any suffix, we put, provided
has been defined,
and if
is any index for which
has been defined, we
put
Thus for the sake of uniformity it is better, in the above definition
*105·01, to write "" rather than "
."
*105·011.
*105·02.
*105·021.
*105·03.
*105·031.
*105·1.
*105·101.
*105·11.
*105·111.
*105·12.
*105·121.
*105·13.
[Pg 54]
*105·131.
*105·14.
Dem.
*105·141.
*105·142.
*105·143.
*105·15.
*105·151.
*105·16.
*105·161.
In what follows, propositions concerning or
have proofs exactly analogous to those of
the corresponding propositions concerning
or
.
*105·2.
Dem.
*105·201.
*105·21.
*105·211.
*105·22.
*105·221.
*105·23.
*105·231.
*105·24.
*105·241.
*105·25.
[Pg 55]
*105·251.
*105·252.
Dem.
*105·26.
Dem.
*105·261.
*105·27.
*105·271.
*105·28.
*105·281.
*105·29.
*105·3.
Dem.
*105·301.
*105·31.
*105·311.
*105·312.
*105·313.
*105·314.
*105·315.
*105·316.
Dem.
[Pg 56]
*105·317.
*105·32.
Dem.
*105·321.
*105·322.
*105·323.
*105·324.
*105·325.
*105·326.
Dem.
*105·327.
*105·33.
Dem.
*105·331.
*105·34.
*105·341.
*105·342.
Dem.
[Pg 57]
*105·343.
*105·344.
Dem.
*105·345.
*105·35.
Dem.
*105·351.
*105·352.
*105·353.
*105·354.
*105·355.
*105·356.
*105·357.
*105·36.
Dem.
*105·361.
Dem.
[Pg 58]
*105·362.
*105·37.
*105·371.
Dem.
*105·372.
*105·38.
Dem.
*105·4.
Dem.
*105·41.
[Pg 59]
*105·42.
*105·43.
Dem.
*105·44.
Dem.
[Pg 60]
Summary of *106.
In this number we have to consider the cardinals whose members are
classes of relations which have a given relation of type to some given
class. For example, we have ,
and
has a given relation of type to
when
is given. Thus we want a notation for
and all the associated ideas. In this number, we shall deal only with
relations in which the referent and relatum have a relation, as to
type, which can be expressed by the notations of *63, i.e.
roughly speaking, when, for suitable values of
,
,
, our relations are contained in
Thus if has been defined, we shall put
with analogous definitions for
,
and
.
Much the most important case is that of . For this
case we have
*106·1.
Thus will be the number of a class of
relations whose fields are of the same type as
, provided
this class of relations is similar to
. E.g. the
number of terms such as
, where
, will
be
.
We have
*106·21.
*106·22.
*106·23.
*106·32.
[Pg 61]
*106·4·41·411.
*106·53.
whence it follows that
*106·54.
The propositions of this number, except *106·21, are never referred to again (except in *154·25·251·262, which are themselves never used again), but they have a somewhat greater importance than the propositions of *105, owing to the fact that the arithmetical operations are defined by means of classes of relations, i.e. the sum of two cardinals (for instance) is defined as the cardinal number of a certain class of relations (cf. *110).
*106·01
*106·011.
*106·012.
*106·02.
*106·021.
*106·03.
*106·04.
*106·041.
*106·1.
*106·101.
Similar propositions hold for any other double index for which
has been defined.
*106·11.
Similar propositions hold for any other double suffix for which
has been defined.
*106·121.
[Pg 62]
Similar propositions hold for any other index and suffix for which
or
has been defined.
*106·13.
Similar propositions hold for etc.
*106·14.
*106·141.
Similar propositions hold for ,
,
etc.
*106·2
Dem.
*106·201.
*106·202.
*106·203.
*106·204.
*106·22.
Dem.
[Pg 63]
The proof requires, in addition to *106·12, its analogue for
. Such analogues will be assumed as
required.
*106·221.
*106·222.
*106·223.
Other propositions of the same kind as the above may be proved by
observing that, if and
are indices for which
and
have been defined, we have
of which the proof is direct and simple. Hence, since we always have
, we also always have
We have in like manner
But we do not always have
*106·23.
Dem.
*106·231.
*106·24.
*106·241.
The analogues of the above propositions for other indices or suffixes are similarly proved.
*106·25.
*106·251.
*106·31.
*106·311.
*106·312.
Dem.
[Pg 64]
*106·32.
Dem.
*106·4.
Dem.
*106·401.
Dem.
*106·402.
Dem.
*106·41.
Dem.
*106·411.
*106·43.
Dem.
[Pg 65]
*106·44.
The following propositions are analogous to *102·71 ff., and similar remarks apply to them.
*106·5.
Dem.
*106·51.
Dem.
*106·52.
Dem.
*106·53.
*106·54.
Dem.
*106·55.
[Pg 66]
Summary of Section B.
In the present section, we have to consider the arithmetical operations as applied to cardinals, as well as the relation of greater and less between cardinals. Thus the topics to be dealt with in this section are the first that can properly be said to belong to Arithmetic.
The treatment of addition, multiplication and exponentiation to be given in what follows is guided by the desire to secure the greatest possible generality. In the first place, everything to be said generally about the arithmetical operations must apply equally to finite and infinite classes or cardinals. In the second place, we desire such definitions as shall allow the number of summands in a sum or of factors in a product to be infinite. In the third place, we wish to be able to add or multiply two numbers which are not necessarily of the same type. In the fourth place, we wish our definitions to be such that the sum of the cardinal numbers of two or more classes shall depend only upon the cardinal numbers of those classes, and shall be the same when the classes overlap as when they are mutually exclusive; with similar conditions for the product. The desire to obtain definitions fulfilling all these conditions leads to somewhat more complicated definitions than would otherwise be required; but in the outcome, the result is simpler than if we started with simpler definitions, since we avoid vexatious exceptions.
The above observations will become clearer through their applications. Let us begin with the case of arithmetical addition of two classes.
If and
are mutually exclusive classes, the sum
of their cardinal numbers will be the cardinal number of
. But in order that
and
may be
mutually exclusive, they must have no common members, and this is
only significant when they are of the same type. Hence, given two
perfectly general classes
and
, we require to
find two classes which are mutually exclusive and are respectively
similar to
and
; if these two classes are called
and
, then
will be the sum of the cardinal numbers of
and
. We
note that
and
indicate
respectively the
's of the same types as
and
, and accordingly we take as
and
the
two classes
[Pg 67]
these two classes are always of the same type, always mutually
exclusive, and always similar to
and
respectively.
Hence we define
The sum of the cardinal numbers of and
will
then be the cardinal number of
; hence we may call
the arithmetical class-sum of two classes, in
contradistinction to
, which is the logical
sum. It will be noted that
, unlike
, does not require that
and
should be
of the same type. Also
is not identical with
, but when
,
is also
, though in a different type. Thus the law of tautology does
not hold of the arithmetical class-sum of two classes.
If and
are two cardinals of assigned types, we denote
their arithmetical sum by
. (As many kinds
of arithmetical addition occur in our work, and as it is essential
to our purpose to distinguish them, we effect the distinction by
suffixes to the sign of addition. It is, of course, only in dealing
with principles that these different symbols are needed: we do not
wish to suggest that they should be adopted in ordinary mathematics.)
Now if
is to have the properties which we
commonly associate with the sum of two cardinals, it must be typically
ambiguous, and must be the cardinal number of any class which can
be divided into two mutually exclusive parts having
terms
and
terms respectively. Hence we are led to the following
definition:
In this definition, various points should be noted. In the first
place, it does not require that and
should be of the
same type;
is significant whenever
and
are classes of classes. Thus it is not necessary for
significance that
and
should be cardinals, though if
they are not both cardinals,
. If
they are both cardinals, we find
Thus in this case .
Hence if neither nor
is null, and if
has
terms and
has
terms,
is a
member of
. It easily follows that
Hence when and
are homogeneous cardinals (i.e.
when they are cardinals other than
), their sum is the
number of the arithmetical class-sum of any two classes having
terms and
terms respectively.
A few words are necessary to explain why, in the definition,
we put
rather than
.
The reason is this. Suppose either
or
, say
, is
. Then, by *102·73,
, if
is of the appropriate
type. Hence if we had put
[Pg 68]
where the ambiguities of type involved in
and
may be determined as we please, we should have
We should also have
and so on. Thus
would not have a definite
value, i.e. it would not merely have typical ambiguity, which
it ought to have, but it would not have a definite value even when
its type was assigned. Thus such a definition would be unsuitable.
For the above reasons, we put
in the definition, and obtain the
typical ambiguity which we desire by means of the typical ambiguity
of the "
" in "
." It is
always essential to right symbolism that the values of typically
ambiguous symbols should be unique as soon as their type is assigned.
The scope of these definitions and of the corresponding definitions for
multiplication and exponentiation (*113·04·05.*116·03·04) is extended
by convention
of the prefatory statement.
The above definition of is designed
for the case in which
and
are typically
definite. But we must be able to speak of "
,"
and this must be a definite cardinal, namely
.
If we simply write
in place of
,
in the definition of
,
we find
But this will not always have a definite value when the type of
is assigned. To
take a simple case, write
for
and
for
. Then
whence we easily obtain
If we determine the ambiguity of
to be
, we find
in all types; but if we determine the ambiguity to be
, we have
and this exists in the type of
, if
not in lower types. Hence the value of
depends upon the determination of the ambiguity of
. It is obvious that we want our definition to
yield
in all types; but in order to insure that this shall hold even when,
for some values of
,
, we
must introduce two new definitions, namely
This definition is to be applied when "
" and
"
" occur without any[Pg 69] determination of type. On the
other hand, if we have
and
,
we apply the definition of
.
We shall find that whenever
and
both exist,
Thus the above definition is only required in order to exclude values
of
or
for which either
or
is
.
The commutative and associative laws of arithmetical addition are easily
deduced from the definition of . We shall have
because each =
. A similar though slightly
longer proof shows that
The above definition of enables us to proceed to the
sum of any finite number of classes, and allows any one class to recur
in the summation. But it does not enable us to define the sum of an
infinite number of classes. For this we need a new definition. Since
an infinite number of classes cannot be given by enumeration, but only
by intension, we shall have to take a class of classes
, and
define the arithmetical sum of the members of
. Thus now the
classes which are the summands must all be of the same type (since
they are all members of
), and no one class can occur more
than once, since each member of
only counts once. (In order
to deal with repetition, we must advance to multiplication, which will
be explained shortly.) Thus in removing the limitation to a finite
number of summands, we introduce certain other limitations. This is the
reason which makes it worth while to introduce the above definition of
in addition to the definition now to be given.
If is a class of classes, the sum of the cardinal numbers of
the members of
will evidently be obtained by constructing
a class of mutually exclusive classes whose members have a one-one
relation to the members of corresponding members of
. Suppose
,
are two different members of
, and
suppose
is a member both of
and of
. Then we
wish to count
twice over, once as a member of
and once
as a member of
. The simplest way to do this is to form the
ordinal couples
and
, which
are not identical except when
and
are identical.
Thus if we take all such ordinal couples, i.e. if we take the
class
for every
which is a member of
, we get a class of
mutually exclusive classes, namely the classes of the form
,
where
, each of these is
similar to the corresponding member of
. Hence the logical sum
of this class of classes, i.e.
[Pg 70]
has the required number of terms. Now, by *85·601,
Hence the class whose logical sum we are taking is
. Hence we put
may be called the arithmetical sum of
, in contradistinction to
, which is the logical
sum. Thus
bears to
a relation analogous
to that which
bears to
.
We put further
Thus is the sum of the numbers of members
of
.
It is to be observed that is not in
general a function of
. For, if two members
of
have the same cardinal number, this will only count
once in
, whereas it counts twice in
.
We shall find that, provided ,
Thus where a finite number of summands are concerned, the two
definitions of addition agree, except that the first allows one class
to count several times over, while the second does not.
In dealing with multiplication, our procedure is closely analogous
to the procedure for addition. We first define the arithmetical
class-product of two classes and
, which is
a certain class whose cardinal number is the product of the cardinal
numbers of
and
. We write
for the arithmetical class-product of
and
, and
define it as the class of all ordinal couples of which the referent
is a member of
and the relatum a member of
,
i.e. as
By *40·7, this class is
. Hence we
put
The class
is similar to
, and each member of it is similar to
; hence if
and
,
consists of
classes having
members each. The class
is important also in connection with
exponentiation.
The product of two cardinals is defined as follows:
In regard to types, this definition calls for analogous remarks to
those which were made on
. Also, as before, we
need definitions of
and
, whence we obtain
[Pg 71]By means of these definitions, we can define the product of any finite
number of cardinals; but in order to define products which have an
infinite number of factors, we need a new definition.
If is a class of classes, we take
as its arithmetical product. In simple cases, it is easy to see the
justification of this decision. E.g. let
consist of
the three classes
,
,
,
and let the members of
be
,
; those
of
,
,
; those of
,
,
. Then the members of
are
with four more obtained by substituting
for
in the
above. Thus
.
In general, however, the existence of
is
doubtful, owing to the doubt as to the validity of the multiplicative
axiom. (We shall return to this point shortly.) Hence there is no proof
that the product of an infinite number of factors cannot be zero unless
one of the factors is zero.
When is a class of mutually exclusive
classes,
is similar to
. On account of its lower type,
is often more convenient than
. Hence we put
or (what comes to the same thing)
For the product of the cardinal numbers of the members of
, we
put
As in the case of
,
is not in general a function of
. We shall have
Thus for products of a finite number of different factors, the two
definitions of multiplication agree.
It remains to define exponentiation. Since this is not a commutative
operation, it essentially involves an order as between the base and the
exponent; hence we do not obtain a definition of the exponentiation of
a class , analogous to
or
, but only a definition of
,
which may be extended to any finite number of exponentiations. We put
where
has the meaning explained
above, resulting from *38·03. It will be observed that, if
and
,
is a class of
mutually exclusive classes each of which has
terms; hence
may suitably be used to define
.
Hence we put
and for the same reasons as before, we put
[Pg 72]
The above definition of exponentiation gives the same value of
as results from Cantor's definition by means of
"Belegungen." The class of Cantor's "Belegungen" is
and it is easily proved that this is similar to
.
The usual formal properties of exponentiation result without much difficulty from the above definitions.
The above definition of exponentiation is so framed as to make
propositions on exponentiation independent of the multiplicative axiom,
except when exponentiation is to be connected with multiplication,
i.e. when it is to be shown that the product of factors,
each of which is
, is
. This proposition cannot be
proved generally without the multiplicative axiom. Similarly, in the
theory of multiplication, the proposition that the sum of
's
is
requires the multiplicative axiom (as
does also the proposition that a product is zero when and only when
one of its factors is zero). Otherwise, the theory of multiplication
proceeds without the need for employing the multiplicative axiom.
To take first the connection of addition and multiplication: this
connection, in the form in which we naturally suppose it to hold, is
affirmed in the proposition:
We will take the first of these as being simpler. It affirms that
the sum of
's is
. This
can be proved when
is finite, whether
is finite or
not; but when
is infinite, it cannot be proved without the
multiplicative axiom. This may be seen as follows. We know that
Thus (A) above will result if we can prove
since we shall put
for
,
and use (B).
Since ,
, we have
.
Assume
Let
,
, ... be members of
,
and let
,
, ... be the members of
which are correlated with
,
,
... by
, i.e.
.
We have, since
,
,
[Pg 73]
.
Thus
,
i.e.
.
If
and
are finite, we can pick out arbitrarily
a correlation
for
and
,
another
for
and
, and so
on; then
... correlates
and
, and therefore
.
But when
and
are infinite, this
method is impracticable. In this case, we proceed as follows.
By *73·01, .
Thus "" will stand for all the
permutations of a class into itself; "
"
stands for all the permutations of
into
,
i.e. all the
's whose domain is
and
whose converse domain is
. It is obvious that
In the case of the
and
above, we know that
when
; thus
where "
" stands for "correspondence." Thus
is the class of all correspondences of
and
;
is the class of all
such classes of correspondences. If we extract one member out of each
of these classes of correspondences, we get a class of relations whose
sum is a correlator of
and
; i.e.
Thus the desired result follows whenever
Now we have
.
Consequently
whence, by what was said previously,
The consideration of leads
similarly to the proposition
The proof is closely analogous to that for the connection of addition
and multiplication.
It will be seen that, in the above use of the multiplicative axiom, we
have two classes of classes and
concerning which
we assume
i.e. we assume that
and
are similar
classes of similar classes. A slightly modified hypothesis concerning
and
will enable us to obtain many results,
without the multiplicative axiom, which otherwise might be expected to
require this axiom. This is effected as follows.
[Pg 74]
Put ,
where "
" is a single symbol representing a relation.
When this relation holds between and
, we shall
say that
and
have "double similarity." In this
case,
correlates
and
, while
correlates
and
, so that if
is a
member of
,
, i.e.
, is
its correlate in
. We shall then have
Also we have
Conversely,
whence
Hence the multiplicative axiom is only required in order to pass from
to
. It is this fact, and the
consequent possibility of diminishing the use of the multiplicative
axiom, which has led us to the employment of "
"
in the present section.
We treat also, in this section, the relation of greater and less
between cardinals. We say that
when there is a part of
which is similar to
, but
no part of
is similar to
. The principal proposition
in this subject is the Schröder-Bernstein theorem, i.e.
This is an immediate consequence of *73·88. It cannot be shown, without
assuming the multiplicative axiom, that of any two cardinals one must
be the greater, i.e.
If we assume the multiplicative axiom, this results from Zermelo's
proof that on that assumption, every class can be well-ordered,
together with Cantor's proof that of any two well-ordered series which
are not similar, one must be similar to a part of the other. But these
propositions cannot be proved till a much later stage (*258).
[Pg 75]
Summary of *110.
In this number, we start from the definition:
*110·01.
is called the "arithmetical class-sum" of
and
. The definition is framed so as to give two mutually
exclusive classes respectively similar to
and
, so
that the number of terms in the logical sum of these two classes is the
arithmetical sum of the numbers of terms in
and
respectively.
is significant whenever
and
are classes, whatever their types may be.
By means of , we define the arithmetical sum of two
cardinals as follows:
*110·02.
This defines the "arithmetical sum of two cardinals." (It is not
necessary to significance that and
should
be cardinals, but only that they should be classes of classes. If,
however, either is not a cardinal,
).
It will be observed that, when
and
are typically
definite, so are
and
in the above definition;
but
is typically ambiguous, on account of the ambiguity of
"
." Hence
is also typically
ambiguous.
It will be shown that is always a cardinal, and
that, if
Hence whenever
and
are cardinals other than
,
is an existent cardinal in some
types, though it may be
in others.
Two more definitions are required in this number, namely:
*110·03.
*110·04.
These definitions are needed in order to apply the definition of
to the case in which
and
are
replaced by typically ambiguous symbols
and
. It does not make any difference to the value of
how the ambiguities of
and
are determined, so long as
they are determined in a way that insures
;
but if there are types in which either
or
is
, we get
in all types if we determine the ambiguities so that
or
. It is in
order to[Pg 76] exclude such determinations of the ambiguity that the above
definitions are required. Also in connection with these definitions and
the corresponding definitions *113·04·05 and *116·03·04 and *117·02·03,
the convention
of the prefatory statement must be noted.
The propositions of the present number begin with the properties of
. We show (*110·11·12) that
consists of two mutually exclusive parts, which are respectively
similar to
and
; we show (*110·14) that if
and
are mutually exclusive,
is similar to
, and (*110·15) that if
and
are respectively similar to
and
, then
is similar to
. We show (*110·16)
that
consists of all classes which can
be divided into two mutually exclusive parts which are respectively
similar to
and
.
We then proceed (*110·2—·252) to the consideration of .
Here
and
are typically definite, and the definition
*110·02 applies to any typically definite symbols, such as
or
. We
prove (*110·21) that if
and
are cardinals, their
sum consists of all classes similar to some class of the form
, where
; we
prove (*110·22) that the sum of
and
is
, and
(*110·25) that if
and
are cardinals, their sum is equal
to the sum of the "same" cardinals in any other types in which they are
not null, i.e.
*110·25.
We then (*110·3—·351) consider ,
to which we apply the definitions *110·03·04. We have
*110·3.
whence the other properties of
follow from previous propositions.
We then have (*110·4—·44) various propositions on the type of and
its existence and kindred matters. The chief of these are
*110·4.
*110·42.
This proposition requires no hypothesis, because, if and
are not both cardinals,
, and
is a cardinal, by *102·74.
Our next set of propositions (*110·5—·57) are concerned with the permutative and associative laws, which are *110·51 and *110·56 respectively.
We then (*110·6—·643) consider the addition of 0 or 1, proving
(*110·61) that a cardinal is unchanged by the addition of 0, and
(*110·643) that .
[Pg 77]
These definitions are extended by of the prefatory
statement.
*110·1.
*110·101.
Dem.
Dem.
*110·11·12 give the justification for the use of in
defining arithmetical addition, since they show that
consists of two mutually exclusive parts which are respectively similar
to
and
.
*110·13.
Dem.
Thus whenever and
are mutually exclusive, their
logical sum may replace their arithmetical sum in defining the sum of
their cardinal numbers.
Dem.
*110·151.
Dem.
[Pg 78]
*110·152.
Dem.
*110·17.
Dem.
Thus when and
are of the same type,
exists at least in the type next above
that of
and
. We cannot prove that it exists in
the type of
and
. E.g. suppose the lowest
type contained only one member; then if
were that one member,
would not exist in the type to which
belongs, but would exist in the next type, i.e.
there would not be two individuals, but there would be two classes,
namely
and
, so that
.
*110·18.
Dem.
*110·201.
*110·202.
Dem.
[Pg 79]
*110·211.
Dem.
*110·212.
Dem.
Dem.
*110·221.
Dem.
Thus is
independent of
and
so long as
and
exist in the types of
and
respectively.
*110·231.
Dem.
[Pg 80]
Dem.
Dem.
A similar proof applies to ,
, etc.,
and to any such derived cardinals whose existence follows from that
of
and
. The proposition does not hold generally for
,
and other descending derived cardinals,
because they may be null when
and
exist.
The following proposition (*110·3) is more often used than any other in this number except *110·4.
The following proposition is frequently used.
*110·33.
The above proposition is used in *110·63. We might have used the above
to define arithmetical addition, but this method would have been less
convenient than the method adopted in this number, both because there
would[Pg 81] have been more difficulty in dealing with types, and because the
existence of (in the
types in which it does exist) is less evident with the above definition
than with the definitions given in *110·01·02·03·04.
Dem.
Similar propositions will hold generally for ascending cardinals.
The following proposition (*110·4) is the most used of the propositions
in this number. It is useful both in the form given, and in the form
resulting from transposition, in which it shows that
unless both
and
are existent cardinals.
It is chiefly useful in avoiding the necessity of the hypothesis
,
in such propositions as the commutative
and associative laws.
The following propositions, down to *110·411 inclusive, are concerned with types. They are not referred to in the sequel.
*110·401.
Dem.
*110·402.
Dem.
*110·403.
[Pg 82]
*110·404.
*110·41.
Dem.
It will be observed that the following proposition (*110·42) requires no hypothesis. This is owing to *110·4 and *102·74.
Dem.
*110·43.
Dem.
The above proposition depends upon the fact that
is typically ambiguous, even when
and
are typically
definite. It is used in the theory of inductive cardinals
(*120·32·41·424).
The following propositions are concerned with the commutative and associative laws for arithmetical addition of cardinals.
Dem.
[Pg 83]
*110·501.
It is not necessary to the truth of the above proposition that
and
should be cardinals. If either is not a cardinal,
and
are both
.
The following propositions lead to the associative law (*110·56).
*110·52.
Dem.
*110·521.
*110·53.
*110·531.
Dem.
*110·541.
Dem.
*110·55.
*110·551.
Dem.
[Pg 84]
This is the associative law for arithmetical addition. It will be seen
that, like the commutative law, it does not require that ,
,
should be cardinals.
*110·561.
The following propositions, concerning the addition of 0 or 1, are used frequently in dealing with inductive cardinals (*120).
Dem.
When is a typically definite cardinal,
is
the same cardinal rendered typically ambiguous; when
is a
typically ambiguous cardinal,
, is
. In place
of the above proposition, we might write
;
this would be true whenever the ambiguity of
was
so determined as to make it significant. But the above form gives more
information.
Dem.
In this proposition, is typically ambiguous; hence
we escape the necessity of putting
on the right, as we should have to do if
were
typically definite. We can deduce *110·61 from *110·6 as follows:
[Pg 85]
We have to travel via in this
proof, in order to avoid the possibility of a typical determination
of
which would make
.
It is for the same reason that we cannot put
"
"; for if the
first
is determined to a type in which
, while the second is not, this equation
becomes false.
*110·62.
Dem.
Dem.
The above proposition is much used in the theory of finite and infinite, both cardinal and ordinal. It connects mathematical induction for inductive cardinals with mathematical induction for inductive classes (cf. *120).
*110·631.
Dem.
The proposition
which might at first sight seem demonstrable, will only be true
universally if the total number of objects in any one type
is not finite. For suppose
is a type, and
.
Then if
is a finite class,
. Hence
. Hence
in all types. But
will exist in all types higher
than that of
. If on the other hand the number of entities in
is infinite, we shall have
Hence in this case the above proposition will be true universally.
[Pg 86]
*110·632.
Dem.
*110·64.
*110·641.
*110·642.
Dem.
The above proposition is occasionally useful. It is used at least three times, in *113·66 and *120·123·472.
*110·7·71 are required for proving *110·72, and *110·72 is used in *117·3, which is a fundamental proposition in the theory of greater and less.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 87]
The above proof depends upon the fact that ""
and "
" are typically ambiguous,
and therefore, when they are asserted to be equal, this must
hold in any type, and therefore, in particular, in that type for
which we have
, i.e. for
. This is why the use of *100·3 is
legitimate.
Dem.
[Pg 88]
Summary of *111.
The arithmetical properties of a class, so far as these do not require
or assume that it is a class of classes, are the same for any similar
class. But a class of classes has many arithmetical properties
which it does not share with all similar classes of classes. For
example, if is a class of classes, the number of members
of
is an arithmetical property of
, but it
is obvious that this is not determined by the number of members of
, but requires also a knowledge of the numbers of members
of members of
. For example, let
consist of the
two members
and
, and let
consist
of
and
. Then
;
but in order to be able to infer
,
we require
,
and
or
or some such further
datum. The relation of "double similarity," to be defined in the
present number, is a relation between classes of classes, which,
when it holds between
and
, insures that all
the arithmetical properties of
and
are the
same, e.g. we have (in particular)
and
.
This relation we denote by "
," which is to be
read as one symbol. It is defined as follows: We define first the class
of "double correlators" of
and
, which we denote
by "
,"
and of which the definition is
*111·01.
so that
We then define "" as meaning
that
is
not null, i.e. that there is at least one double correlator of
and
.
To illustrate the nature of a double correlator, let us suppose that
consists of the two classes
and
,
and that
consists of
,
,
while
consists of
,
,
.
Similarly let
consist of
and
while
consists of
,
and
consists of
,
,
. Now let
correlate each
with the
having the same two suffixes.
Then
is a one-one, and its converse domain is
.
Moreover
(which is
) =
,
and
, so that
.
Thus
is a double correlator according to
the definition.
The essential characteristic of a double correlator is that
(1)
is a correlator of
and
, (2)
is a correlator of
and
[Pg 89]
. If we write
in place of
, then if
, we have
; moreover
is a correlator of
and
. Thus
and
are similar
classes of similar classes. They are not merely this, however, for
we not only know that
is similar to
, but we
know a particular correlator of
and
, namely
. This is essential to the use of double
similarity, as will appear shortly.
Let us consider the relation between and
which
consists in their being similar classes of similar classes. This means
that there is a correlator
of
and
, such
that, if
,
is similar to
.
That is to say, we are to consider the hypothesis
or, as it may be more briefly expressed,
Let us assume
.
If we attempt to prove (say) that
is similar to
, we find that we are forced to assume the multiplicative
axiom, unless
and
are finite. This necessity
arises as follows. Let us put
where "
" stands for "correspondence." Then we know that
whenever
,
is not null.
Further it is easy to prove that, if
and
are
classes of mutually exclusive classes, and if we can pick out one
representative member of
for each value of
which is a member of
, then the relational sum
of all these representative correlations gives us a correlator of
and
. That is, we have
But in order to infer hence , we need
, i.e. we need
to be able to pick out a particular correlator for each pair of similar
classes
and
. This, however, cannot be done in
general without assuming the multiplicative axiom. It follows that we
must not define two classes as having double similarity when
,
but must give a definition which enables us to specify a particular
correlator for each pair of similar classes. This is what is effected
by the above definition of double correlators, where our
is given
as of the form
, where
. If the multiplicative
axiom is assumed, but in general not otherwise, we have (*111·5)
In the present number, we shall begin with various properties of
double correlators. We prove (*111·11) that is a double
correlator of
and
when, and only when,
is a correlator of
and
, and
is a correlator of
and
. We prove (*111·112)
that in the same hypothesis,
.
We prove (*111·13) that
is a double
correlator of
with itself; that (*111·131) if
is a
double correlator of[Pg 90]
and
,
is a
double correlator of
and
; that (*111·132) if
,
are double correlators of
with
and of
with
respectively,
is a
double correlator of
with
. Hence it follows
(*111·45·451·452) that double similarity is reflexive, symmetrical, and
transitive.
We then proceed (*111·2—·34) to consider ,
where it is to be supposed that
is a correlator of
and
, and that
is similar to
if
. We prove
*111·32.
Thus in the case supposed, is a double correlator of
and
. Thus
*111·322.
We then proceed (*111·4—·47) to various propositions on ","
and finally (*111·5·51·53) state three propositions which
assume the multiplicative axiom, namely
*111·5. If ,
,
then
.
*111·51. In the same case, ,
i.e. if
and
are similar classes of
mutually exclusive similar classes, their sums are similar.
*111·53. In the same case, if ,
,
. Hence the multiplicative axiom
implies that two classes of
mutually exclusive classes each of
which has
terms, have the same number of terms in their sum.
*111·02.
*111·03.
*111·1.
Dem.
[Pg 91]
*111·111.
Dem.
The two following propositions are useful lemmas for the case when
is replaced (as it often is) by
.
*111·12.
Dem.
*111·121.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 92]
Dem.
*111·14.
Dem.
*111·15.
Dem.
*111·16.
Dem.
*111·18.
Dem.
The class is important,
being the class of Cantor's "Belegungen," used by him to define
exponentiation; we have in fact
Thus the above proposition shows that
is less than or equal to
; and
since, whenever it is not zero,
,
it is less than or equal to
[Pg 93]
The following propositions lead up to *111·32·33·34:
*111·201.
*111·202.
*111·21.
*111·211.
*111·22.
Dem.
*111·221.
Dem.
*111·23.
Dem.
*111·24.
Dem.
*111·25.
[Pg 94]
*111·3.
Dem.
*111·31.
Dem.
*111·311.
*111·313.
Dem.
[Pg 95]
Dem.
*111·321.
*111·322.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 96]
The following propositions are concerned with the elementary properties
of "." It will be seen that they are closely
analogous to those of "
."
*111·401.
Dem.
*111·402.
*111·43.
*111·44.
*111·46.
Dem.
*111·52.
Dem.
[Pg 97]
Summary of *112.
In this number, we return to the arithmetical operations. The definition of addition in *110 was only applicable to a finite number of summands, because the summands had to be enumerated. In the present number, we define the arithmetical sum of a class of classes, so that the summands are given as the members of a class, and do not require to be enumerated. Hence the definition in this number is as applicable to an infinite number of summands as to a finite number.
If is a class of mutually exclusive classes, the number of
will be the sum of the numbers of members of
;
i.e. if we write "
" for the sum of
the numbers of members of
,
But when the members of
are not mutually exclusive, a
term
which is a member of two members (say
and
) of
has to be counted twice over in obtaining
the arithmetical sum of
, whereas in the logical sum
is
only counted once. Thus we need a construction which shall duplicate
, taking it first as a member of
, and then as a
member of
. This is effected if we replace
first by
, and then by
. In fact,
has the kind of arithmetical properties which
we mean to secure when we speak of "
considered as a member of
"—a phrase which, as it stands, does not serve our purpose,
for
is simply
however we may choose to consider it. Thus we
replace
by
and
by
and so on; i.e. (using *85·5), we
replace
by
and
by
and so on. These new classes are similar
to
and
and so on, and are mutually exclusive.
Hence their logical sum has the number of terms which is wanted
for the arithmetical sum of the members of
. Thus we
put
With regard to the second of these definitions, it is to be
observed that is not a function of
, unless no two members of
are similar;
for
cannot contain the same number twice over.
For the same reason, if
is a class of cardinals, and we
define "
," we do not get what[Pg 98] is wanted for
arithmetical addition, because our definition will not enable us to
deal with summations in which there are numbers that are repeated.
We could, if it were worth while, define "
" as
follows: Take a class of classes
, consisting of one class
having each number which is a member of
, i.e. let
be a selection from
; then
will have the required number of terms. i.e. we might put
But since this definition is only available for sums in which no number
is repeated, it is not worth while to introduce it.
In this number we prove the following propositions among others.
*112·15.
This is an extension of *110·32.
*112·17.
The chief point in the above proposition is that it does not require
,
.
*112·2—·24 are concerned with the use of the multiplicative axiom and the propositions of *111 in which it appears as hypothesis. We have
*112·22.
whence we derive the proposition
*112·24.
I.e. assuming the multiplicative axiom, two classes which
each consist of classes of
terms each have the same
number of terms in their sum. This number would naturally be defined
as
multiplied by
, but owing to the necessity of the
multiplicative axiom in this proposition, we have selected a different
definition of multiplication (*113) which does not depend upon the
multiplicative axiom. The reader should observe that the similarity
of two classes, each of which consists of
mutually exclusive
sets of
terms, cannot be proved in general without the
multiplicative axiom.
The remaining propositions of this number give properties of
in special cases. We prove that
(*112·3),
that
(*112·321),
that
(*112·34),
which connects the definition of addition in this number with that in
*110. Finally we prove the general associative law for addition, in the
following two forms:
*112·41.
*112·43.
[Pg 99]
*112·02.
*112·1.
*112·102.
Dem.
*112·103.
*112·11.
*112·12.
*112·13.
Dem.
[Pg 100]
*112·15.
*112·151.
Dem.
The following proposition is a lemma for *112·153, which is required for *112·16. *112·16 in turn is used in *112·17, which is a fundamental proposition in the theory of addition.
Dem.
In the following proposition, we have a double correlator of a sort
which will frequently occur in cardinal arithmetic, namely
with its converse domain limited, where
is a given double
correlator (or single correlator, on other occasions). As appears from
the propositions used in the above proof of *112·152, if
is a
correlator whose converse domain includes
and has
as
a member,
.
Thus
is an operation which, when
operating on suitable relations of individuals to classes (including
selectors), turns the individuals into their correlates and the classes
into the classes of their members' correlates. This is why it is a
useful relation.
Dem.
[Pg 101]
Dem.
*112·18.
Dem.
Dem.
*112·21.
*112·22.
*112·23.
Dem.
*112·231.
Dem.
[Pg 102]
Dem.
*112·301.
Dem.
*112·302.
Dem.
Thus if is a member of a class of classes, it does not
affect the value of their arithmetical sum.
*112·303.
Dem.
*112·304.
Dem.
*112·31.
Dem.
[Pg 103]
*112·311.
Dem.
*112·32.
Dem.
*112·33.
*112·331.
Dem.
This proposition establishes the agreement of the two definitions of
addition, namely that in *110 and that in *112. It will be seen that
the definition of *112 is inapplicable to the addition of a class to
itself, if this is to give the double of the class, instead of (like
logical addition) simply reproducing the class. Hence the need of the
condition in the above proposition.
*112·341.
Dem.
*112·35.
Dem.
Similar propositions can obviously be proved for any finite number of summands.
[Pg 104]
*112·4.
Dem.
*112·41.
Dem.
*112·42.
Dem.
*112·43.
Dem.
The above is the associative law for arithmetical addition.
[Pg 105]
Summary of *113.
In this number, we give a definition of multiplication which can be
extended to any finite number of factors, but not to an infinite
number of factors. We define first the arithmetical class-product of
two classes and
, and thence the product of two
cardinals
and
as the number of terms in the product
of
and
when
has
terms and
has
terms. In *114, we shall give a definition of
multiplication which is not restricted to a finite number of factors.
The advantages of the definition to be given in this number are, that
it does not require the factors to be of the same type, and that
it enables us to multiply a class by itself without (as in logical
addition and multiplication) simply reproducing the class in question.
The disadvantage of the definition in this number is the impossibility
of extending it to an infinite number of factors.
The arithmetical class-product of two classes and
,
which we denote by
[5], is the class of all
ordinal couples which take their referent from
and their
relatum from
, i.e. it is the class of all such
relations as
, where
and
. For a given
, the class of couples we obtain is
, which is similar to
; and the
number of such classes, for varying
, is
. Thus
we have
classes of
couples,
and
is the logical sum of these classes of
couples. The class of such classes as
, where
, is important again in connection with exponentiation;
we have
, whence the
class of such classes, when
is varied among the
's, is
, and
which we take as the definition of
.
[Pg 106]
We represent the arithmetical product of and
by
. This, as well as
,
is defined in terms of
exactly as, in *110, the
sum was defined in terms of
.
The present number contains many propositions which belong to the
theory of rather than (specially)
of
; and many propositions are rather logical
than arithmetical in their nature, i.e. they might have
been given in *55. The line is, however, so hard to draw that it
has seemed better to deal simultaneously with all propositions on
or on its sum, which is
.
Thus in the present number, the early propositions,
down to *113·118, deal mainly with logical properties of
and
; the following
propositions, down to *113·13, deal mainly with arithmetical properties
of
; the propositions *113·14—·191
are concerned mainly with arithmetical properties of
;
*113·2—·27 deal with the simpler properties of
;
*113·3—·34 give propositions involving the multiplicative
axiom, and exhibiting the connection (assuming this axiom) of addition
and multiplication; *113·4—·491 are concerned with various forms of
the distributive law; *113·5—*113·541 deal with the associative law of
multiplication, and the remaining propositions deal with multiplication
by 0 or 1 or 2.
The most important propositions in the present number are the following:
*113·101.
This merely embodies the definition of .
*113·105.
This proposition is especially useful in dealing with exponentiation (*116).
*113·114.
It is in virtue of this proposition that a product of a finite number of factors only vanishes when one of its factors vanishes.
*113·118.
This proposition is chiefly useful in the analogous theory of ordinal
products (*165, *166), where it enables us to apply *74·773. Unless
, we have
,
and unless
(*113·116).
*113·12.
I.e. unless is null,
consists of
mutually
exclusive classes each having
members.
*113·127.
[Pg 107]
This is an important proposition, since it gives a double
correlator of with
whenever simple correlators of
with
and of
with
are given.
It leads at once to
*113·13.
This proposition is fundamental in the theory of multiplication, since
it shows that the number of members of depends
only upon the numbers of members of
and
. It is
also fundamental in the theory of exponentiation, as will appear in
*116.
*113·141.
This is the source of the commutative law of multiplication (*113·27).
*113·146.
This connects our present theory of multiplication with the theory of selections.
We come next to propositions concerning . We have
*113·204.
The use of this proposition, like that of *110·4, is for avoiding trivial exceptions.
*113·23.
*113·25.
This proposition enables us to infer propositions on products of cardinals from propositions on products of classes, and is therefore constantly used.
*113·27.
This is the commutative law of cardinal multiplication.
The chief proposition using the multiplicative axiom is
*113·31.
I.e. assuming the multiplicative axiom, the sum of the numbers
of members in classes of
terms is
.
If we had taken this sum as defining
,
almost all propositions on multiplication would have required
the multiplicative axiom. The advantage of
is that, given
and
,
we can construct a double correlator of
with
, without using the
multiplicative axiom. This is proved in *113·127 (mentioned above).
The distributive law, which is next considered, has various forms. We have, to begin with,
*113·4.
whence, using also the commutative law, we easily deduce
*113·43.
[Pg 108]
But the distributive law also holds when, instead of enumerated
summands ,
or
,
, the summands are
given as the members of a class
, which may be infinite. We
have
*113·48.
whence, using the definitions of *112, we find
*113·491.
This is an extension of the distributive law to the case where the number of summands may be infinite.
The associative law
*113·54.
is proved without any difficulty.
We prove next that when, and only when,
or
,
,
being existent cardinals
(*113·602); that a cardinal is unchanged when it is multiplied by 1
(*113·62·621); that
(*113·66) and
that
(*113·671).
*113·02.
In relation to types, *113·03·04·05 call for similar remarks to those made in *110 for addition.
*113·1.
*113·101.
*113·102.
Dem.
[Pg 109]
*113·104.
*113·105.
Dem.
*113·106.
*113·107.
*113·11.
Dem.
*113·111.
*113·112.
Dem.
*113·113.
*113·114.
*113·115.
Dem.
*113·117.
[Pg 110]
*113·12.
*113·121.
*113·122.
*113·123.
*113·124.
Dem.
*113·125.
*113·126.
Dem.
*113·128.
*113·141.
*113·142.
[Pg 111]
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 112]
Note to *113·144. In virtue of *113·143 and *55·61 we have
At a later stage (in *150) we shall put
Thus we shall have, anticipating this notation,
Hence we have
*113·145.
*113·146.
*113·147.
Dem.
The advantage of this proposition is that it exhibits the correlator of
and
as a function of
.
*113·148.
Dem.
*113·15.
Dem.
[Pg 113]
*113·151.
*113·152.
Dem.
The following proposition is only significant when and
are classes of relations. It is used in relation-arithmetic
(*172·34).
*113·153.
Dem.
*113·16.
Dem.
[Pg 114]
*113·17.
Dem.
*113·171.
Dem.
Note that the hypothesis is only
significant when
and
are of the same type.
*113·172.
Dem.
*113·18.
Dem.
[Pg 115]
*113·181.
Dem.
*113·182.
*113·183.
Dem.
*113·19.
Dem.
Dem.
*113·201.
[Pg 116]
*113·202.
Dem.
*113·203.
*113·205.
*113·21.
*113·22.
Dem.
*113·221.
*113·222.
Dem.
Dem.
*113·24.
*113·25.
[Pg 117]
This proposition constitutes part of the reason for our definitions. It is obvious that such definitions ought, if possible, to be chosen as will yield this proposition.
*113·251.
Dem.
*113·261.
Here "." includes all ascending derivatives of
.
We shall only prove the result for
and
,
since it is proved in just the same way for the other cases.
or
or etc. will serve equally well; i.e. it is not necessary to
take the same derivative of
as of
.
Dem.
As appears in the above proof, if and
are any
derivatives of
and
, the above proposition holds
provided we have
Thus it holds for all ascending derivatives, but not always for descending derivatives.
Dem.
Note that this proposition is not confined to the case in which
and
are cardinals. When either or both are not cardinals,
[Pg 118]
Dem.
*113·32.
*113·33.
The above propositions give the connection of addition and multiplication.
The following propositions are concerned with various forms of the distributive law.
Dem.
*113·401.
*113·41.
Dem.
[Pg 119]
*113·42.
*113·421.
*113·43.
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned with various forms of the distributive law, when the summands are not enumerated, but given as the members of a class.
The first of them (*113·44) gives the distributive law with regard to arithmetical class-multiplication and logical addition of classes.
Dem.
*113·45.
Dem.
*113·46.
Dem.
[Pg 120]
*113·47.
This is the distributive law for arithmetical multiplication and arithmetical addition of the kind defined in *112.
*113·48.
Dem.
*113·49.
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned with the associative law for arithmetical multiplication.
Dem.
*113·51.
Dem.
[Pg 121]
*113·511.
*113·52.
*113·53.
Dem.
*113·531.
Dem.
*113·6.
Dem.
*113·601.
Dem.
[Pg 122]
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned with multiplication by a unit class or by 1 or 2.
*113·61.
Dem.
*113·612.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 123]
Observe that if is a typically definite cardinal,
is the "same" cardinal rendered typically ambiguous;
while if
is typically ambiguous,
in
every type.
*113·63.
Dem.
*113·64.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
*113·67.
Dem.
[Pg 124]
Summary of *114.
The kind of multiplication defined in *113 cannot be extended beyond
a finite number of factors. We therefore, as in the case of addition,
introduce another definition, defining the product of the numbers of a
class of classes, and capable of being applied to an infinite number of
factors. We define the product of the numbers of members of
as
; thus we put
It is to be observed that is not a function of
, because, if two members of
have the
same number, this will count only once in
, but
will count twice in
.
It is very easy to see that, in case is finite,
will be what we should ordinarily
regard as the product of the numbers of members of
. For
suppose (e.g.)
where
. Then
Thus if is a member of
,
is
determinate when
,
,
are given,
,
,
being the referents to
,
,
. Whether
,
,
overlap or not, the choice of any
one of
,
,
is entirely independent of the choice of
the other two, and therefore the total number of choices possible
is obviously the product of the numbers of
,
,
. Thus our definition will not conflict with what is commonly
understood by a product.
The propositions of this number are less numerous and less important than those of *113. We shall deal first with products of a single factor, and products in which one factor is null (*114·2—·27). We shall then deal (*114·3—·36) with the relations between the sort of multiplication here defined and the sort defined in *113. Then we have a few propositions (*114·4—*114·43) showing that unit factors make no difference to the value of a product. Then we prove (*114·5—·52) that the value of the product is the same for two classes having double similarity, and then (*114·53—·571) we give extensions of this result which depend upon the multiplicative axiom. Finally, we give some new forms of the associative law of multiplication.
[Pg 125]
Among the more important propositions in this number are the following:
*114·21.
I.e. a product of one factor is equal to that factor.
*114·23.
I.e. a product vanishes if one of its factors is zero. The converse requires the multiplicative axiom, as appears from the proposition
*114·26.
I.e. the multiplicative axiom is equivalent to the assumption that a product vanishes when, and only when, one of its factors is zero.
*114·301.
whence
*114·31.
which is a form of the associative law, and
*114·35.
which connects the two sorts of multiplication.
*114·41.
I.e. unit factors make no difference to the value of a product.
*114·51.
This proposition gives a correlator of and
as a function of a double correlator of
and
, and thus leads to
*114·52.
Hence, by the propositions of *111, we infer
*114·571.
I.e. assuming the multiplicative axiom, if and
each consist of
classes of
terms each,
their products are equal.
We have next various forms of the associative law, beginning with
*114·6.
which is an immediate consequence of *85·44. The other form is
*114·632.
As to the sense in which this is a form of the associative law, see the observations following *114·6.
*114·01.
*114·11.
*114·12.
[Pg 126]
Thus a product of no factors is 1. This is the source of ,
as we shall see later.
*114·21.
*114·22.
*114·23.
Thus an arithmetical product is zero if any of its factors is zero. To prove the converse, we have to assume the multiplicative axiom, which, in fact, is equivalent to the proposition that an arithmetical product is only zero when at least one of its factors is zero.
*114·24.
Dem.
*114·25.
Dem.
Note that .
*114·26.
*114·261.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 127]
The above is one form of the associative law of multiplication.
*114·311.
*114·32.
Dem.
*114·33.
*114·34.
*114·35.
*114·41.
*114·42.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 128]
*114·501.
Dem.
The condition ,
,
which is involved in the hypothesis of *114·54 (through
,
), is not necessary. The following
propositions enable us to remove it. We first prove
and then we use *114·54 to take us from
to
. Thence we arrive at
.
*114·56.
*114·561.
[Pg 129]
*114·562.
Dem.
*114·57.
Dem.
This is the most general form of the associative law for arithmetical multiplication.
Owing to the fact that we have two kinds of multiplication, namely
and
, we have four
forms of the associative law of multiplication, namely:
(1) *114·6, above,
(2) *113·54, i.e. ,
(3) *114·31, i.e. ,
(4) a form of the associative law which has not yet been proved, which may be explained as follows.
Suppose we have a number of pairs of classes, e.g. ,
,
,....
Suppose we form the products
,
,
, ...
and multiply all these products together. We wish to
prove that (with a suitable hypothesis) the result is similar to the
product of all the
's and all the
's taken together
as one class; i.e. if we call
the class of products
,
,
, ..., and
the class whose
members are
,
,
, ...,
,
,
, ..., we wish to prove
In order to express this proposition in symbols, let
be the
correlator of the
's and
's, so that
.
(The suffix
will not be used further, since it implies that the
number of
's and of
's is finite or denumerable.)
Then our class of products of the form
is
[Pg 130]
where
is the class of all the
's ; and the product
of this class of products is
On the other hand, the class of all the
's and
's is
, and the product of this class is
Thus what we have to prove (with a suitable hypothesis) is
The hypothesis required is
A smaller hypothesis suffices, however, for a proposition which, in
virtue of *114·301, is closely allied to the above, namely
For this, a sufficient hypothesis is
Thus e.g. we may write
for
, and we find
We shall now prove the above propositions. What follows, down to *114·621, consists of lemmas.
For convenience, we write for
in the course of these lemmas; this notation is introduced in the
hypotheses of the lemmas.
Dem.
[Pg 131]
*114·602.
Dem.
As in *114·601, we prove
*114·603.
Dem.
*114·604.
The relation here defined is the correlator required for proving
Besides what is proved in the present proposition, we shall have to prove
The proof of the present proposition is as follows.
Dem.
[Pg 132]
*114·605.
Dem.
The following propositions are required for proving that, with the same
hypothesis, .
*114·61.
Dem.
*114·611.
Dem.
[Pg 133]
*114·612.
Dem.
*114·613.
Dem.
*114·614.
Dem.
*114·62.
The hypothesis is not necessary, since,
when
,
are both . This is proved in *114·63.
Dem.
[Pg 134]
The above is one of the two variants of the associative law for
and
.
*114·631.
*114·632.
This is the second variant of the associative law for
and
.
Dem.
In the above proposition, the hypothesis has to be such as to yield
. Various other forms of hypothesis
will secure this result, and will give other forms of the above
proposition. This subject is treated in *74, above.
[Pg 135]
Summary of *115.
Whenever is a class of mutually exclusive
classes,
is similar to
; hence
Now is of the same type as
; and when
is a class of mutually exclusive
classes,
consists of all classes
formed by selecting one representative from each member of
.
It often happens that
is easier
to deal with than
; hence when possible
(i.e. when
, it
is convenient to use
, rather
than
, as the standard member of
. We therefore put
We shall call the "multiplicative class" of
.
The associative law,
requires not merely
, but also
. The combination of these
two hypotheses gives a completely disjointed class of classes of
classes, i.e. a class of classes of classes
which can
be obtained by dividing a given class
into mutually
exclusive portions, and then dividing each of those portions into
mutually exclusive portions. For example, take a square (a class of
points) and divide it by horizontal lines, and then divide each of the
resulting rectangles by vertical lines; then the resulting rows of
little rectangles form such a class, each row of rectangles being one
member of the class. Such a class we call an "arithmetical" class, and
denote by "
."
The present number is concerned with the properties of multiplicative classes and arithmetical classes. Some of these properties will be useful in dealing with exponentiation.
The present number begins with various propositions concerning
which are merely repetitions of previous
propositions of *83, *84, *85 or *113. Thus we have
*115·141. ,
*115·142. ,
*115·143. ,
*115·16. ,
and various other properties.
[Pg 136]
We then proceed to consider . We prove
*115·22.
and *115·23 gives a similar proposition substituting ""
for
.
After a few more propositions on ,
we proceed to the associative law for
(*115·34),
i.e.
(This proposition, *115·34, also states that, with the same hypothesis,
. Hence we
have
*115·35.
We have also
*115·42.
*115·44.
We have next to prove that if two classes of classes have double similarity, so have their multiplicative classes. The proof is simple, since the double correlator is the same as for the original classes, i.e.
*115·502.
whence
*115·51.
The number ends with some propositions which result from *114·64·65 and
are analogous to them. One of these is used in the following number, in
proving ,
namely,
*115·6.
The subject of this number will be useful in dealing with
exponentiation, since we shall define by means
of
, where
and
.
*115·01.
*115·02.
*115·1.
*115·101.
*115·11.
[Pg 137]
Owing to this proposition, can be treated
without any reference to
whenever
.
It is this proposition that makes the notation
appropriate for the multiplicative class.
*115·13.
*115·131.
*115·14.
*115·141.
*115·142.
*115·143.
*115·144.
*115·145.
*115·15.
*115·151.
*115·152.
*115·153.
*115·154.
*115·16.
The following proposition is used in the theory of well-ordered series (*250·5).
*115·17.
Dem.
[Pg 138]
*115·18.
*115·2.
*115·21.
*115·211.
Dem.
*115·22.
Dem.
Observe that, although ""
follows from
the converse implication does not hold. If there were two different
classes
and
having the same sum, we might have
, i.e.
,
without having
, in spite of "
."
In proofs, less use can be made of "
"
than of "
."
If
or
,
the latter implies
.
Dem.
*115·24.
[Pg 139]
*115·25.
*115·26.
In the above proposition,
does not require the hypothesis
,
being true always. It is merely included here for convenience of
reference.
*115·27.
We have now to prove the associative law for ","
i.e.
In virtue of *115·12, we have only to prove (under the hypothesis)
which, by *85·44, will follow from
which, by *114·52, will follow from
Now
Thus the correlator which will give our proposition will be
. We have only to
prove that this is a
, and the rest follows.
*115·3.
Dem.
*115·31.
Dem.
*115·32.
*115·33.
This proposition gives the associative law for "."
The following proposition embodies the last three propositions.
[Pg 140]
*115·35.
In connection with and
, there remain two propositions of
sufficient interest to deserve proof, namely
and
Of these, the first is deduced from the second, while the second is
proved by means of *114·51, putting for the
which
appears in that proposition, and
for the
of that proposition.
*115·4.
Dem.
*115·41.
*115·42.
Dem.
*115·43.
Dem.
*115·44.
The following proposition is a lemma for *115·46.
[Pg 141]
*115·45.
Dem.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in dealing with products in relation-arithmetic (*174·42).
*115·5.
*115·501.
Dem.
[Pg 142]
The above propositions show how, in certain respects,
is more convenient than
. We cannot have
,
because
is a class of relations, not a
class of classes; and the correlator of
and
is by no means so simple a function of the
correlator of
and
as
,
which correlates
and
, in virtue of *115·502.
The following propositions are a continuation of those given in *114·601 ff.
Dem.
*115·601.
Dem.
*115·602.
*115·61.
*115·62.
*115·63.
[Pg 143]
Summary of *116.
In this number, we define "," meaning
"
to the exponent
," where
and
are classes, as
Now
consists of
all ways of selecting one each from the members of
, i.e. from the classes
, where
. Thus to get a member of
, take a set of couples
, where
is always an
, and there
is only one
for a given
, and
is each member of
in succession. Thus for each member of
, we have
possible referents; hence it is plain that the
number of possible sets of couples consists of
factors each equal to
, and is therefore fit to be
taken as defining
.
The definitions of and
are derived from the definition of
exactly as the definitions of
and
, or of
and
, were
derived respectively from
and
.
The chief difficulty in this number lies in the proof of the three
formal laws of exponentiation, namely
The proofs of the second and third of these, in particular, require
various lemmas; but there is no difficulty involved except the
complexity of the classes and relations concerned.
The definition of is so framed as to minimize the
necessity for the multiplicative axiom (see the note on **113·31 in the
introduction to *113). We have
*116·36.
that is, assuming the multiplicative axiom, the product of
factors each equal to
is
(assuming
and
to be cardinals which are not null).
If we had defined as the product of
factors
each equal to
, we should[Pg 144] have required the multiplicative
axiom for almost all propositions on
but by taking the
particular class
, we avoid the
multiplicative axiom except in a few propositions. Among these few is
the above proposition connecting exponentiation with multiplication.
Cantor has defined by means of the class of "Belegungen,"
i.e. the class
which (*116·12) =
.
By *85·53 and *113·103, this class is equal to
(as is proved in *116·13), whence, since
,
it follows (*116·15) that the class of "Belegungen" is similar to
. Hence our definition gives the same
value of
as Cantor's.
The propositions of the present number begin with various simple
properties of . Its existence follows
from
*116·152.
whence (*116·16) , and
*116·18.
We have
*116·19.
in virtue of *113·13 and *115·51. *116·192 shows that, if
correlates
with
, and
correlates
with
, then
is a
double correlator of
with
.
We then proceed to a set of propositions on which are
analogous to *113·2 ff. on
. We have
*116·203.
*116·25.
and various other less useful propositions.
We then have various propositions on 0 and 1 and 2. We prove
*116·301.
*116·311.
*116·321.
(Observe that is the same cardinal as
, but
rendered typically ambiguous.)
*116·331.
*116·34.
(This proposition does not require that should be a cardinal.)
[Pg 145]
After the proposition (*116·36) already quoted, on the connection of
exponentiation and multiplication, we proceed to a set of propositions
on the case where a number of classes are all given as similar (by
assignable correlations) to a given class. In *116·411, we prove that
if is a class of mutually exclusive classes, each of which
is similar to a given class
, and if, when
,
is a correlator of
and
,
and
is the sum of
, then
This is a further connection of multiplication and exponentiation. (On
the purport of this and following propositions, see the explanation
preceding *116·4.) In *116·43, the hypothesis is somewhat modified.
We still have a set
of classes which are all similar to
, but the correlator for a given class
is not
given as
, but is given as
, where
is a member
of a class
which is similar to
. Then
. We assume that
is a
one-one, and that if
and
have domains which overlap,
then
. Thus
is a class of mutually exclusive
classes, each of which has
terms, while
has
terms. Then it is proved in *116·43 that
This proposition and another (*116·45) which follows from it are useful
in proving the formal laws of exponentiation. The proof of these
occupies the following propositions from *116·5 to *116·68. We have
*116·52.
*116·55.
*116·63.
An extension of the first of these is
*116·661.
Here the number of members of need not be finite. The
purport of the proposition is as follows: Let
,
,
, ... be the members of
; form
,
,
, ...,
and take the product of the numbers of all these; then the resulting
number is the same as if we first took the sum of the numbers of all
the members of
, thus obtaining (say) a number
, and
raised
to the
th power.
An extension of *116·55 is given by *116·68, where we prove
There is no analogous extension of *116·63.
We prove next Cantor's proposition (which is very useful)
*116·72.
I.e. the number of combinations of things any number
at a time is
. (Observe that
need not be finite.)
The remainder of the number is concerned with consequences of this
proposition.
[Pg 146]
*116·01.
*116·02.
*116·1.
*116·11.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
is the class of
one-many relations whose converse domain is
and whose
domain is contained in
. This is what Cantor calls
the "Belegungsmenge," and is used by him as the definition of
exponentiation. In virtue of *116·15, his definition gives the same
results as ours.
Dem.
[Pg 147]
*116·14.
*116·151 is a lemma for *116·152.
*116·151.
Dem.
*116·152.
Dem.
Dem.
The above propositions are useful in establishing existence-theorems, as appears in the following propositions.
*116·17.
*116·171.
Dem.
*116·172.
Dem.
*116·18.
*116·181.
Dem.
[Pg 148]
*116·182.
*116·183.
Dem.
*116·19.
Dem.
*116·191.
*116·194.
Dem.
The following propositions (down to *116·27 exclusive) are the analogues of propositions with the same decimal part in *113.
*116·2.
*116·201.
[Pg 149]
*116·202.
*116·203.
*116·205.
*116*21.
*116·22.
*116·221.
*116·222.
*116·24.
*116·25.
*116·251.
This proposition shows that we may raise or lower the types of
and
as we please, without affecting the value of
provided
and
, or rather
and
, exist in the new types.
*116·261.
Here "etc." covers any derivative of or
whose existence
follows from that of
or
.
*116·271.
*116·3.
Dem.
*116·301.
*116·31.
Dem.
[Pg 150]
*116·311.
Dem.
*116·32.
Dem.
It would not be an error to write "" instead of
"
" in the above proposition. For if the
"
" is typically determined so that
,
then
. Thus in virtue of *116·321,
is true whenever it is significant. But the above form
gives more information, since it preserves the typical ambiguity of
and
.
*116·33.
Dem.
*116·311.
Dem.
*116·34.
Dem.
[Pg 151]
*116·35.
Dem.
*116·351.
*116·352.
*116·353.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 152]
In the above proposition, "" is sufficient
hypothesis as to
, since "
" is implied by
. But
is
essential, since if
,
and
(provided
, whence
.
The above proposition connects exponentiation with multiplication.
*116·361.
Dem.
The following propositions, which illustrate certain generalizations of the relations of rows and columns, may be made clearer by the accompanying figure, in which, for the sake of simplicity, all the classes concerned are taken to be finite.
Let be a set of classes, constituted by four rows of
five dots in the figure, which are each given as similar to a given
class
, represented by the top row of five dots in the
figure, namely the row enclosed in an oval. We assume that an actual
correlating relation is given correlating each member of
with
. Let
be the class of these relations, and
assume that
consists of one correlator for each member
of
, and that
.
Thus
, and
.
Put
. Then, if
,
relates to
every member of the column below
, i.e.
consists of the four dots which are
vertically below
; assuming, what in the circumstances is
possible, that each dot is placed below its correlate in
.
Thus
represents the columns, while
represents the rows.
We prove, in *116·41, that ,
the class of rows, has double similarity with
,
or, what comes to the same thing, with
.
Hence it follows that
,
which is the whole class of dots, is similar to
or
, and that
, which is the product of
[Pg 153]the numbers of the columns, is equal to
or
.
The correlator which is used for proving these propositions is
,
where, if
is a member of
and
is a member of
,
correlates
with
.
Similarly, by correlating with
, calling the
correlator
, we have
,
i.e.
, whence
.
Hence
, i.e. the class of rows, has
double similarity with
or
, whence the product of the numbers
of the rows is
or
.
Finally, we take a class similar to
or
(illustrated in the figure by the column of dots enclosed
in an oval), and calling
a correlator of
and
, we replace
by
and
by
. We thus find that, if
correlates with
a class of relations whose domains
are mutually exclusive, and which each correlate their domains with
a given class
, then
has double
similarity with
, whence the same
results as before with
in place of
or
.
The following propositions are useful in connecting multiplication with exponentiation, and in proving the formal laws of exponentiation.
*116·4·401 are lemmas for *116·41.
Dem.
[Pg 154]
Dem.
Dem.
The following proposition is merely another form of *116·41.
Dem.
[Pg 155]
*116·412·413 are lemmas for *116·414.
*116·412.
*116·413.
*116·414.
*116·42.
*116·422.
Dem.
[Pg 156]
Dem.
The above proposition is used in *116·534·61.
*116·44.
Dem.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in *116·676.
We have now to prove the three formal laws of exponentiation, namely
[Pg 157]
Of these the first is an immediate consequence of the distributive law,
while the second and third result from forms of the associative law of
multiplication.
Dem.
In the last line of the above proof, *73·43 is required because the two
's involved have not been proved to be of the same type.
They are in fact of the same type, but it is unnecessary to prove this.
*116·51.
Dem.
[Pg 158]
Dem.
The following propositions are lemmas for
The principal previous propositions used in the proof are *115·6 and
*116·43. The proof proceeds as follows.
This, using *115·6, and putting
,
in place of
and
of that proposition, is
similar to
Now by *113·65, putting
,
.
We now apply *116·43, taking
as the
of that proposition, or rather, taking
.
Thus we find
Hence our proposition follows.
*116·529.
In *150, this notation will be introduced as a permanent definition.
For the present, we only introduce it to avoid ,
which is awkward.
Dem.
[Pg 159]
The hypothesis is not necessary in
the above proposition; but the proof is simpler with the hypothesis,
and we do not need the proposition without the hypothesis.
*116·531.
Dem.
*116·532.
Dem.
*116·533.
Dem.
[Pg 160]
Dem.
*116·535.
The hypothesis is not necessary, as
we shall now prove.
Dem.
In obtaining (5), we use *73·43 as well as *113·611, because
's of different types are involved.
Dem.
This completes the proof of the second of the formal laws of
exponentiation. The following propositions are lemmas for the third of
these laws, namely
[Pg 161]
*116·6.
Dem.
*116·601.
*116·602.
Dem.
*116·603.
*116·604.
Dem.
*116·605.
Dem.
[Pg 162]
*116·606.
Dem.
*116·607.
*116·611.
*116·62.
Dem.
[Pg 163]
Dem.
This completes the proof of the third of the formal laws of exponentiation.
*116·64.
*116·651.
Dem.
*116·652.
The following propositions are lemmas for *116·661, which is an extension of *116·52.
*116·653.
Dem.
[Pg 164]
*116·654.
Dem.
*116·655.
This proposition is an extension of *116·5.
The hypothesis is unnecessary
in the above proposition, as we shall now prove.
*116·656.
Dem.
*116·657.
*116·658.
Dem.
*116·659.
Dem.
[Pg 165]
*116·66.
Dem.
This proposition is an extension of *116·52.
The following propositions are concerned in proving *116·68, which is
an extension of *116·54, where the and
of that
proposition are replaced by the members of a class
.
*116·67.
Dem.
[Pg 166]
*116·671.
Dem.
*116·672.
Dem.
*116·673.
Dem.
*116·674.
Dem.
*116·675 .
Dem.
[Pg 167]
Dem.
Dem.
The above proposition is an extension of *116·54·55.
The following propositions are lemmas for
The proposition and its proof are due to Cantor.
*116·7.
Dem.
[Pg 168]
In this and following propositions, the class
is introduced solely as a known class consisting of two terms. Any
other class of two terms will serve equally well.
*116·71.
Dem.
*116·711.
Dem.
*116·712.
Dem.
*116·713.
Dem.
*116.714.
Dem.
[Pg 169]
*116·715.
Dem.
Dem.
*116·8.
Dem.
[Pg 170]
*116·81.
Dem.
*116·82.
*116·83.
*116·9.
*116·901.
*116·91.
*116·92.
[Pg 171]
Summary of *117.
A cardinal is said to be greater than another cardinal
when there is a class
which has
terms and has
a part which has
terms, while there is no class
which has
terms and has a part which has
terms. The
relation "greater than" is transitive and asymmetrical; and by the
Schröder-Bernstein theorem, if
is greater than or equal to
, and
is greater than or equal to
, then
. But we cannot prove that of any two cardinals one must be the
greater, unless we assume the multiplicative axiom. The proof then
follows from Zermelo's theorem that on that assumption every class can
be well-ordered. This subject will be dealt with at a later stage.
The form of the definitions is so arranged as to allow of the inequality of two cardinals in different types. The relevant considerations are the same as for the definitions of addition, multiplication and exponentiation.
Our definition of "" is
*117·01.
We also define "" as meaning "
,"
and "
" as meaning
"
," for the reasons explained in
*110. It then easily follows that if
,
and
must be homogeneous cardinals (this is part of *117·15); that if
and
are homogeneous cardinals, and
, the
same holds if we substitute
and
for one or both of
and
(*117·16); that
*117·13.
and that
*117·14.
We cannot define "" as "
,"
because "
" restricts
and
too much by
requiring that they should be of the same type, and restricts them too
little by not requiring that they should both be existent cardinals. To
avoid both these inconveniences, we put
*117·05.
The use of this definition is chiefly through the propositions
*117·108.
[Pg 172]
*117·24.
In *117·2, we repeat the Schröder-Bernstein theorem (*73·88), which is required in most of the remaining propositions of this number. It leads at once to the propositions
*117·22.
(which practically supersedes the definition of "")
*117·221.
*117·222.
*117·23.
This last proposition may be called the Schröder-Bernstein theorem with as much propriety as *73·88; the two are scarcely different.
If we now revert to the definition of , or to *117·13,
and apply *117·22, we see (*117·26) that "
"
may be conveniently regarded as asserting
;
in fact, the best ideas to work with are
and its converse
, which for practical purposes we regard as defined by
*117·22, and from which we derive
and
. The relation
will be the
product of
into the negation of its converse; this holds for
and
(*117·281) as well as for
and
.
*117·3·31 constitute an important use of *110·72, namely to prove that one existent cardinal is greater than another or equal to it when the first can be obtained by adding to the second (where what is added must be a cardinal). That is to say, we have
*117·3.
*117·31.
*117·4—·471 are concerned in proving that and
are
transitive, that
is asymmetrical (*117·42), and allied propositions.
Our next set of propositions is concerned with 0 and 1 and 2. We prove that a homogeneous cardinal is whatever is greater than or equal to 0 (*117·501); that a homogeneous cardinal other than 0 is whatever is greater than 0 (*117·511); that a homogeneous cardinal other than 0 is whatever is greater than or equal to 1 (*117·531); and that a homogeneous cardinal other than 0 and 1 is whatever is greater than 1 (*117·55), and is whatever is greater than or equal to 2 (*117·551).
We next prove a set of propositions concerning which have no
analogues for
, except when the cardinals concerned are finite. Thus
e.g. we prove
*117·561.
If we substitute for
, this no longer holds. Thus e.g.
put
,
,
(cf. *123); then
, but
. Similar
remarks apply to the analogous propositions (*117·571·581·591) on
multiplication and exponentiation.
[Pg 173]
We prove next that a sum is greater than or equal to either of its
summands (*117·6); that a product neither of whose factors vanishes
is greater than or equal to either of its factors (*117·62); that,
assuming and
are existent cardinals, then if they are
neither 0 nor 1, their product is greater than or equal to their sum
(*117·631), and if
is neither 0 nor 1, then
(*117·652).
The last important proposition in this number is Cantor's theorem
*117·661.
which follows immediately from *102·72 and *116·72.
The propositions of this number are much used in the following section, on finite and infinite.
The analogues of *117·02·03 are to be applied also to *117·04·05·06.
*117·1.
*117·101.
*117·102.
*117·103.
*117·105.
*117·106.
*117·107.
Dem.
[Pg 174]
*117·11.
Dem.
Dem.
*117·121.
Dem.
[Pg 175]
The above proof is given shortly because it proceeds on the same lines
as *117·12. In applying *10·55, the of that proposition is
replaced by
, and the
is replaced by
Dem.
Dem.
The advantage of this proposition is that it expresses ""
in terms of
and
alone, without the auxiliary
and
of the definition.
[Pg 176]
This proposition (which is the Schröder-Bernstein theorem) is fundamental in the theory of greater and less.
Dem.
Dem.
*117·221.
*117·222.
Dem.
*117·242.
*117·244.
[Pg 177]
Dem.
Dem.
*117·28.
*117·29.
*117·291.
Dem.
[Pg 178]
Dem.
Dem.
The above proposition shows that if a cardinal exists in a
given type, so do all smaller cardinals.
Dem.
*117·41.
Dem.
*117·43.
*117·44.
*117·45.
Dem.
*117·46.
*117·47.
[Pg 179]
*117·5.
Dem.
*117·51.
Dem.
*117·52.
Dem.
*117·53.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 180]
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
The proof of *117·561 follows from *117·56 in the same way as the proof of *117·31 follows from *117·3. In the remainder of this number we shall omit proofs of this kind.
*117·57.
Dem.
[Pg 181]
Dem.
The two following propositions are lemmas for *117·59.
*117·582.
Dem.
*117·583.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 182]
The hypothesis is essential in the above proposition, for
while
, so that
.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in *120·53.
Dem.
*117·61.
Dem.
*117·63.
Dem.
[Pg 183]
The two following propositions are lemmas for *117·64.
*117·632.
Dem.
*117·633.
Dem.
Dem.
*117·651.
Dem.
[Pg 184]
*117·66.
Dem.
*117·661.
The above proposition is important.
*117·67.
Dem.
*117·68.
Dem.
*117·681.
*117·682.
Dem.
*117·683.
*117·684.
The above proposition is used in *120·765.
[Pg 185]
The correlators established at various stages throughout Section B present certain analogies to each other, and they or others closely resembling them will be found to be the correlators required in relation-arithmetic (Part IV). We shall therefore here collect together the most important propositions hitherto proved on correlators.
When we have to deal with correlators of two different functions
of a single class, as e.g. and
, the correlator is usually
or
or
, with a suitable limitation on
the converse domain. Sometimes it is
or
. Thus for example the class
, by means of which
is
defined (*112), has double similarity with
if
(*112·14); in this case, the
double correlator is
with its converse
domain limited, i.e.
In the case of
and
,
the correlator is
, i.e.
In the case of
and
, the correlator is
, i.e.
also correlates
with
(*85·61) and
with
(*85·53), and
with
(*85·27·42) if
.
The correlator of with
is
(*116·131).
Another kind of correlators arises where we are given a correlator
of and
, and we wish to construct a correlator
for some associated classes
and
where we
are given correlators of
with
and of
with
, and we wish to construct a correlator of
with
, where
is some double descriptive function in the sense
of *38. In this case, the correlator will usually be of the form
(with a limited converse domain). Sometimes
and
will be identical; sometimes
will be
.
Such correlators always depend upon
*55·61.
together with the propositions *74·77 seq. giving cases
in which is a
one-one relation. It follows from *55·61 that if
and
are correlators whose converse domains include the domain and
converse domain respectively[Pg 186] of a relation
, then
will be a relation holding between
and
whenever
holds between
and
. Examples of such
correlators as
are
*112·153.
*113·127.
*113·65.
*114·51.
*116·192.
An exceptionally simple correlator is given by
*115·502.
Another exceptionally simple case is
*73·63.
By means of the above correlators, most correlators that are required
can be calculated. Thus it will be seen that *116·192 in the above list
is an immediate consequence of *113·127 and *115·502, since
In order to develop the subject, it is almost always necessary, not merely to prove that two classes are similar, but actually to construct a correlator of the two classes. This applies equally to relation-arithmetic, in which analogous correlators are used to prove ordinal similarity.
[Pg 187]
Summary of Section C.
The distinction of finite and infinite is not required, as appears from Section B, for the definition of the arithmetical operations or for the proof of their formal laws. There are, however, many important respects in which finite cardinals and classes differ respectively from infinite cardinals and classes, and these differences must now be investigated.
There are two different ways in which we may define the finite and the infinite, and these two ways cannot (so far as is known at present) be shown to be equivalent except by assuming the multiplicative axiom. As there seems no good reason for regarding one of these ways as giving more exactly than the other what is usually meant by the words "finite" and "infinite," we shall, to avoid confusion, give other names than these to each of the two ways of dividing classes and cardinals. The division effected by the first method of definition we shall call the division into inductive and non-inductive; that effected by the second method we shall call the division into non-reflexive and reflexive.
The division into inductive and non-inductive, which is treated in
*120, is defined as follows. An inductive cardinal is one which can
be reached from 0 by successive additions of 1; that is, an inductive
cardinal is one which has to 0 the relation , where (by
*38·02)
is the relation of
to
, and the
subscript asterisk has the meaning defined in *90. Hence we put
By applying the definition of *90, this gives
This proposition may be regarded as stating that an inductive cardinal
is one which obeys mathematical induction starting from 0, i.e.
it is one which possesses every property possessed by 0 and by the
numbers obtained by adding 1 to numbers possessing the property.
In elementary mathematics, it is customary to regard mathematical
induction, as applied to the series of natural numbers, as a principle
rather than a definition, but according to[Pg 188] the above procedure it
becomes a definition rather than a principle. This procedure is
unavoidable as soon as it is perceived that there are cardinals which
do not obey mathematical induction starting from 0. (This only holds
on the assumption that the total number of objects in any one type is
not one of the inductive cardinals. This assumption, in a slightly
different form, is introduced below as the "axiom of infinity.")
Thus for example
, and
.
Hence if
is any inductive cardinal,
. But we know that
,
the first of Cantor's transfinite cardinals[6], satisfies
. Thus mathematical induction starting from 0
cannot be validly applied to prove properties of
. It
follows that the inductive cardinals as above defined are only some
among cardinals; nor does it appear that there is any way of defining
them except as those that obey mathematical induction starting from 0.
It follows that mathematical induction is not a principle, to be either
proved or assumed as an axiom, but is merely a characteristic defining
a certain class of cardinals, namely the class of inductive cardinals.
By a syllogism in Barbara, it is evident that 0 is an inductive cardinal; hence by the definition 1 is an inductive cardinal, and hence 2, 3, ... are inductive cardinals. Thus any given cardinal in the series of natural numbers can be shown to be an inductive cardinal. The usual elementary properties of inductive cardinals, such as the uniqueness of subtraction and division, are easily proved by mathematical induction.
We define an inductive class as a class the number of whose terms is
an inductive cardinal. More simply, we put
It is then easily shown that an inductive class is one which can be
reached from
by successive additions of single members.
That is, if we put
Thus we have
We might equally well have begun by defining inductive classes, and
proceeded to define inductive cardinals as the cardinals of inductive
classes; in that case, we should have used the above relation
to
define inductive classes.
Some of the properties which we expect inductive cardinals to possess,
such for example as , can only be proved
by assuming that no inductive cardinal is null, i.e. that
This amounts to the assumption that, in any fixed type, a class
can be found[Pg 189] having any assigned inductive number of terms. If
this were false, there would have to be some definite member of the
series of natural numbers which gave the total number of objects of
the type in question. Thus suppose there were exactly n individuals
in the universe, and no more, where n is an inductive cardinal. We
should then have
classes,
classes of classes,
and so on. In that case, in the type of individuals we should have
,
, etc. Hence we should have
In the type of classes, we should get similar results for
, and
so on. It is plain (though not demonstrable except in each particular
case) that if the assumption
fails in any one type, it fails in any other type in the same
hierarchy, and if it holds in any one, it holds in any other; for if
n be the total number of individuals, then if
is an inductive
cardinal, the total number of any other type is an inductive cardinal,
while if
is not an inductive cardinal, no more is the total
number of any other type. Hence the assumption
is either true in any type or false in any type in one hierarchy. We
shall call it the "axiom of infinity," putting
This assumption, like the multiplicative axiom, will be adduced as
a hypothesis whenever it is relevant. It seems plain that there is
nothing in logic to necessitate its truth or falsehood, and that it can
only be legitimately believed or disbelieved on empirical grounds. When
we wish to use a typically definite form of the axiom, we shall employ
the definition
which asserts that, if
is any inductive cardinal, there are
at least
terms of the same type as
.
It is important to observe that, although the axiom of infinity cannot
(so far as appears) be proved a priori, we can prove that any given
inductive cardinal exists in a sufficiently high type. For if the total
number of individuals be , the numbers of objects in succeeding
types are
,
, etc., and these numbers grow beyond
any assigned inductive cardinal. Owing, however, to the fact that we
cannot add together an infinite number of classes whose types increase
without limit, we cannot hence show that there is a type in which
every inductive cardinal exists, though we can show of every inductive
cardinal that there is a type in which it exists. i.e. if
is any inductive cardinal, there must be a type for
such that
is true; but there need not be a type
for
such that if
is any inductive cardinal,
is true.
The axiom of infinity suffices to prove the existence, in appropriate
types, of ,
,
,
...
,
, ...[7]. It does not
[Pg 190]suffice, so far as we know, to prove the existence of
or any Aleph with a greater suffix than
, because
the existences of
,
, ... are proved in
successively rising types, and no meaning can be found for a type whose
order is infinite.
The other definition of finite and infinite is of less importance
in practice than the definition by induction. It is dealt with in
*124. According to this definition, we call a class reflexive when it
contains a proper part similar to itself, i.e. we put
or, what comes to the same thing,
We call a cardinal reflexive when it is the homogeneous cardinal of a
reflexive class, i.e. we put
It is easy to show that
We find that inductive classes and cardinals are non-reflexive, and
reflexive classes and cardinals are non-inductive. We find also that
reflexive cardinals are those that are equal to or greater than
, while inductive cardinals are those that are less than
. By assuming the multiplicative axiom, we can show
that every cardinal is equal to, greater than, or less than
,
whence it follows that every cardinal is either reflexive or
inductive, thus identifying the two definitions of finite and infinite.
But so long as we refrain from assuming either the multiplicative axiom
or some special axiom ad hoc, it remains possible (so far as is
known at present) that there may be cardinals neither greater than,
nor equal to, nor less than
. Such cardinals, if they
exist, are neither inductive nor reflexive: they are infinite if we
define infinity by the negation of induction, but finite if we define
infinity by reflexiveness. It is possible that further investigation
may either prove or disprove the existence of such cardinals; for the
present, their existence must remain an open question, except for those
who regard the multiplicative axiom as a self-evident truth.
In *121 we shall consider intervals in a discrete series;
i.e. in a series generated by a one-one relation between
consecutive terms. If be the generating relation of such a
series, and
and
be two members of the series, of which
is the later, the terms which lie between
and
are the
terms
for which we have
where
has the meaning defined in *91. Hence we put
where "
" means "the
-interval between
and
."
We want[Pg 191] also symbols for the interval together with one or both of its
end-points. For these we put
[8]
Thus, for example, if
and
be inductive cardinals, and
be the relation of
to
, and
,
will be the numbers greater than
and less than
,
while
will be these numbers together with
,
will be these numbers together with
, and
will be these numbers together with both
and
. By means of intervals, we define a class of relations
(where
is any inductive cardinal), where "
"
means that we can pass from
to
in
steps. In order
to fit the case in which
and
are identical, and to insure
that no relation such as
shall hold between terms which do
not both belong to the field of
, we put
Then, provided
,
,
and if further
, then
,
, etc. If
is a transitive serial relation,
is the relation "immediately preceding," which has great importance
in well-ordered series. In this case,
. If
is a transitive serial relation generating a finite series or
a progression or a series of the type of the negative and positive
integers in order of magnitude, we have
In *121 we shall only consider in the case where
and generally we shall have the further hypothesis
. We can then prove that the interval
between
and
is always an inductive class (it will be null
unless
); this proposition is useful in its application to
the number-series and to progressions generally.
When ,
[Pg 192]the class of such relations as
(where
is an
inductive cardinal) is identical with
, the class
of powers of
(cf. *91 seq.). This identification (which
does not hold in general without the above hypothesis) leads to many
useful propositions. In *91 seq., we treated powers of a
relation without the use of numbers, i.e. without defining the
th power of
. When the powers of
are the class of
such relations as
, we can of course take
as
the
th power of
. The general definition of the
th
power of
(where
is an inductive cardinal) will be given
later, in *301; we shall denote it by
, thereby including the
notation
already defined.
In *122 we shall deal with progressions, i.e. with series of the
type of the series of natural numbers. In this number, we shall deal
with such series as generated by one-one relations; they will be dealt
with at a later stage (*263) as generated by transitive relations.
We define a progression as a one-one relation whose domain is the
posterity of its first term, i.e.
According to this definition, there must be a first term
;
will be
,
i.e.
, which is contained
in
, i.e. in
;
since
, every term of the field of
has a successor, so that there is no end to the series; since
, every term of the
series can be reached from the beginning by successive steps. These
characteristics suffice to define progressions.
In *123 we proceed to the definition and discussion of ,
the smallest of reflexive cardinals. This is the cardinal number of any
class whose terms can be arranged in a progression; hence it is the
class of domains of progressions, i.e. we may put
With this definition, remembering that
is a cardinal,
we can prove that
is a cardinal; but to prove that
is an existent cardinal, we need the axiom of
infinity. The existence-theorem for
is then derived
from the inductive cardinals, which, if no one of them is null, form a
progression when arranged in order of magnitude. It should be observed
that this existence-theorem is for a higher type than that for which
the axiom of infinity is assumed. In order to get an existence-theorem
for the same type, we need the multiplicative axiom as well.
After a number on reflexive classes and cardinals (*124) and a number on the axiom of infinity (*125), the Section ends with a number (*126) on "typically indefinite inductive cardinals." The constant inductive cardinals are the typically ambiguous symbols 0, 1, 2, ...; thus we want to define the class of inductive cardinals in such a way that a variable member of the class shall be typically ambiguous. This is not possible without a sacrifice of rigour, but in *126 it is shown how to minimize the sacrifice of rigour, and how to obviate the resulting logical dangers. A variable whose values are typically ambiguous is said to be "typically indefinite."
A proof that all inductive cardinals exist has often been derived from
*120·57 (below). But according to the doctrine of types, this proof is
invalid, since "" in *120·57 is necessarily of higher
type than "
."
[7]
For the definitions of ,
,
etc., see *265.
[8] These symbols are suggested by those given in Peano's Formulaire, Vol. IV. p. 116. (Algèbre, § 46.)
[Pg 193]
Summary of *118.
A difficulty arises respecting substitution in arithmetic. For
if is a formal number and its occurrence in
is
arithmetical, then by
is always to be taken
in an existential type. Hence we can only substitute a real variable
for
under the hypothesis
, and we can
only substitute another formal number
for
provided
that the equation
, which justifies the substitution,
is arithmetical, i.e. provided that in this equation the type of
is such that
.
The result is that the application of *20·18 is apt to lead to fallacies owing to the different meanings which a formal number may possess in different occurrences. Hitherto we have considered each case in detail, e.g. note on *110·61, and proof of *110·56.
The condition for the safe application of *20·18 is given in *118·01, namely
*118·01.
This question is more fully discussed in the prefatory statement of this volume. The first reference to *118·01 is in *120·222. Another way of evading the difficulty is to work with formal numbers which, together with all their components, are of the same type. This leads to the consideration of Uniform Formal Numbers, which with the exception of *118·01 occupies the rest of the number.
The dominant type of a formal number as used in any context is the type of the formal number itself in that context, and the subordinate types of the formal number are the dominant types of its component formal numbers.
When the dominant types of some of the formal numbers are not expressly
indicated by an explicit notation (cf. *65), the rules according to
which the dominant types thus left ambiguous are to be related, so far
as they are related, including the rules governing the relation of
subordinate types, if left ambiguous, to dominant types, are given by
conventions ,
, and
of the
prefatory statement in this volume.
We have now to consider an important special case which arises when
types are explicitly indicated by the use of *65·01·03. A formal
number,[Pg 194] whose subordinate types are the same as its dominant type, is
called uniform; and if some of its subordinate types are the
same as its dominant type, it is called partially uniform. A
formal number can only be partially uniform, or at least so designated
as to be necessarily partially uniform, when the dominant type and
those subordinate types identical with it are expressly indicated by
*65·01·03. For otherwise the conventions ,
,
and perhaps also
, apply; and these do not secure
uniformity, and may perhaps in some contexts be inconsistent with it.
Common sense in its consideration of arithmetic habitually disregards
the possibility of a formal number representing . In other
words, it always applies conventions
and
.
But also, owing to its disregard of types, it assumes that the formal
numbers are all uniform. The assumption which is really essential to
this common sense reasoning, so far as the form of its arithmetical
conclusions are concerned, is the assumption that none of the numerical
symbols represent
. This assumption is secured here, when
no types are expressly indicated, by
and
.
We have now to consider the effect on arithmetical operations of the
other assumption, that the formal numbers are uniform, or partially
uniform. There is no difficulty arising from any change of convention
for symbolism, since, as stated above, partial or complete uniformity
is secured by express indication of type. Accordingly conventions
,
continue, as always, to apply when the
types of formal numbers are left ambiguous.
Convention will not be applied either in *118 or *119 or
*120: in *118 the fact is entirely unimportant since the dominant types
of equational occurrences are always indicated, so that no case arises
when it could apply.
Apart from its intrinsic interest and its bearing on substitution, the arithmetic of uniform formal numbers is necessary for *120, where the fundamental arithmetical properties of inductive numbers are investigated.
The propositions of this number are proved by the use of the results of *117. The basis of the reasoning is
*118·13.
In *118·2·3·4 the meaning of the symbolism for dominant types is stated, namely
*118·2.
*118·3.
*118·4.
The important propositions which are finally reached for addition are
*118·23.
[Pg 195]
*118·24.
*118·241.
*118·25.
The important propositions for multiplication are
*118·33.
*118·34.
*118·341.
*118·35.
*118·351.
The important propositions for exponentiation are
*118·43.
*118·44.
*118·441.
*118·45.
*118·451.
*118·46.
*118·461.
with two analogous propositions *118·462·463,
*118·47.
*118·471.
with two analogous propositions *118·472·473.
It is thus seen that, apart from some exceptional cases connected with
0 and 1, in all arithmetical operations uniform, or partially uniform,
formal numbers can replace those constructed in obedience to convention
.
[Pg 196]
As far as the symbolism is concerned, this proposition with the
omission of from the hypothesis is a transcript
of *20·18. But if
or
(not excluding both) is a
formal number,
is required in case the occurrence of
in
is arithmetical. In fact this proposition embodies
the three fundamental propositions of the Principle of Arithmetical
Substitution arrived at in the Prefatory Explanations on Types. Its
necessity arises from the convention
which is explained
there.
*118·11.
Dem.
*118·12.
*118·13.
*118·2.
*118·201.
*118·21.
Dem.
Here the reference is to the convention
explained in the prefatory statement.
*118·22.
Dem.
*118·23.
Dem.
[Pg 197]
*118·24.
Dem.
*118·25.
Dem.
*118·3.
*118·301.
*118·31.
Dem.
*118·311.
*118·32.
Dem.
[Pg 198]
*118·33.
*118·34.
Dem.
*118·341.
*118·35.
*118·351.
*118·352.
*118·4.
*118·401.
*118·402.
Dem.
*118·41.
Dem.
*118·411.
*118·42.
*118·421.
*118·43.
[Pg 199]
*118·44.
*118·441.
*118·45.
Dem.
*118·451.
Dem.
*118·46.
*118·461.
Dem.
*118·462.
[Pg 200]
*118·463.
*118·47.
*118·471.
Dem.
[Pg 201]
Summary of *119.
The treatment of subtraction follows the same general lines as that of addition, and is simplified by the results in *110. A difficulty arises from the fact that subtraction (in any ordinary sense of the term) is not always possible; and also from the fact that the result, when possible, is not always a cardinal number.
We put
*119·01.
Thus when subtraction (in the ordinary sense of the term) is not
possible,
The question of existential adjustment of types is dealt with by
of the prefatory statement combined with the following
definitions:
*119·02.
*119·03.
We then proceed to deduce the elementary properties derivable from these definitions.
*119·11.
*119·12
*119·14.
*119·25.
*119·26.
The next group of propositions is concerned with some simple results of subtraction.
*119·32.
*119·34.
*119·35.
Associative laws are then considered.
*119·44.
*119·45.
The question of types is then dealt with:
[Pg 202]
*119·52.
A difficulty arises from the fact that if and
are two complete types whose members are classes, we cannot
prove that, either
or
. We put
*119·54.
Then we obtain
*119·541.
Finally we show that any existential adjustment of types will suffice for the components:
*119·61.
*119·62.
Also *119·25·26 are now extended to
*119·64.
The only applications of the propositions of this number are in connection with Inductive Cardinals (cf. *120).
*119·01.
Here the suffix to the sign of subtraction is introduced to show that
we are concerned with cardinal subtraction. It will be found that
is not an
except under hypotheses for
and
.
*119·04.
Note that the occurrence of a formal number in the place of
or
in
is an arithmetic occurrence, and
accordingly
applies to it.
*119·1.
*119·101.
*119·102.
*119·103.
*119·11.
Dem.
[Pg 203]
Thus is an
when
is an
.
*119·13.
Dem.
*119·14.
*119·21.
The notation is defined in *65·01.
Dem.
*119·22.
Dem.
*119·23.
Dem.
*119·24.
Dem.
Dem.
*119·27.
For the extension of this theorem cf. *119·64.
[Pg 204]
*119·31.
Dem.
The penultimate step in the proof employs the principle, explained in
the prefatory statement, that, since in the previous line the equation
has its sides undetermined in type by the conventions
and
, any convenient type can be chosen for them. The type
chosen in this line is such that
, and the
references indicate the existence of at least one such type.
*119·32.
*119·33.
Dem.
*119·35.
Dem.
*119·41.
Dem.
[Pg 205]
*119·42.
Dem.
Note that if be an infinite class, it does not follow from
that
.
This will be proved, however, when
is an inductive class (cf.
*120·41).
*119·43.
Dem.
*119·44.
Dem.
*119·45.
*119·51.
Dem.
*119·52.
The difficulty in respect to types, which arises from the fact that
and
have not been proved to be identical, does not
exist when
is an "inductive number"; cf. *120·413.
*119·53.
*119·531.
Dem.
[Pg 206]
*119·532.
Dem.
*119·54.
*119·541.
Dem.
Dem.
*119·63.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 207]
Summary of *120.
Inductive Cardinals are those that obey mathematical induction starting
from 0, i.e. in the language of Part II, Section E, they are
the posterity of 0 with respect to the relation of to
,
or, in more popular language, they are those that can be
reached from 0 by successive additions of 1. In former days, these
were supposed to be all the cardinals, and mathematical induction was
treated as a kind of self-evident axiom. We now know that only certain
cardinals obey mathematical induction starting from 0. It is these
cardinals which are to be considered in this number. They embrace 0, 1,
2, ... and generally all those cardinals which would be commonly called
finite, all those which can be expressed in the usual Arabic system of
numeration, and no others. The propositions to be proved concerning
them in this number are elementary and familiar; the interest lies
entirely in the definition and method of proof, not in the propositions
themselves.
Put
Since has necessarily its domain and converse domain
of the same type, it is important to be careful in noting the relations
of type. Accordingly we also put
We begin by applying the propositions of *90. Thus we have
*120·11.
*120·12.
*120·121.
*120·13.
*120·15.
*120·151.
*120·152.
We then proceed to deduce the elementary properties of inductive
classes, putting
We have
[Pg 208]
*120·21.
*120·211.
(We do not have an equivalence here, because, for aught we know, it
might be possible to determine the ambiguity of
so that
, even when
.
his will not be possible, however, if the axiom of infinity
is assumed.)
*120·212·213.
*120·214.
We have a set of propositions applying induction to classes directly, and not through the intermediary of cardinals. Thus we have
*120·251.
*120·26.
We then state the axiom of infinity, and prove (*120·33) that it
is equivalent to the assumption that if is an inductive
cardinal,
. To prove this, we first
prove various propositions about
, among others the
following:
*120·311.
*120·322.
We then proceed to consider subtraction (*120·41—·418), which only gives a cardinal number when the subtrahend is an inductive cardinal. We have
*120·41.
We might validly put instead of
,
since
will be true whenever it
is significant.
We have
*120·411.
*120·4111.
Hence we arrive at the conditions requisite for the usual point of view of subtraction; namely,
*120·412.
Also from *120·4111 we deduce
*120·414.
And from *120·411.*119·34, we find
*120·416.
We prove next that no proper part of an inductive class is similar to the whole (*120·426), i.e. that inductive classes are non-reflexive, and various connected propositions, e.g.
[Pg 209]
*120·423.
*120·4232.
*120·428.
*120·429.
The last two of the above propositions do not hold in general when
is a cardinal which is not inductive.
We prove next that if is an existent inductive cardinal,
then any existent cardinal is greater than, equal to, or less than
(*120·441); that if
,
are inductive
cardinals, so is
(*120·45·4501), and if
is an inductive cardinal other than
, so are
and
(*120·452). We then have some propositions
dealing with mathematical induction starting from 1 or 2, e.g.
*120·4622.
*120·47.
From *120·452 we deduce
*120·48.
so that any number less than an inductive number is inductive. Hence
*120·481.
which is a proposition constantly used, and
*120·491.
We then prove that if ,
are inductive cardinals,
and
are either inductive
cardinals or
(*120·5*120·52), while conversely if
or
is an existent inductive cardinal,
and
are so also, with exceptions for 0 and 1 (*120·512·56·561).
Hence we infer the uniqueness of division and the taking of roots
(*120·51·53·55) so long as inductive numbers are concerned.
We have next a set of propositions on the axiom of infinity and the
multiplicative axiom. We prove (*120·61) that if there is any existent
cardinal which is not inductive, the axiom of infinity is true. From
*83·9·904, we infer by induction that if is an inductive
class of which
is not a number,
exists (*120·62), whence it follows that either the multiplicative
axiom or the axiom of infinity must be true (*120·64).
Finally, we have a set of propositions on inductive classes. We prove
*120·71.
*120·74.
*120·75.
with analogous propositions (involving however a hypothesis as to
[Pg 210]) on the subject of
.
The propositions of the present number are essential to the ordinary arithmetic of finite numbers. In the present work, however, they are not much used after the present section until we reach Part V, Section E, where we deal with the ordinal theory of finite and infinite.
*120·01.
Note that in virtue of our general conventions for descriptive
functions of two arguments (*38),
That is,
is the relation of a cardinal to its immediate
predecessor. It is the number written in the usual mathematical
notation as +1 in the series of positive and negative integers, just as
its converse is the number -1. (It should be observed that if
is any cardinal, +
is not identical with
, since +
is a relation, while
is a class of classes.)
*120·011.
All members of belong to the
same type as
, so that, if
is any member of
, "
" is significant.
*120·02.
*120·021.
In virtue of these definitions an inductive class is one whose cardinal is an inductive cardinal.
"," like "
," is an arithmetical
hypothesis which some will consider self-evident, but which we prefer
to keep as a hypothesis, and to adduce in that form whenever it is
relevant. Like "
," it states an existence-theorem.
In the above form, it states that, if
is any inductive
cardinal, there is at least one class (of the type in question)
which has
terms. An equivalent assumption would be that,
if
is any inductive class, there are objects which are not
members of
. For in that case, if
be such an object,
. Hence by
induction, every inductive cardinal must exist. Another equivalent
assumption would be that
(the class of all objects of
the type in question) is not an inductive class. The assumption that
exists in the type in question is, as we shall see, a
stronger assumption than the above, unless we assume the multiplicative
axiom.
If the axiom of infinity is true, the inductive cardinals are all
different one from another, i.e. , where
and
are inductive cardinals, is not equal to
unless
. But if the axiom of infinity is false,
then, in any assigned type, all the cardinals after a certain one are
. (Except in the lowest type, the last existent cardinal
must be a power of 2.) That is, if (say) 8 were the largest existent
cardinal in the type in question, we should[Pg 211] have, in that type,
, and the same would hold of 10, 11, .... This
possibility has to be taken account of in what follows.
In order to give typical definiteness to the axiom of infinity, we write
Then "" states that, if
is any
inductive cardinal, there are at least
objects of the same
type as
.
The right-hand side of the above equivalence gives the usual formula
for mathematical induction. Observe that the conditions of significance
require that should be taken in the same type as
. This fact is specially relevant in the proof of *120·15.
The symbol "" is of ambiguous type not necessarily
the same in different occurrences; also, according to the convention
explained in the prefatory statement as holding for
and
, "
" will not
imply that
and
are of the same type. Accordingly
to avoid error in connection with *120·1·101 typical definiteness is
required as in the three following propositions.
*120·102.
*120·103.
By means of this proposition and *120·12, any assigned cardinal in the series of natural numbers can be shown to be an inductive cardinal; thus e.g. to show that 27 is an inductive cardinal, we shall only have to use *120·121 twenty-seven times in succession.
*120·122.
*120·124.
Dem.
[Pg 212]
*120·13.
Dem.
The above proposition is often convenient for inductive proofs.
*120·14.
Dem.
This proposition does not show that every inductive cardinal is an existent cardinal; to obtain this, we require the axiom of infinity.
i.e. a cardinal which is not null and is inductive in any one type is also inductive in any other type.
Dem.
*120·151.
Dem.
*120·152.
Dem.
[Pg 213]
The following propositions, giving alternative forms for the definition of inductive classes, are inserted in order to show that the theory of inductive classes might be treated in a less arithmetical manner than we have adopted.
*120·2.
*120·201.
Dem.
*120·21.
Dem.
Note that ""
is not proved above. The proof encounters the
difficulty that we may have
; in order
to establish our proposition in this case, we have to show that if
, then every class is an
inductive class. We can however prove the following implication.
*120·211.
Dem.
*120·212.
*120·213.
*120·214.
The following propositions are lemmas for *120·24.
*120·22.
Dem.
[Pg 214]
*120·221.
Dem.
Dem.
The proof of this proposition might also proceed by the use of uniform formal numbers, employing *118·241.
*120·23.
Dem.
Dem.
This proposition might be used to define inductive classes. It gives
a form of mathematical induction applicable to classes instead of
to numbers. Virtually it states that an inductive class is one
which can be formed by adding members one at a time, starting from
. This is made more explicit in *120·25. Instead of
,
in the above propositions, as well as in those that follow, we may
plainly substitute
*120·251.
*120*26.
[Pg 215]
*120·261.
*120·27.
Dem.
This proposition also follows immediately from *12·21·15.
*120·3.
*120·301.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 216]
*120·321.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 217]
The above proposition establishes (with the natural limitations) the uniqueness (within each type) of subtraction (conceived as in *120·412) when the subtrahend is an inductive cardinal. (When the subtrahend is a non-inductive cardinal, subtraction ceases to give a unique result.) Hence we are led to the following extensions of *118 for the case of inductive cardinals:
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
*120·414.
*120·415.
*120·416.
*120·417.
[Pg 218]
*120·42.
Dem.
*120·422.
Dem.
*120·423.
Dem.
*120·4231.
Dem.
[Pg 219]
Dem.
*120·425.
Dem.
Dem.
*120·427.
The above proposition shows that no reflexive class is inductive.
*120·428.
Dem.
*120·429.
Dem.
[Pg 220]
The following definition, in which "" stands for
"
," defines the "species" of a cardinal
as all
cardinals which are less than, equal to, or greater than
.
We cannot prove, unless by assuming the multiplicative axiom, that
all cardinals belong to the species of
, except in the case
where
is an inductive cardinal. In all other cases there may,
so far as is known at present, be other cardinals which are neither
greater nor less than
.
*120·43.
*120·431.
*120·432.
*120·433.
*120·434.
*120·436.
*120·437.
*120·438.
Dem.
*120·44.
Dem.
[Pg 221]
*120·442.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
The following proposition is a lemma in the proof of *120·452.
Dem.
This proposition could be extended to greater generality as regards types; but its sole use is as a lemma.
Dem.
[Pg 222]
In the last line but one of the above proof, we substitute for the
of *120·11 the function
The following propositions are chiefly required as leading to *120·4621·4622·47, which are useful in proving propositions concerning all inductive cardinals other than zero.
*120·46.
Dem.
*120·461.
Dem.
*120·462.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 223]
It is on this proposition that the irrelevance of types in the consideration of inductive cardinals depends.
*120·463.
Thus mathematical induction starting from 1 will apply to all inductive cardinals except 0. Similar propositions can be similarly proved for 2, 3, ....
*120·471.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 224]
*120·48.
Thus every cardinal which is not greater than every inductive cardinal is an inductive cardinal.
*120·481.
Thus if any inductive class can be found which contains a given class, the given class is also inductive.
*120·49.
Dem.
Thus every non-inductive cardinal (except ) is greater than
every inductive cardinal (except
).
Dem.
*120·492.
In virtue of *120·491, a class which is not inductive contains
sub-classes having 0, 1, 2, 3, ... terms. If we take the successive
classes of sub-classes
these are mutually exclusive, and all exist provided
is not an inductive[Pg 225] cardinal, i.e. provided the axiom of
infinity holds. Thus if the axiom of infinity holds, we get
classes of sub-classes contained in any non-inductive class.
It follows, as we shall see later, that if
is a non-inductive
class,
is a reflexive class. This seems to
be the nearest approach possible to identifying the two definitions of
finite and infinite when the multiplicative axiom is not assumed. When
the multiplicative axiom is assumed as well as the axiom of infinity,
we pick out one class from
, one from
, and so on; then, forming the logical sum of
all these classes, we get
terms which are members of
. Hence it follows that
is a reflexive class; for, as we
shall see later, a reflexive class is one which contains sub-classes of
terms. Thus with the help of the multiplicative axiom,
the two definitions of finite and infinite can be identified.
*120·493.
Dem.
Dem.
The restriction involved in in
the hypothesis of the above proposition is not necessary if we assume
that the axiom of infinity must fail in any one type if it fails in any
other, i.e.
[Pg 226]where
and
are any two objects of any two
types. To prove this proposition would require assumptions, as to
the interrelation of various types, which have not been made in our
previous proofs.
This proposition establishes the uniqueness of division among inductive cardinals.
Dem.
If ,
in the above are typically ambiguous symbols,
such as
we have
; for in this case,
.
Also if
and
are of the same type, we have
,
in virtue of *103·43. Hence "
" may, with
truth, be substituted for "
" in the above
proposition, since the result is true whenever significant. But in this
form the proposition gives less information, since it tells us nothing
as to what happens when
and
are not of the same
type.
*120·511.
Dem.
Dem.
*120·513.
This proposition does not hold when is a non-inductive
cardinal.
Dem.
[Pg 227]
Dem.
If ,
,
are typically ambiguous symbols,
we have
in the conclusion of the above proposition,
instead of
. Also if
and
are of the same type,
; thus
whenever "
" is significant.
*120·54.
For the proof, which is here given shortly, compare *117·58.
Dem.
*120·541.
*120·542.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 228]
Here "" is necessarily in a higher type than "
,"
because it applies to a class of which
is a member.
Dem.
*120·6.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 229]
Dem.
The above proposition may also be deduced from *120·611, by *62·231.
*120·63.
In virtue of this proposition the multiplicative axiom is not required in dealing with a finite number of factors, even when some or all of the factors are themselves infinite.
Dem.
Thus of our two arithmetical axioms, the multiplicative axiom and the axiom of infinity, at least one must be true.
*120·7.
*120·71.
Dem.
The above proposition is frequently used.
[Pg 230]
*120·72.
Dem.
*120·721.
Dem.
*120·73.
*120·731.
Dem.
*120·741.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 231]
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned in establishing the converse of *120·76 subject to a suitable hypothesis. The final outcome is given in *120·77.
*120·761.
Dem.
*120·762.
Dem.
[Pg 232]
*120·764.
*120·766.
Dem.
*120·767.
[Pg 233]
Summary of *121.
The present number is concerned with the class of terms between
and
with respect to some relation
, i.e.
those terms which lie on a road from
to
on which any two
consecutive terms have the relation
. Such a road may be called
a
-road, and if
, the step from
to
may be
called a
-step. In order that a
-road from
to
should exist, it is necessary and sufficient that we should have
. When this condition is fulfilled, there will
in general be many
-roads from
to
. But if
, or if
,then at most one
road leads from
to
. This follows from the propositions of
*96. In virtue of those propositions, if
,
is
throughout the road from
to
, and this road forms an
open series. The two other possibilities with a
are (assuming
)
In the first case, there is a cyclic road from to
, and
there are two roads from
to
, one consisting of that part
of the cycle which is required to reach
, the other consisting of
this part together with the whole cycle required to travel from
back to
. Thus the class of terms which can be reached in some
journey from
to
is the whole class of descendants of
,
i.e. the class
, which is the cycle
composing the road from
to
.
In the second case, the descendants of form a
, and
is
in the circular part of the
. Here, as before, there are two roads
from
to
, of which the first stops as soon as it reaches
, while the second proceeds to travel round the circle until it
comes to
again. Thus here again, all the descendants of
lie
on some road between
and
.
The interval between and
is defined as the class of terms
lying on some road from
to
. There will be four kinds of
interval, according as we do or do not include the end-points as such.
We denote the kind including both end-points by
that excluding both by
and the other two respectively by
[Pg 234]
The definitions are
If is either one-many or many-one, it will be one-one
throughout the interval
, except at most at one
exceptional point, namely the junction of the tail and circle of the
. If
or
, the
interval between
and
cannot be
-shaped, but must
be either open or cyclic; in either case,
is
throughout
, with no exceptions; for
if
,
is
throughout the interval because the interval is contained in
, and if
,
because the interval is contained in
. Thus
throughout this number we shall constantly have the hypothesis
; if
, the interval is to be supposed traversed
from
to
, while if
, it
is to be supposed traversed from
to
. In either case the
interval between
and
must be an inductive class. This is
proved in *121·47. If, however,
is serial (cf. *204), and thus
neither many-one nor one-many, the interval between
and
is the stretch of the series between
and
, with or without
end-points according to the definition chosen, and need not be an
inductive class.
If the interval between and
(both included) has
members, we say that
. Thus if
there is only one road from
to
, "
"
means that it requires
steps to get from
to
.
Assuming
, if we also have
(i.e. if none of the families
of
are cyclic), then if
and
, we shall have
. On this basis an inductive theory of
is built up, and it is shown that the class of such relations
as
for different inductive values of
is the
same as
, the class of powers of
including
(*121·5). The definition of
is
The whole class of such relations as for different
inductive values of
is called
, i.e.
we put
If exists, and if
, then the
descendants of
, so long as we do not reach a term
for which
, may be unambiguously described as the 2nd, 3rd,
...
th, ... terms of the posterity of
,
itself
being the 1st term. The correlation thus effected with the inductive
cardinals is the logical essence of the process of counting; the last
cardinal used in the correlation is the cardinal number of terms
counted. We will call these terms
,
, ...
,
..., defining
as follows:
This notation does not conflict with as defined in
*65.01. There
must be a class if
is a cardinal, here
must be a cardinal and
a relation.
[Pg 235]
Hence whenever exists, the number of terms from the
beginning to
(both included) is
. This is
the fact upon which counting relies. If
is a many-one and
is contained in diversity, and
is any
inductive cardinal other than 0, then
exists when and
only when
has at least
members;
i.e. roughly speaking,
exists whenever it could
possibly be expected to exist. In this case the whole posterity of
is contained in the series
,
, ...
,
... (*121·62). If the posterity is an inductive class, this
series stops; if not, it forms a progression (cf. *122).
The propositions of the present number are very useful, not only in this section, but in the ordinal theory of finite and infinite and in parts of the book subsequent to that theory.
After some propositions which merely repeat definitions and give
immediate consequences, we proceed (*121·3 ff.) to the theory of
. We have
*121·302.
*121·305.
*121·31.
When is a transitive serial relation, we shall have
.
*121·321.
*121·333.
*121·35·351·352.
A similar result holds for , which =
n the same circumstances.
We next proceed to the proof that an interval (under a similar hypothesis) is always an inductive class. This occupies *121·4—·47, being summed up in the proposition
*121·47.
This is an important proposition. It leads to
*121·481.
with a similar proposition if .
The next set of propositions (*121·5—·52) is concerned with
. Assuming
, we prove
that
and
(*121·5); that if
is not null,
(*121·501); that
(*121·52) and
(*121·502); and that
etc. (*121·51).
[Pg 236]
Our next set of propositions is concerned with
(*121·6—·638). We have
*121·601.
*121·602.
*121·634.
Finally we have three propositions (*121·7—*121·72) on
, of which the most useful is
*121·7.
*121·01.
*121·011.
*121·012.
*121·013.
*121·03.
*121·031.
*121·04.
*121·1.
*121·101.
*121·102.
*121·103.
*121·11.
*121·12.
*121·121.
*121·13.
*121*131.
*121·14.
*121·141.
*121·142.
*121·2.
[Pg 237]
*121·201.
*121·202.
*121*21.
Dem.
*121·22.
*121·23.
*121·231.
*121·24.
Dem.
*121·241.
*121·242.
*121*25.
*121·251.
*121·252.
*121·253.
*121·254 is frequently used in the theory of series.
*121·26.
Dem.
*121·27.
Dem.
[Pg 238]
*121·271.
*121·272.
Dem.
*121·273.
Dem.
Dem.
*121·301.
Dem.
*121·302.
*121·303.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 239]
Dem.
*121·306.
Dem.
*121·307.
*121·308.
*121·31.
*121·32.
Dem.
If is not a cardinal, or if
,
.
*121·321.
Dem.
*121·322.
[Pg 240]
*121·323.
*121·324.
Dem.
*121·325.
Dem.
*121·326.
*121·327.
Dem.
*121·33·331 are lemmas for *121·332, which is a very useful proposition.
Dem.
From the above proposition it follows that
This does not follow unless , because
will always be true if
, and therefore (when
) if
.
Dem.
[Pg 241]
*121·333.
*121·34.
Dem.
*121·341.
*121·342.
*121·35.
Dem.
*121·351.
*121·352.
*121·36.
Dem.
[Pg 242]
*121·361.
Dem.
*121·371.
*121·372.
*121·373.
*121·374.
The proofs of these propositions are analogous to the proof of *121·37.
*121·38.
*121·381.
*121·382.
*121·383.
*121·384.
[Pg 243]
*121·39.
Dem.
The following series of propositions are concerned with proving
*121·47, i.e.
The proof for
follows from that for
by *121·143. Confining ourselves,
therefore, to
, we proceed as follows.
We prove first that, starting from z and going backwards, each new
step adds only one term (which may not be distinct from all its
predecessors); i.e. we have
From this it follows by induction that if
is an
inductive class, so is
. Thus we only have to
prove that
is an inductive class. Here we must
distinguish two cases, according as
or
. In the former case, we have
whence
is an inductive class, and therefore so
is
.
But in the latter case, when , the matter is more
difficult. In this case,
is a member of a cycle, the cycle being
. We have to prove that this cycle must be an
inductive class. Given
,
will be a member of this
cycle if
, and may be at the end of the tail of a
, if
. (Cf. *96.)
By *96·453, we know that is
when confined to
. Hence[Pg 244] in
,
has
a unique predecessor, say
. Assume
. We then imagine
a barrier placed between
and
, i.e. we construct a
relation
which is to hold between any two consecutive members
of
except
and
. Putting
,
we have
. Then the relation
generates an open series consisting of all the terms of
; i.e. we have
Hence, by our previous case, since
is an
inductive class, so is
.
If , then by *96·33 the cycle reduces to the single term
, and therefore
is still an inductive class.
Hence , and therefore
, is
always an inductive class when
, which
was to be proved.
Dem.
*121·41.
Dem.
In virtue of this proposition, we have only to prove
. This is obvious when
, for then either
or
. But when
, it
is more difficult.
*121·42.
Dem.
[Pg 245]
*121·43.
Dem.
*121·431.
Dem.
*121·432.
Dem.
*121·433.
Dem.
[Pg 246]
*121·434.
Dem.
*121·44.
Dem.
*121·441.
*121·45.
*121·46.
*121·48.
Dem.
*121·481.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in the proof of *122·35, which is an important proposition in the theory of progressions.
[Pg 247]
The following propositions are concerned with the identification of
such relations as with powers of
in the sense of *91.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
We shall at a later stage (*301) give a general definition of
. When this definition has been introduced, we shall be able
to prove, with the hypothesis of *121·51,
The definition of
is postponed on account of various
complications which render a general definition of
difficult.
The chief difficulty arises when[Pg 248]
.
Thus suppose we have
; we shall also have
,
,
etc. Hence if we have
, we have
Again, suppose this case excluded, but suppose
Then we shall have
Thus the general definition of
has to be complicated, except
when
.
The following propositions are concerned with the series of relations
and the series of terms
. The relation
holds between two terms (roughly speaking) when it
requires
steps to get from the first to the second; the term
is the
th term starting from
, which, when
it exists, is
. In order that
should exist, it is
necessary that
should exist, and that there should be just one
term
in the field of
such that the interval from
to
(both included) consists of
terms. When this is the case
for all inductive cardinals from 1 to
, we can say that
generates a series starting from
and having at least
terms, each correlated with one of the cardinals in the interval from
1 to
, both included; i.e. the series has a
th
term, whenever
. If this holds for all inductive
values of
, the family of
is a progression[9]. (It will
be observed that all such terms as
belong to the family of
, which need not form the whole field of
.)
Dem.
*121·601.
Dem.
*121·602.
Dem.
[Pg 249]
*121·61.
Dem.
Dem.
*121·63.
Dem.
*121·631.
Dem.
*121·632·633 are required for proving *121·634.
[Pg 250]
Dem.
*121·635.
Dem.
*121·636.
Dem.
*121·637.
Dem.
[Pg 251]
Dem.
*121*64.
Dem.
*121·641.
*121·65.
Dem.
[Pg 252]
*121·66.
Dem.
The following proposition is used in *122·38·381.
Dem.
*121·71.
Dem.
[Pg 253]
Summary of *122.
By a "progression" we mean a series which is like the series of the
inductive cardinals in order of magnitude (assuming that all inductive
cardinals exist), i.e. a series whose terms can be called
where every term of the series is correlated with some inductive
cardinal, and every inductive cardinal is correlated with some term
of the series. Such series belong to the relation-number (cf. *152
and *263) which Cantor calls
. Their generating relation
may be taken to be the transitive relation of earlier and later, or
the one-one relation of immediate predecessor to immediate successor.
We shall reserve the notation
for the transitive
generating relations of progressions; for the present, we are concerned
with the one-one relations which generate progressions. The class of
these relations we shall call "
."
It is not convenient to define a progression as a series which is ordinally similar to that of the inductive cardinals, both because this definition only applies if we assume the axiom of infinity, and because we have in any case to show that (assuming the axiom of infinity) the series of inductive cardinals has certain properties, which can be used to afford a direct definition of progressions. The existence of progressions, however, is only obtainable by means of the axiom of infinity, and is then most easily obtained from the fact that the inductive cardinals form a progression. We shall not consider the existence-theorem until the next number (*123).
From this number onwards convention of the Prefatory
Statement is used when relevant.
The characteristics of the generating relation of a progression,
which we employ in the definition, are the following:
(1) is a one-one relation;
(2) there is a first term, i.e. ;
(3) the whole field is contained in the posterity of the first term,
i.e. . (If this failed,
would consist of two or more distinct families, of which, since we have
, all but one would have to be cyclic families.)
(4) every term of the field has a successor, i.e. the series is
endless. This is secured , or (what is
equivalent)
.
[Pg 254]
These four properties suffice to define the one-one generating
relations of progressions. It will be observed that (2), (3) and (4)
are all secured by
This secures , by *14·21; it secures
, by *37·25 and *90·163; hence, by
*33·181,
, and therefore
Hence our definition of progressions is
Instead of stating in the definition that is to
be a one-one relation, it is sufficient to put
,
which, with
, implies
, and may be substituted for
without altering the force of the definition
(*122·17).
In the present number we shall prove, among other propositions, that
every existent class contained in a progression has a first term
(*122·23), i.e. that progressions are well-ordered series;
that in a progression (*122·16),
which makes the propositions of *121 available; that if
is
any inductive cardinal other than 0,
exists (*122·33),
i.e. the series has a
th term; that any class contained
in
and having a last term is an inductive class
(*122·43), and that any class contained in
and not
having a last term is itself the domain of a progression (*122·45), so
that every class contained in
is either inductive or
the domain of a progression (*122·46); that if
is a many-one,
and
a member of its domain, and if the descendants of
have no last term and are none of them descendants of themselves,
then
arranges these descendants in a progression (*122·51);
and that the same holds if
is a one-one and
(*122·52); and that if
and
belongs to
one of the generations of
, but not to one of the generations
of
, then
arranges the whole family of
in a
progression (*122·54).
The following general observations on the families of one-one relations may serve to elucidate the bearing of the propositions of this section.
Given any relation , we call
,
i.e.
the family of
. If
is a one-one, this family may be of four
different kinds. (1) It may be a closed series, like the angles of a
polygon. This occurs if
. In this case the family
forms an inductive class. (2) It may be an open series with a beginning
and an end; this occurs if
In this case also the family forms an inductive class. (3) It may
be an[Pg 255] open series with a beginning and no end, or an end and no
beginning. This occurs if
or if
In this case, the series is of the type
or
, and is non-inductive and reflexive. (4) The
series may be open and have neither beginning nor end. This occurs if
In this case we get a series whose relation-number is the sum (in the
sense of *180) of
and
, which again is
non-inductive and reflexive. In all four cases, if
and
be
any two members of the family of
, the interval between
and
is an inductive class.
If is a member of
, or if the family of
contains a member of
, cases (1) and (4)
are excluded, since the series has a beginning. In this case the number
of predecessors of any term is an inductive number. It will be observed
that every family is either wholly contained in
or
wholly contained in
; families of kinds (2)
and (3) (excluding, in (2), those which have an end but no beginning)
are contained in
, while families of kinds (1) and
(4), and those of (2) which have an end but no beginning, are contained
in
; families containing a member of
are contained in
, while all
others are contained in
.
Thus a one-one relation in general gives rise to a number of wholly
disconnected series, some closed, others open and with or without a
beginning or an end. The condition that all the series should be open
is .
The case of a -shaped family, considered in *96, cannot arise when
, for in a
-shaped family the term at the
junction of the tail and the circle has two predecessors, one in the
tail and one in the circle, so that the relation in question is not
. It follows that, when
, if
is a family containing a member of
,
(cf. *96·23).
When exists, there is only one family which has a beginning. In
this case, ignoring the other families (if any), we call the members
of the family of
respectively
,
,
,
.... If the family has
members, where
is an inductive
cardinal, its last member will be
. If on the other hand the
number of members of the family is not an inductive cardinal, it must
be
; in this case, the family forms a progression, whose
members are
,
,
, ...,
, ...,
where
always exists when
is an inductive cardinal.
[Pg 256]
In addition to the propositions already mentioned, the following are important:
*122·21.
(Cf. note to *122·21, below.)
*122·34.
*122·341.
In virtue of these two propositions, the terms of a progression are
where every inductive cardinal occurs. This is the same fact as is
usually assumed when the terms are represented as
*122·35.
*122·36.
*122·37.
*122·38.
I.e. the number of terms up to any given point of a progression is inductive.
*122·01.
Dem.
Observe that, by the conventions as to descriptive symbols,
involves the
existence of
, whereas
does not, since, if
does not exist,
we have
, and therefore
will satisfy the equivalence, i.e.
will satisfy the equivalence although it has no first
term. This is the reason why
appears explicitly in
*122·11, though it was only implicit in *122·1.
*122·12.
[Pg 257]
*122·14.
Dem.
*122·141.
Dem.
*122·142.
*122·143.
*122·15.
Dem.
*122·151.
*122·152.
This proposition enables us to apply to progressions all the
propositions of *121 in which we have as hypothesis
Dem.
[Pg 258]
To illustrate this proposition, consider its application to the
inductive cardinals arranged in order of magnitude; i.e. take as
a value of the relation
We then have ; also
We have also
so that
.
Again
whence
i.e.
But we do not get or
unless we have
which is the axiom of infinity. If this condition fails, we reach at
last an inductive cardinal which =
, and we have
so that
has two immediate predecessors, namely itself
and the last existent cardinal. The posterity of 0, in this case, is
a
in which the circle has narrowed to a single term, namely
.
Thus we need the axiom of infinity in order to prove
*122·2.
This proposition, together with *122·16 and *91·56, shows that if
,
has the three properties by
which transitive serial relations are defined (cf. *204), namely it is
(1) transitive, (2) contained in diversity, (3) connected, i.e.
such that it relates any two distinct members of its field. We shall at
a later stage define the ordinal number
as the class of such
relations as
, where
.
*122·22.
Dem.
[Pg 259]
Dem.
This proposition shows that every existent class contained in a progression has a first term, i.e. that a progression is a well-ordered series (cf. *250).
*122·231.
Dem.
*122·24.
Dem.
Except when ,
will not
reduce to a single term. In fact, if
,
, i.e.
consists of the first
terms of the
progression.
*122·25.
Dem.
[Pg 260]
The above proposition shows that what we may call an "arithmetical
progression" in a progression is a progression, i.e. if,
starting from any term of a progression, we take every other term, or
every third term, or every th term, we still have a progression.
*122·26.
Dem.
The above proposition shows that if an existent class contained in a progression has no maximum, then any assigned member of the progression is succeeded by members of the class.
The following proposition states that if has members
belonging to a progression, and there are members of the progression
which do not precede any member of
, then there is in the
progression a last member of
.
*122·27.
Dem.
*122·28.
Dem.
[Pg 261]
*122·3.
*122·31.
Dem.
*122·32.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 262]
In virtue of *122·34·341, all the terms of a progression occur in the
series ,
, ...
, ..., and every inductive
cardinal except 0 is used in forming this series.
Dem.
*122·36.
Dem.
*122·37.
Dem.
[Pg 263]
The following series of propositions are concerned in proving that
any class contained in a progression is inductive if it has a last
term, and is a progression if it has no last term. In the latter case,
it is supposed arranged in the same order as it had in the original
progression. A certain complication is necessary in order to define
its one-one generating relation. If is the generating relation
of the original progression, we proceed first to
,
then to
, where
is
the class in question; this gives us a transitive generating relation
for
. Calling this relation
, we then proceed to
, i.e. the relation of consecutive members of
the series generated by
. This relation turns out to be one-one,
and to arrange
in a progression; hence our proposition is
proved. The reason for the necessity of this detour is that consecutive
members of
may not be consecutive members of the original
progression.
*122*41.
Dem.
*122·42.
Dem.
Thus every class which is contained in a progression and has a last
term is inductive. We have next to prove
This is effected in the following propositions.
*122·44.
Note. The hypothesis here exceeds what is necessary for the conclusion, but is the hypothesis required for *122·45, for which the present and the following propositions are lemmas.
Dem.
*122·441.
Dem.
[Pg 264]
*122*442.
In proving below, we assume
and consider the maximum of
,
which is shown to exist and be
, whence
.
Dem.
*122·443.
Dem.
*122·444.
Dem.
[Pg 265]
This proposition shows that every series extracted from a progression and having no last term is a progression.
This proposition shows that any number less than the number of terms in a progression is inductive. This result will be developed in the next number (*123).
*122·47.
Dem.
*122·48.
Dem.
*122·49.
The following propositions are concerned with circumstances under which the posterity or the family of a term forms a progression.
Here has the meaning defined in *96.
Dem.
[Pg 266]
The following proposition (*122·52) is used in *123·191, *261·4 and *264·22.
Dem.
The remaining propositions (*122·53·54·55) are not used in the sequel.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 267]
Dem.
[Pg 268]
Summary of *123.
In this number we are concerned with the arithmetical properties of
, the smallest of Cantor's transfinite cardinals.
Cantor defines
as the cardinal number of any class
which can be put into one-one relation with the inductive cardinals.
This definition assumes that
, when
is an inductive cardinal; in other words, it assumes the axiom of
infinity; for without this, the inductive cardinals would form a
finite series, with a last term, namely
. For this reason
among others, we do not make similarity with the inductive cardinals
our definition. We define
as the class of
those classes which can be arranged in progressions, i.e. as
. We then have to prove that
so defined is a cardinal, and that if it is not null, it is the number
of the inductive numbers.
For convenience we put for the moment for the relation of
to
when
is an inductive cardinal. We then easily
prove
*123·21·23.
The only thing further required to prove is
, i.e.
By *120·311, this holds if , which holds if
holds. Hence
*123·25·26.
whence, by *123·36,
*123·27.
Again it is obvious from *122·34·341 that if is a progression,
can always be put into a
relation
to the inductive cardinals (*123·3) since
consists of
the terms
,
, ...
, ..., and all the
inductive cardinals are used in putting
into this form.
Hence
*123·31.
whence also
*123·311.
It remains to prove that any class similar to the inductive cardinals
is an ; this can only be proved by assuming the axiom
of infinity. We prove[Pg 269] first (*120·32) that if
is a progression,
and
is a one-one whose converse domain is
,
then
is a progression whose domain is
. Hence
*123·321.
From this and ,
,
we obtain
*123·322.
Hence by our previous results
*123·34.
Also we have, by *120·322 above,
whence, since
, we obtain at last
*123·36.
As to the existence of in various types, if
holds, i.e. if, given any inductive
cardinal
, there are classes having
terms and composed
of terms of the same type as
, then
.
Thus
*123·37.
The arithmetical properties of in regard to addition,
multiplication and exponentiation by an inductive cardinal are easily
proved. We have
*123·41.
*123·421.
*123·422.
*123·52.
*123·53.
All these propositions are well known.
The early propositions of the present number are for the most part immediate consequences of propositions proved in *122.
*123·1.
*123·101.
*123·11.
*123·12.
[Pg 270]
*123·13.
Dem.
*123·14.
*123·15.
*123·16.
*123·17.
Dem.
*123·18.
*123·192.
Dem.
*123·2.
*123·21.
Dem.
[Pg 271]
*123·22.
*123·23.
Dem.
*123·24.
Dem.
*123·25.
*123·26.
*123·27.
Dem.
[Pg 272]
*123·31.
*123·311.
It is not assumed here that and
are of the same
type.
*123·312.
Dem.
*123·313.
Dem.
*123·32.
[Pg 273]
*123·321.
*123·322.
Dem.
*123·323.
*123·33.
*123·34.
*123·35.
*123·361.
*123·37.
Dem.
*123·39.
Dem.
*123·4.
*123·401.
Dem.
*123·41.
[Pg 274]
*123·411.
*123·42.
Note that is the odd terms and
the even terms of
.
Dem.
*123·421.
Dem.
*123·422.
Dem.
*123·43.
Dem.
[Pg 275]
*123·44.
Dem.
*123·45.
*123·46.
Dem.
*123·47.
Dem.
[Pg 276]
The following propositions are concerned in proving
. The proof given is roughly Cantor's. It
consists in showing that the relation
defined in the hypothesis
of *123·5 is a progression.
Dem.
*123·501.
Dem.
*123·502.
Dem.
[Pg 277]
*123·503.
Dem.
*123·504.
*123·51.
*123·52.
*123·53.
*123·7.
Dem.
[Pg 278]
Summary of *124.
In this number, we have to take up the second definition of infinity mentioned in the introduction to this Section. A class which is infinite according to this definition we propose to call a reflexive class, because a class which is of this kind is capable of reflexion into a part of itself. A class is called reflexive when there is a one-one relation which correlates the class with a proper part of itself. (A proper part is a part not the whole.) A reflexive cardinal is the homogeneous cardinal of a reflexive class.
We prove easily that reflexive classes are not inductive (*124·271),
that reflexive cardinals are such as are greater than or equal to
(*124·23), and such as are unchanged by adding 1
(excepting
) (*124·25). To prove that classes which are
not inductive must be reflexive has not hitherto been found possible
without assuming the multiplicative axiom. We do not need, however,
to assume the axiom generally, but only as applied to products of
factors. With this assumption, the result follows by a
series of propositions explained below. Thus if a product of
factors, no one of which is zero, is never zero, then the two
definitions of the finite and the infinite coincide (*124·56).
We will call a cardinal a "multiplicative cardinal" if a
product of
factors none of which are zero is never zero.
Thus all inductive cardinals are multiplicative cardinals; and the
assumption needed for identifying the two definitions of finite and
infinite is that
should be a multiplicative cardinal.
For a reflexive class we use the notation "," and
for a reflexive cardinal we use "
." We define a
reflexive cardinal as the homogeneous cardinal of a reflexive
class, i.e. we put
The only effect of this is to exclude
from reflexive
cardinals, which is convenient. We then need (on the analogy of
*110·03*110·04) a definition of what is meant when an ambiguous symbol such
as
is said to be reflexive, and we therefore put
[Pg 279]
For the class of multiplicative cardinals we use the notation
"." Thus we put
whence it follows that if
, a product of
factors, none of which is zero, will never be zero.
We begin, in this number, with the more obvious properties of
, proving that a
is one which
contains sub-classes of
terms (*124·15), that it is one
whose number is unchanged when a single term is taken away (*124·17),
and that it remains reflexive if any inductive class is taken away from
it (*124·182).
We then give corresponding propositions concerning
(*124·23·25·252), proving, in addition to propositions already mentioned,
that a reflexive cardinal is greater than every inductive cardinal
(*124·26), and that a class which is neither inductive nor reflexive
(if there be such) is one which neither contains nor is contained in
any progression (*124·34). On such classes, see the remarks at the end
of this number.
We then (*124·4·41) give a proposition merely embodying the definition
of , and show that all inductive cardinals are
multiplicative, which follows immediately from *120·62.
The following series of propositions (*124·51 ff.) are concerned with
the proof that, if is a multiplicative cardinal, then
the two definitions of finite and infinite coalesce. The proof, which
is somewhat complicated, proceeds as follows.
To begin with, we know that if is a class which is not
inductive, it contains classes having
terms, if
is any
inductive cardinal. Thus we have
The classes of classes
,
,
...
, ... thus form a progression, which is
contained in
. Hence (*124·511)
So far, the multiplicative axiom is not required.
The above progression of classes of classes is
If
is a selective relation for this class of classes,
is a progression contained in
. Hence
*124·513.
whence
*124·514.
To prove the next step, namely
[Pg 280]
we make a fresh start. We have, by hypothesis, a progression
whose domain is contained in
; hence
.
Thus it will suffice to prove
where the conditions of significance require that
should
consist of classes.
For this purpose, we prove that no member of can be the
last that has new members which have not occurred before. The proof
proceeds by showing that if this were not so,
would
be an inductive class, and therefore, by *120·75,
would
be an inductive class. Hence (*124·534) the members of
which introduce new terms form an
, by *123·19;
and so therefore do the classes of new terms which they introduce
(*124·535). Hence (*124·536) a selection from these classes of new
terms, which is a sub-class of
, is also an
,
and therefore (*124·54) there is a progression contained in
if the selection in question exists. This completes
the proof.
In virtue of *124·511 and *120·74, we have, without the multiplicative axiom,
*124·6.
Hence if it could be shown that cannot be reflexive
unless
is reflexive, a double application of this would enable
us, by means of *124·6, to identify the two definitions of the finite
without the multiplicative axiom.
*124·01.
An equivalent definition would be
*124·02.
*124·021.
*124·03.
*124·1.
*124·11.
*124·12.
[Pg 281]
*124·13.
*124·14.
Dem.
*124·141.
Dem.
Dem.
*124·151.
*124·16.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 282]
*124·18.
*124·181.
Dem.
*124·2.
*124·21.
Dem.
*124·231.
*124·232.
*124·24.
Dem.
*124·251.
Dem.
*124·253.
Dem.
[Pg 283]
Dem.
*124·27.
Dem.
*124·28.
Dem.
*124·29.
Dem.
*124·3.
*124·31.
In virtue of the above proposition, if there are any numbers which are
neither inductive nor reflexive, they are such as are neither greater
than, less than, nor equal to . (The existence of
in a suitable type can be deduced from the existence
of numbers which are neither inductive nor reflexive; cf. *124·6.) Two
further propositions (*124·33·34) are given below on non-inductive
non-reflexive classes and cardinals. The subject is resumed in the
remarks at the end of the number.
*124·33. [Pg 284]
Dem.
The following propositions give the proof of *124·56, which identifies
the two definitions of the finite, on the assumption that
is a multiplicative cardinal. (*124·513, however, is only
used in proving *124·514, and *124·514 is not used in the proof. It
is retained as marking a stage in the argument, although the actual
propositions subsequently used are not it, but the lemmas which lead to
it.)
here has the meaning defined in *123·02.
Dem.
[Pg 285]
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned in proving that, if
is a multiplicative cardinal, then a class such as
in *124·512 must be such that a progression is contained
in
. The characteristics of
which are
used in the proof are
.
Since
, we have
. Hence the
hypothesis with which the following series of propositions is concerned
is
but the earlier propositions do not need the full hypothesis.
In what follows, note that if
is the class of those terms which occur in
and have never
occurred before in any earlier member of
. We prove that,
with our hypothesis, members of
for which this class
of new terms is not null form a class which has no last member, and
therefore form a progression.
*124·52.
Dem.
[Pg 286]
*124·521.
Dem.
*124·53.
*124*531.
Dem.
*124·532.
*124·533.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 287]
Dem.
Dem.
*124·541.
Dem.
*124·55.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 288]
The above proposition identifies the two definitions of the finite, on
the hypothesis .
*124·57.
*124·58.
Dem.
The above proposition gives another hypothesis which would enable us to
identify the two definitions of the finite if it could be proved, namely
or, what comes to the same thing,
Dem.
*124·61.
Dem.
The following properties of cardinals which are neither inductive nor
reflexive (supposing there are such) are easily proved. Let us put
where "" stands for "mediate." Then
Hence mediate cardinals have no maximum or minimum.
whence
since we have either
or
.
[Pg 289]
Summary of *125.
The present number is merely concerned to give a few equivalent
forms of the axiom of infinity, and of the kindred assumption of the
existence of .
In virtue of *125·24·25 below, if the axiom of infinity holds in any one type, then it holds in any other type which can be derived from this one, or from any type from which this one can be derived. Hence if we assume, as it seems natural to do, that all extensional types are derived from a first type, namely that of individuals, then the axiom of infinity in any such type is equivalent to the assumption that the number of individuals is not inductive.
We deal, in this number, first with equivalent forms of ,
then with equivalent forms of
, then
with equivalent forms of
or
.
When "
" or "
"
occurs in this number without typical definition, it and all other
typically ambiguous symbols are to be taken in the lowest logically
possible types, or with the same relative types as if this had been
done. The propositions of this number are often not referred to in the
sequel, but are here collected together on account of their intrinsic
interest.
*125·1.
*125·11.
*125·12.
Dem.
*125·13.
*125·14.
Dem.
[Pg 290]
*125·15.
Dem.
*125·16.
Dem.
[Pg 291]
*125·2.
*125·21.
Dem.
*125·22.
*125·23.
Dem.
*125·3.
Dem.
*125·31.
*125·32.
Dem.
*125·33.
Dem.
[Pg 292]
*125·34.
Dem.
*125·35.
Dem.
*125·36.
Dem.
[Pg 293]
Recapitulation of Conventions and Summary of *126.
We have now arrived at the stage where we can adopt the standpoint of ordinary arithmetic, and can for the future in arithmetical operations with cardinals ignore differences of type. In order to understand how this is so, it will be necessary briefly to recall the line of thought of some of the previous numbers and the conventions upon which the symbolism is based.
The symbolism of *102, though perfectly precise as to the typical
relations of the various symbols, is in fact too complex for use,
except in cases of absolute necessity. It is better to use the
typically ambiguous symbols and
, combined
with some simple rules of interpretation of the symbolism, so as to
secure that the various occurrences of the same symbols are in their
proper relationships of type. This is the course followed in *100,
*101, and in every number from *110 onwards.
The important symbols which involve an explicit or implicit use of
or
are called 'formal numbers,' and it is
only necessary to make the rules of interpretation apply to them.
A constant formal number is any symbol representing a typically
ambiguous constant such that there is a constant such that,
however the ambiguities of type may be determined, the former constant
is identical with
. The variable formal numbers are
defined by enumeration. They are divided into three Sets, the Primary
Set, the Argumental Set, and the Arithmetical Set.
The Primary Set consists of ,
,
, where
is a variable
of any type and
is a variable
of any type.
Also
and
may themselves be complex symbols which
in some way involve variables.
The Argumental Set has only one member , where
is a variable
of any type. In its capacity
of a formal number
is only interesting when
is an
; then
gives the
corresponding
in another type, provided that
is
not
. Also
may be a complex symbol which in some
way involves a variable, e.g.
is a formal number of the Argumental Set:
is called the
argument of
.
[Pg 294]
The Arithmetical Set consists of ,
,
,
. These formal numbers
are only interesting when
and
are also members of
. Also
and
may be complex symbols, so long
as one of them at least involves a variable. For example
is a formal number, and so is
.
The Primary and Argumental and Arithmetical Sets of Formal Numbers are derived from the corresponding sets of variable formal numbers, by adding to them the constant formal numbers obtained by substituting constants for the variables occurring in the expressions for the members of the variable set in question.
In the formal numbers of the arithmetical set as written above,
and
are called the first components. Thus every formal
number of this set has two first components. The first components (if
any) of the first components are also called components of the
original formal number, and so on; so that components of components are
components of the original symbol.
A formal number of the arithmetical set, whose components are all
formal numbers, either constant or variable but not belonging to
the argumental set, is called a pure arithmetical formal number.
These are the formal numbers which it is important in arithmetic to
secure from assuming the value owing to lowness of type.
The logical investigation of *100 and *101, where typically ambiguous formal numbers are used, is directly concerned in investigating the premisses necessary to secure various propositions from fluctuating truth-values owing to the intrusion of null-values among the cardinals. The convention, necessary to avoid determinations of type which we never wish to consider, is as follows, where the terms used are explained fully in the prefatory statement:
. Argumental occurrences are bound to logical and
attributive occurrences; and, if there are no argumental occurrences,
equational occurrences are bound to logical occurrences. This rule only
applies so far as meaning permits after the assignment of types to the
real variables.
In *110, *113, *116, *119 we consider the arithmetical operations of addition, multiplication, exponentiation, and subtraction. Also in *117 we consider the comparison of cardinal numbers in respect to the relation of greater and less.
There is no interest in complicating our theorems by allowing for the
cases when a pure arithmetical formal number, whose components are
ambiguous as to type, becomes equal to owing to the low
type of one of its components. Also in the theory of greater and
less the possibility of null-values in low types has no real interest.
Accordingly these are excluded from any consideration by the definitions
*110·03·04, *113·04·05, *116·03*116·04, *117·02·03,
[Pg 295] as far as members of the primary set of formal numbers are concerned; and for other formal numbers by the following convention:
. Whenever a formal number
occurs, so that,
if it were replaced by
, the dominant type of
would by definition have to be adequate, then the
dominant type of
is also to be adequate.
When is a pure arithmetical formal number, this convention
secures that the type of every component is adequate.
But in arithmetic we also wish to avoid the intrusion of null-values
into the consideration of equations, so far as this avoidance can be
attained by the use of high types. Accordingly when we are concerned
with the purely arithmetical point of view, we add also the following
definition and convention ().
Definition. An arithmetical equation is an equation between pure arithmetical formal numbers whose dominant types are both determined adequately.
. All equations involving pure arithmetical formal numbers
are to be arithmetical.
This convention is used in *117 and in some earlier propositions which are noted in the prefatory statement.
Its effect is to render the statement of hypotheses often unnecessary. Examples of its application to the numbers where it is not used in the symbolism are also considered in the prefatory statement.
In the case of the inductive numbers we cannot logically prove, apart
from , that one type exists which is adequate for
all the formal numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, etc. But we can prove that for any
particular inductive number, say 521, a type exists for which 521 is
not equal to
. Accordingly for a given symbolic form, in
which the symbolism necessarily has only finite complexity, when the
types of variables which by hypothesis represent inductive classes or
inductive numbers, not
, have been settled, it is always
possible to fix on a type which will be adequate for all the pure
arithmetical formal numbers produced by the symbolism of the form, and
also at the same time (and here the peculiar properties of inductive
numbers come in) to have chosen the original types of the variables so
that any of the variables can assume the value of any assigned constant
inductive number, say 521, without being null.
The result is that we may assume that the symbols representing inductive numbers are never null, and thereby obtain the stable truth-values of propositions about them.
Accordingly we proceed as follows: we put
*126·01. .
[Pg 296]
We make the rule that when appears, convention
is always applied. The result is that when a formal
number is an
we need never think about its type, and
accordingly all the conventions vanish from the mind, as far as pure
arithmetical indefinite inductive cardinals are concerned. We supersede
all other conventions by the single one that, if it has been proved
or assumed that a formal number represents an inductive cardinal,
the types are so arranged that that formal number is not equal to
. The proofs of propositions in this number consist largely
of the production of a definite type in which this result is attained.
The important propositions are
*126·12.
*126·121.
*126·13·14·15.
*126·141.
*126·151.
Also *126·4·42·43 give the fundamental propositions for subtraction, division, and "inverse exponentiation"; and *126·5·51·52·53 the fundamental propositions for the relations of greater and less.
*126·01.
Whenever the symbol is used the Rule of Indefinite
Numbers is adhered to, so that all consideration of distinctions
in type among inductive cardinals can be laid aside (cf. Prefatory
Statement and also the Summary of this number).
*126·011.
*126·1.
Dem.
*126·101.
[Pg 297]
Dem.
This proposition, taken in connection with *120·4232, embodies the
convention named the Rule of Indefinite Numbers and its justification.
The convention is that 1, 2, 3, ... are always in future to be used in
existential types. In other words whenever any particular inductive
number is employed, it is determined in a type in which it is not
. The justification is that by *126·11·12 such a type can
always be found for each particular inductive number.
The convention is also applied to arithmetical formal numbers in *126·13·14·15.
For all arithmetical and equational occurrences this convention is
really the outcome of ,
, and
.
*126·141.
*126·151.
*126·23.
Dem.
[Pg 298]
*126·31.
Note that the specification of the type of is omitted
in accordance with the convention. The reference to *126·12 shows that
it is always possible to apply the convention.
*126·32.
*126·33.
*126·41.
Dem.
[Pg 299]
The proof proceeds as in *126·5.
[Pg 301]
The subject to be treated in this Part is a general kind of arithmetic of which ordinal arithmetic is a particular application. The form of arithmetic to be treated in this Part is applicable to all relations, though its chief importance is in regard to such relations as generate series. The analogy with cardinal arithmetic is very close, and the reader will find that what follows is much facilitated by bearing the analogy in mind.
The outlines of relation-arithmetic are as follows. We first define
a relation between relations, which we shall call ordinal
similarity or likeness, and which plays the same part for
relations as similarity plays for classes. Likeness between and
is constituted by the fact that the fields of
and
can be so correlated by a one-one relation that if any two terms have
the relation
, their correlates have the relation
, and vice
versa. If
and
generate series, we may express this by
saying that
and
are like if their fields can be correlated
without change of order. Having defined likeness, our next step is to
define the relation-number of a relation
as the class of
relations which are like
, just as the cardinal number of a class
is the class of classes which are similar to
. We
then proceed to addition. The ordinal sum of two relations
and
is defined as the relation which holds between
and
when
and
have the relation
or the relation
, or
when
is a member of
and
is a member of
.
If
and
generate series, it will be seen that this defines
the sum of
and
as the series resulting from adding the
-series after the end of the
-series. The sum is thus not
commutative. The sum of the relation-numbers of
and
is of
course the relation-number of their sum, provided
and
have no common terms.
The ordinal product of two relations and
is the relation
between two couples
,
, when
,
belong to
and
,
belong to
and either
or
. Thus, for example, if the field of
consists of
,
,
, and the field of
consists of
,
, the relation
will hold
from any earlier to any later term of the following series:
It is plain that, denoting the ordinal product of
and
by
, we have
[Pg 302]
where the second "
" as standing between classes has the
meaning defined in *113·01.
Infinite ordinal sums and products will also be defined, but the definitions are somewhat complicated.
The arithmetic which results from the above definitions satisfies all
those of the formal laws which are satisfied in ordinal arithmetic,
when this is not confined to finite ordinals; that is to say,
relation-numbers satisfy the associative law for addition and for
multiplication[10], they satisfy the distributive law in the shape
(where the + and are those appropriate to relation-numbers)
and they satisfy the exponential laws
They do not in general satisfy the commutative law either in addition
or in multiplication, nor do they satisfy the distributive law in the
form
nor the exponential law
But in the particular case in which the relations concerned are finite
serial relations, the corresponding relation-numbers do satisfy these
additional formal laws; hence the arithmetic of finite ordinals
is exactly analogous to that of inductive cardinals (cf. Part V,
Section E).
If the relations concerned are limited to well-ordered relations, relation-arithmetic becomes ordinal arithmetic as developed by Cantor; but many of Cantor's propositions, as we shall see in this Part, do not require the limitation to well-ordered relations.
[Pg 303]
Summary of Section A.
Two series generated by the relations and
respectively
are said to be ordinally similar when their terms can be correlated
as they stand, without change of order. In the accompanying figure,
the relation
correlates the members of
and
in
such a way that if
, then
,
and if
, then
. It is evident that the journey
from
to
(where
) may, in such a case, be taken
by going first to
, thence to
, and
thence back to
, so that
,
i.e.
. Hence to say that
and
are ordinally similar is equivalent to saying that there is
a one-one relation
which has
for its converse domain
and gives
. In this case we call
a
correlator of
and
.
We denote the relation of ordinal similarity by ","
which is short for "similar ordinally." Thus
It will be found that the relation plays the
same part in relation to
in relation-arithmetic as
plays in relation to
in cardinal arithmetic. It is therefore
desirable to have a simpler notation for
. We
put
[Pg 304]
We shall find that the semi-colon so defined has the same kind of
properties in relation-arithmetic as the two inverted commas have in
cardinal arithmetic. Corresponding to the notation
,
we put
We shall thus have
. It will
appear that
has ordinal properties analogous to
the cardinal properties of
. Thus e.g. where
appears as a cardinal correlator,
will appear as an ordinal correlator
(in each case with the converse domain suitably limited).
The elementary properties of will be considered in *150. We
shall then, in *151, be able to study ordinal similarity, taking as our
definition of an ordinal correlator
and defining two relations as ordinally similar when they have at least
one ordinal correlator, i.e. putting (on the analogy of *73)
There is no need to confine the notion of ordinal similarity (or
likeness, as we shall also call it) to serial relations. When
two relations have ordinal similarity, their internal structures are
analogous, and they therefore have many common properties. Whenever
similarity has been proved between two classes and
, then if
is given as the field of some relation
, and
is the correlating relation,
is like
,
and has
for its field. Hence similar classes are the
fields of like relations. It must not be supposed, however, that like
relations are coextensive with relations whose fields are similar.
This does not hold even when we confine ourselves to serial relations,
except in the special case of finite serial relations.
The definition of relation-numbers (*152) is as follows: The
relation-number of , which we call
, is the class
of relations which are ordinally similar to
; and the class of
relation-numbers, which we denote by
, is the class of
all classes of the form
. The elementary properties of
relation-numbers, treated in *152, are closely analogous to those of
cardinal numbers treated in *100.
After a few propositions about the ordinal 0 and the ordinal 2, which
we call and
(*153), we pass to the consideration
of relation-numbers of various types. It will be observed that
"
," like "
," is a relation which is
ambiguous as to the type both of its domain and of its converse
domain. Thus "
" only has an unambiguous meaning
when the types of
and
are determined.
and
may
or may not be of the same type; the only restriction upon the type
of either is that both must be "homogeneous" relations, i.e.
relations whose domain and converse domain[Pg 305] are of the same type. This
restriction results from the fact that
occurs in the definition
of "
," and a relation does not have a field unless
it is homogeneous; hence
must be homogeneous, and therefore,
whatever
may be,
must be homogeneous,
i.e.
must be homogeneous. Thus e.g. such relations
as
,
, or
are not ordinally similar either
to themselves or to anything else. Whenever "
"
is significant for a suitable
, we have
;
but if
is not homogeneous, "
" is never
significant. Hence throughout the theory of ordinal similarity, the
relations of which ordinal similarity is affirmed or denied must be
homogeneous. The correlators, on the contrary, need not be homogeneous.
Owing to the homogeneity of our relations, the types of
relation-numbers are much more easily dealt with than they otherwise
would be; for the type of a homogeneous relation is determined by that
of a single class, namely its field, whereas the type of a relation
in general depends upon the types of two classes, namely its
domain and its converse domain. Since, where likeness is concerned, the
type of the field determines the type of the relation, propositions
concerning the relations between different typical determinations of
a given relation-number are, for the most part, exactly analogous to
and deducible from those for cardinals. In fact, a relation ordinally
similar to exists in the type of
when, and only when, a
class similar to
exists in the type of
, i.e.
The half of this proposition follows from the fact that, if
is
like
,
is similar to
. The other half follows
from the fact, mentioned above, that if
and
,
then there is a relation like
and having
for its field. Now if
belongs to the type of
, any relation having
for its field is contained
in
. Hence in the case supposed
there is a relation like
and contained in
.
But the relations contained in
constitute
. Hence there is a relation which is like
and is a member of
, whence our proposition results. By
means of this proposition and those of *102—6, the properties
of relation-numbers with respect to types follow easily. The
conventions
,
and
apply to
relation-numbers as to cardinals; they are to be applied in the same
way as in the analogous propositions of Part III, Section A.
[Pg 306]
Summary of *150.
In this number we introduce two notations which have uses in regard to
relations closely analogous to the uses of and
in regard to classes. These two notations are defined as follows:
We then have
.
is merely an alternative to
, just as
is an alternative to
. Also
, in virtue of *38·01 and *43·01.
The uses of occur chiefly when
is a one-one relation
and
. This case is illustrated in the figure
in the introduction to this section. Here if
relates
and
,
relates
and
. Thus given a class
similar to
, if
is the correlating relation,
has
for its field, and has, in very many respects,
properties analogous to those of
.
is important for many special values of
. For example,
let
be a relation between relations; then
will be the
corresponding relation of the fields of these relations. If
be
any relation,
will be the corresponding relation
between ordered couples of which
is the relatum; i.e.
if
, the relation
will hold between
and
. If
is a relation between
classes, and we have
, then the relation
will hold between
and
.
In short, whenever
is a one-many relation, and therefore gives
rise to a descriptive function, then
is the relation which
holds between
and
whenever
holds between
and
.
We introduce one other new notation in this number, corresponding to
in *38. This notation is thus defined:
The purpose of this notation is to enable us to proceed to
and other similar notations; or, otherwise
stated, to enable us to treat
a function
of y rather than of
. Take for example the case of
.
[Pg 307]We may wish to consider various relations
,
, where we are to have (say)
. To express the
relation of
to
resulting from
, we need the above notation. By its help, we have
Thus
is the relation between
and
corresponding to the relation
between
and
.
plays the same part
in relation-arithmetic as is played by
in cardinal arithmetic.
The notations of this number are capable of occasional uses in cardinal arithmetic[11], but their chief utility is in relation-arithmetic, in which they are fundamental.
In order to minimize the use of brackets, we put
As an immediate result of the definition of we have
*150·11.
We have also
*150·12.
*150·13.
This proposition, which is the analogue of
(*37·33), is very often used. We have also
*150·3.
*150·42.
The remaining propositions of this number (with a few exceptions) may be thus classified:
(1) Propositions concerning the domain, converse domain, and field of
(*150·2—·23). Owing to the fact that the chief applications
of this subject are to cases where
and
are serial, the
field of
is more important than its domain or converse
domain. Thus the chief propositions here are
*150·22.
*150·23.
The hypothesis is verified in almost all
applications of
. When it is not verified, the part of
not contained in
is irrelevant to the value of
.
The hypothesis
is very often verified in practice,
[Pg 308]since it is verified when
is a correlator of
and
.
(2) Propositions concerning relations with limited domains, converse
domains, or fields (*150·32—·38). Broadly speaking, a limitation
on the field of is equivalent to a limitation on the
converse domain of
, and both are equivalent to a
corresponding limitation on the field of
provided
.
The limitations that occur in practice are limitations on the converse
domain of
, with consequent limitations on the fields of
and
.
The chief propositions on this subject are
*150·32.
*150·35.
(This follows from *150·32 and *35·71.)
*150·36.
*150·37.
(3) Propositions on when
is one-many or many-one
(*150·4—·56). We have
*150·4.
This proposition is used constantly. Only slightly less useful is
*150·41.
The remaining propositions of this set are chiefly applications of *150·4·41 to special cases.
(4) A few propositions on (*150·6—·62).
These are immediate consequences of the definition.
(5) A set of propositions on couples and matters connected with them (*150·7—·75). The chief of these is
*150·71.
This proposition is very often used in relation-arithmetic. Useful also is
*150·73.
(6) We next have four propositions (*150·8—·83) on when
is a power of
. These belong with the propositions of *92; they
are useful in the ordinal theory of finite and infinite. We have
*150·82·83.
It follows that, in the hypothesis supposed, if is a correlator
of
and
, it is also a correlator of
and
.
[Pg 309]
(7) Propositions concerning the relation (*150·14—·171
and *150·9—·94). These have uses analogous to those of propositions
concerning
. The most important are
*150·14.
(This follows immediately from *150·13, above.)
*150·141.
(This follows immediately from the definition.)
*150·16.
This proposition is analogous to
(*40·38), i.e. to
as appears on substituting
and
for
and
in this variant of *40·38.
The remaining propositions are mainly of the nature of lemmas, to be used once or twice each in relation-arithmetic.
*150·01.
*150·02.
Here, as in *38, "" stands for any sign which,
when placed between two letters, defines a descriptive function
of the arguments represented by those letters. Thus for example
"
" may represent any of the following:
The two following definitions serve merely for the avoidance of brackets.
*150·04.
*150·05.
*150·1.
*150·11.
*150·12.
Dem.
[Pg 310]
*150·131.
Dem.
Observe that we do not have .
Dem.
This proposition is the relational analogue of *37·34.
*150·141.
*150·15.
*150·151.
The following proposition is used in the theory of double ordinal similarity (*164·13).
*150·152.
Dem.
*150·153.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in dealing with relations of relations of couples (*165·23).
*150·16.
The following proposition is a lemma for *150·171.
*150·17.
Dem.
[Pg 311]
Dem.
The above proposition is required in the theory of double ordinal similarity. It is used in proving *164·141, which is used in *164·18, which is a fundamental proposition in the theory of double ordinal similarity.
The following propositions, on the domain, converse domain and field of
, are much used, especially *150·202·22·23. *150·201 is hardly
ever used, but is inserted in order that the general case may not
remain unconsidered.
Dem.
Dem.
*150·203.
*150·21.
*150·211.
[Pg 312]
In practice, when is used, we almost always have
.
For the use of
is to obtain a relation analogous
to
and having a different field; now
is analogous
to
, for the part of
which
lies outside
is unaffected by
. Hence if we
have, to start with, a relation
whose field is not contained
in
, we shall usually find it profitable to limit the
field to
, and consider the transformed relation rather
as
than as
. Thus the
hypothesis
will be verified in almost all
useful applications of the notion of
.
*150·24.
Dem.
*150·25
*150·3.
*150·301.
*150·31.
The following propositions are frequently useful when we have to deal
with correlators of the form , which often
happens.
*150·33.
*150·34.
*150·35.
Dem.
The above proposition, which is the analogue of *37·69, is much used in relation-arithmetic.
[Pg 313]
The following proposition is much used after we reach the theory of well-ordered series, but not before (except in *150·37).
*150·36.
Dem.
*150·361.
Dem.
The above proposition is not used until we reach the theory of series.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in dealing with the correlation of series (*208·2).
This proposition is fundamental in the theory of , because in
most of the uses of this notion
is one-many. The proposition
states that when
is one-many,
is the relation between
the
of terms related by
. Thus if
is the relation
of wife to husband, and
is the relation of brother to brother,
is the relation between wives of brothers. If
is a
relation between relations,
will be the corresponding relation
of their fields; and so on.
*150·42.
The following propositions, down to *150·56, are, with the exception of *150·52—·535, all illustrations of *150·4·41.
*150·5.
*150·51.
[Pg 314]
*150·511.
*150·512.
is a relation which plays a great part in relation-arithmetic.
*150·53.
*150·531.
*150·532.
*150·534.
*150·54.
*150·541.
*150·55.
*150·601.
*150·61.
Relations of the form are frequently
useful in relation-arithmetic, especially in the particular case of
, which takes the place taken by
in cardinal arithmetic. Relations of the form
will be considered in *165.
The following propositions are chiefly concerned with correlations of couples. They are of great utility in relation-arithmetic. *150·71, in particular, is fundamental.
*150·72.
*150·73.
[Pg 315]
*150·74.
Dem.
The four following propositions belong to the subject of *92, but
could not be given in that number owing to the fact that they involve
the notations of *150. They are required for proving that, if
is a correlator of
and
, it is also a correlator of
and
(*151·45), and for one of
the fundamental propositions in the ordinal theory of progressions
(*263·17).
Dem.
*150·81.
Dem.
[Pg 316]
*150·82.
Dem.
Dem.
The following propositions, down to *150·94 inclusive, resume the
subject of the relation , which has already been treated in
*150·14—·171.
Dem.
The following propositions lead up to *150·931·94, which are used in the theory of double ordinal similarity (*164·3·21).
*150·91.
Dem.
*150·92.
Dem.
*150·921.
*150·93.
Dem.
[Pg 317]
*150·932.
*150·933.
Dem.
The above proposition is the analogue of *74·61, which (with a few
trivial transformations) may be written
In obtaining ordinal analogues of such propositions,
will be replaced by
, and the two inverted commas will
be replaced by the semi-colon; a class of classes
will be
replaced, in most of its occurrences, by a relation of relations
,
but will sometimes be replaced by
.
The above proposition (*150·94) is used in proving that the converse of
a double correlator of and
is a double correlator of
and
(*164·21). The corresponding cardinal proposition (*111·131)
uses *74·6, which is practically the same proposition as *74·61, which
is the analogue of *150·94.
*150·95.
Dem.
[Pg 318]
The above proposition is used in the theory of "first differences" (*170·41).
*150·96.
Dem.
*150·961.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in the theory of ordinal exponentiation (*176·21).
[Pg 319]
Summary of *151.
In this number, we give the definition of ordinal similarity, and various equivalent forms; we prove that ordinal similarity is reflexive (*151·13), symmetrical (*151·14) and transitive (*151·15), and we give some particular cases of ordinal similarity (*151·6 ff.). Propositions in this number should be compared with those in *73, to which they are analogous.
The class of ordinal correlators of and
is written
, where "
" stands for
"similar ordinally." We put
(We might equally well put
which is an equivalent but more condensed form of the definition.) We
then define "
is ordinally similar to
" as meaning that there
is at least one ordinal correlator of
and
, i.e.
We shall find that if and
generate well-ordered series,
they have at most one correlator (*250·6), but this does not hold in
general for other series.
After giving the elementary properties of ordinal similarity, we
have three important propositions on its connection with cardinal
similarity, namely: (*151·18) if is similar to
, the field
of
is similar to the field of
(the converse does not hold
in general, but holds if
and
are finite serial relations);
(*151·19) if
is similar to
, there is a relation
similar to
and having
for its field, and vice versa;
(*151·191)
is an ordinal correlator of
and
when,
and only when, it is a cardinal correlator of
and
and
.
[Pg 320]
We then have a set of propositions on correlators of the form
(*151·2—·243). Most of the correlators
with which we shall be concerned are of this form. The most useful
proposition here is
*151·22.
A useful consequence of this proposition is
*151·231.
This consequence is useful because the hypothesis
is satisfied by most of the relations which occur as correlators.
We have next a number of propositions on the inferribility of
or
from
or
, and connected matters
(*151·25—·29).
We have
*151·25.
*151·26.
*151·29.
*151·29 is never used, but is inserted in order to show that our
definition of "ordinal similarity" agrees with what is commonly
understood by that term. If and
are regarded as serial, so
that "
" means "
precedes
in the
-series," and
"
" means "
precedes
in the
-series," then our
proposition states that two series are ordinally similar when their
terms can be so correlated that predecessors in either are correlated
with predecessors in the other, and successors with successors,
i.e. when the two series can be correlated without change of
order.
We have next (*151·31—·52) a set of miscellaneous propositions, of which the most useful are
*151·401 will be useful in such cases as the following: Let
and
be relations between relations, then
and
will be the corresponding relations of their domains.
Suppose
,
.
Then, by *151·401, if
is a correlator of
and
,
is a correlator of
and
.
*151·5 shows that if is a correlator of
and
, it correlates
with
,
with
,
with
, and
with
.
Our next set of propositions (*151·53—·59) is concerned with the
correlation of powers of and
and kindred matters. We show
(*151·55) that a[Pg 321] correlator of
and
is also a correlator
of
and
, and therefore if
and
are similar, so are
and
(*151·56); we show also (*151·59) that if
and
are similar,
so are
and
. These propositions are used in
the theory of progressions (*263·17).
The remaining propositions (*151·6 to the end) are concerned with applications to particular cases. The most useful of these are
*151·61.
which shows how to raise the type of a relation without changing its relation-number;
*151·64.
*151·65.
We prove also that all members of (i.e. all relations
of the form
, where
) are similar
*151·63), and that all relations of the form
are
similar (*151·631).
*151·01.
*151·02.
*151·1.
*151·11.
*151·12.
*151·121.
*151·131.
Dem.
[Pg 322]
*151·141.
Dem.
*151·16.
*151·161.
*151·162.
*151·17.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 323]
*151·21.
*151·22.
Dem.
*151·23.
The above proposition (*151·23) is very useful. It is the analogue of
*73·15. (It should be observed that, in all propositions concerning
likeness, plays the same part as
plays in
propositions concerning similarity.) By means of *151·23, we can
establish likeness in all those numerous cases in which a relation
which is not usually one-one becomes one-one when confined to a
certain converse domain, as for example if we have to deal with
, where
, or with
,
where
. Thus
e.g. by the above proposition, if
is any relation whose
field is
, where
,
will be an ordinally similar
relation whose field is
.
*151·231.
*151·232.
*151·24.
*151·241.
*151·242.
Dem.
[Pg 324]
*151·251.
*151·252.
*151·253.
*151·254.
Dem.
This proposition is the analogue of *72·54. ""
means "
," not "
."
*151·26.
Dem.
*151·261.
*151·262.
*151·263.
*151·264.
Dem.
[Pg 325]
*151·27.
*151·271.
Dem.
The above proposition shows that ordinal similarity as we have defined
it has the properties which are commonly associated with the term
"ordinal similarity," namely that and
are ordinally similar
when their fields can be so correlated that two terms having the
relation
are always correlated with two terms having the relation
, and vice versa.
The hypothesis is redundant in *151·28; this is
shown in the following proposition.
*151·281.
Dem.
[Pg 326]
Dem.
*151·32.
*151·33.
Dem.
*151·4.
Dem.
*151·401.
Dem.
[Pg 327]
*151·41.
This proposition is the analogue of *73·63.
The following proposition is used frequently both in relation-arithmetic and in the theory of series.
*151·5.
Dem.
*151·51.
Dem.
Dem.
*151·54.
Dem.
*151·56 is used in *263·17.
[Pg 328]
The two following propositions are lemmas for **151·59, which is used in *263·17.
*151·57.
Dem.
*151·58.
Dem.
The remaining propositions of this number consist of applications to particular cases.
This proposition is only significant when is a relation between
relations.
*151·61.
*151·62.
Dem.
[Pg 329]
The above proposition shows that all ordinal couples (i.e. all
members of are ordinally similar. The following proposition
shows the same for couples whose referent and relatum are identical.
Dem.
*151·64.
The following proposition is frequently used in relation-arithmetic.
*151·65.
[Pg 330]
Summary of *152.
The relation-number of , which we denote by
, is
defined as the class of relations which are ordinally similar to
,
i.e.
Hence our definition is
The class of relation-numbers consists of all such classes as
, i.e.
These two definitions are analogous to those of *100, merely
substituting "
" for "
." They are justified
by similar considerations, and lead to similar results. With the
exception of *152·7·71·72, the propositions of this number are the
analogues of those of *100, and call for no remarks other than those in
the introduction to *100 (mutatis mutandis).
*152·7·71·72 give relations between relation-numbers and cardinals.
*152·7, which is constantly used, states that the cardinal number
of consists of the fields of the relation-number of
,
i.e. the classes similar to
are the fields of the
relations similar to
; in symbols,
*152·7.
Hence it follows that the fields of a relation-number form a cardinal number, i.e.
*152·71.
Hence also it follows that cardinals other than consist
of classes of the form
, where
is a relation-number
other than
, i.e.
*152·72.
In *154·9, we shall show how to remove the restriction to numbers other
than , thus arriving at
*152·01.
*152·02.
[Pg 331]
*152·1.
*152·11.
*152·2.
*152·21.
*152·22.
*152·3.
*152·31.
*152·32.
*152·321.
*152·33.
Dem.
*152·35.
Dem.
In the above proposition, the same remarks as to types are to be
made as in the case of *100·35. If in a certain type
and
are both null, we have in that type
, but we need not have
.
Thus for example we shall find that, in the type of
,
But we do not have
*152·4.
Note that "," like "
," is a formal
number, and may be subjected to the conventions
,
,
.
*152·41.
*152·42.
[Pg 332]
*152·43.
*152·44.
*152·45.
*152·5.
*152·51.
Dem.
*152·52.
The restriction involved in is, as we shall see
later, not necessary, since
in any assigned
type.
*152·53.
Dem.
*152·54.
The utility of *152·6·62·63 is that they enable us to raise the type of
a relation-number to any required extent. Thus gives a
relation whose field is a class of the next type above that of
,
i.e. of the type
; while
gives
a relation whose field is
, which is of the type
. If
, or, more generally,
if
, this is the type
. Thus if we put
, we have
Thus
is a relation whose field consists of terms of
the same type as
.
[Pg 333]
The following propositions on the relations of cardinals and relation-numbers are very important.
Dem.
Dem.
We shall show in *154·9 that the exclusion of in *152·72 is
unnecessary.
[Pg 334]
Summary of *153.
The relation-numbers and
have already been defined
(in *56), though it remains for the present number to show that they
are relation-numbers. They are the ordinal 0 and 2 respectively,
i.e. they are the ordinal numbers of well-ordered series of no terms and
series of two terms respectively. But there is no means of introducing
an ordinal 1 which shall be analogous to the cardinal 1 as completely
as
and
are analogous to 0 and 2. The only relations
whose fields are unit classes are relations of the form
. We therefore put
*153·01.
The above definition gives the nearest possible approach to an
ordinal 1. so defined is a relation-number, and is the
relation-number corresponding to 1 in the sense that it is the
relation-number of all such relations as have a field consisting of
one term. But
is not what is called an "ordinal number,"
because this term is confined by usage to the relation-numbers of
well-ordered series, and
is not a serial relation. It
is essential to a serial relation to be contained in diversity; and if,
by definition, we include
among series, we introduce
more exceptions than we avoid. Moreover
does not have the
kind of properties which we wish 1 to have; e.g.
is not
.
We do not use , because we shall at a later stage define
as the class of those series whose fields have
terms, so that
, while
and
have the values
and
,
as already defined. On account of this general definition of
,
we choose a different symbol for the relation-number 1, and
has the merit of being as like
as possible.
To illustrate, by anticipation, the way in which differs from
proper ordinal numbers, we may point out that if
is added to
, we do not obtain
. We shall define
as the
class of series which consist of three terms, i.e. the class of
relations of the form
where
. We shall define the sum of two
ordinal numbers[Pg 335] as the ordinal number of the sum of two relations
having these ordinal numbers (cf. *180), and it will appear that if
and
are relations whose fields have no members in common,
then
has a relation-number which is the sum of those of
and
.
Suppose now
and
, where
. Then
This is not a member of
, because of the additional term
. Thus the addition of one term to a series
does
not give the same number as results from the addition of
to
. Hence the addition of 1 to an ordinal number has to be
separately treated[12].
We prove in this number that
(*153·11), that
(*153·24; observe that we have to take a couple of
classes (or relations) in order to be sure of the existence
of two different objects of the class in question), and that
) (*153·32). We prove
(*153·18),
(*153·212), and
(*153·36).
We have also
(not proved) and
(*153·301). But we do not have
;
e.g.
if
, but
.
We have
(*153·12) and
(*153·34),
but from our primitive propositions we cannot deduce
unless we rise above the lowest type of relations. The case is exactly
analogous to that of
(cf. *101); we have
*153·26·262.
But if, as monists aver, there is only one individual, we shall not
have in the type of relations of individuals to
individuals. Our primitive propositions do not suffice to disprove this
supposition.
*153·01.
*153·1.
*153·101.
Dem.
*153·111.
[Pg 336]
*153·13.
*153·14.
Dem.
*153·15.
Dem.
*153·16.
Dem.
*153·17.
Dem.
*153·2.
*153·201.
*153·202.
*153·203.
Dem.
*153·21.
*153·211.
[Pg 337]
*153·22.
*153·23.
This proposition illustrates the reasons for not putting
We want the inductive ordinals, like the inductive cardinals, to
form a series in order of magnitude; but, as the above proposition
illustrates, the relation-number of such relations as
is not in the same series with
and
. The above
proposition should be contrasted with *51·411.
*153·25.
*153·251.
Dem.
*153·26.
*153·261.
*153·262.
*153·27.
*153·28.
Dem.
*153·281.
The above proposition is used in the theory of series (*204·48).
*153·3.
*153·31.
Dem.
[Pg 338]
*153·311.
Dem.
*153·33.
Dem.
*153·341.
*153·35.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 339]
Summary of *154.
This number gives propositions analogous to those of *102. In
accordance with our general notations for typical definiteness,
"" means "the class of relations like
and of
the same type as
," "
" means "the relation to
a relation of the type of
of the class of relations like it and
of the type of
." By a special definition, "
"
is to mean all typically definite relation-numbers of the form
"
," i.e. all relation-numbers generated
by the relation
, i.e. the domain of
.
Existence-theorems in this subject can be proved by means of *154·14,
which states that relations like exist in the type of
when, and only when, classes similar to
exist in the type of
. In virtue of this proposition, the existence-theorems of our
present topic are deducible from those for cardinals. In symbols, this
proposition is
*154·14.
Hence by *102·73 we deduce
*154·242.
whence, by *152·72,
*154·9.
The remaining propositions are chiefly analogues of those in *102. Very few of them are subsequently referred to.
*154·01.
*154·1.
Dem.
[Pg 340]
*154·11.
Dem.
*154·12.
Dem.
*154·121.
Dem.
*154·13.
Dem.
In virtue of *154·14 and the propositions of *102, *103, *104, *105,
*106, we see that all homogeneous or ascending relation-numbers
exist, while is a member of every descending type of
relation-numbers. Remembering that the relations concerned must be
homogeneous, we see that there are two kinds of steps by which their
types may be raised, namely (1) from
to relations of the type of
, i.e. from
to relations of the
type of
, or of
; (2) from
to
relations of the type of
, i.e. from
to
relations of the type of
, or of
if
. Thus repetitions of the two steps from
to
, and from
to
, where
,
will enable us, without changing the relation-number, to
raise its type indefinitely. It will be observed that, in accordance
with our general definitions for relative types, the type of
is
, and the type of
(where
) is
.
*154·2.
*154·201.
[Pg 341]
*154·202.
*154·203.
When belongs to any other type than
,
is meaningless.
*154·21.
*154·22.
Dem.
*154·23.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 342]
The following propositions are concerned with the two particular
transformations from to
and from
to
, which are useful in raising the type of a
relation-number.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
*154·4.
Dem.
[Pg 343]
*154·401.
The remaining propositions of this number (except *154·9) are the analogues of those whose numbers have the same decimal part in *102. They are here given without proof, because the proofs are, step by step, analogous to the proofs of the corresponding propositions in *102.
*154·41.
*154·42.
*154·43.
*154·46.
*154·52.
*154·53.
*154·55.
*154·64.
*154·641.
*154·8.
*154·81.
*154·82.
*154·83.
*154·84.
*154·85.
*154·86.
*154·861.
*154·87.
*154·88.
Dem.
[Pg 344]
Summary of *155.
A relation-number is called homogeneous when it is generated by
a homogeneous relation of likeness, i.e. when it consists
of all relations which are like a given relation and of
the same type as
. For the homogeneous relation-number
of
we write "
"; thus
. When
is given,
is typically definite. We have always
,
hence
. Conversely, if a
typically definite relation-number is not null, it is a homogeneous
relation-number; in fact, if
is a member of it, it is
. Thus the homogeneous relation-numbers are
all the relation-numbers except
.
Homogeneous relation-numbers play the same part in relation-arithmetic as homogeneous cardinals play in cardinal arithmetic. The propositions of this number (except *155·6·61) are the analogues of those with the same decimal part in *103. Their proofs are exactly analogous to the proofs of their analogues in *103, and are therefore omitted.
The following propositions are the most useful in this number.
*155·11.
This merely embodies the definition.
*155·12.
whence
*155·13.
*155·16.
This proposition is used in the theory of well-ordered series (*253 and
*255). It requires that the equation "" on
the right-hand side should be subject to the convention
.
Otherwise, the typical ambiguities might be so determined as to
give
, which would not imply
.
*155·2.
This merely embodies the definition of .
[Pg 345]
*155·22.
*155·26.
*155·27.
*155·34.
*155·4.
*155·5.
*155·6.
This last proposition connects homogeneous relation-numbers with homogeneous cardinals.
*155·01.
*155·02.
*155·11.
*155·12.
*155·13.
*155·14.
*155·15.
*155·16.
*155·2.
*155·21.
*155·22.
*155·24.
*155·25.
*155*26.
*155*27.
*155·28.
*155·3.
*155·301.
*155·31.
*155·32.
*155·33.
*155·35.
*155·4.
[Pg 346]
*155·41.
*155·42.
*155·43.
*155·44.
*155·5.
*155·51.
*155·52.
The following propositions have no analogue in *103.
Dem.
On ascending and descending relation-numbers, propositions
analogous to those of *104, *105, and *106 might be proved by
proofs analogous to those given in those numbers. It is, however,
scarcely necessary to add anything to the propositions already
proved, namely *154·24·241·242·25·251 on descending relation-numbers,
*154·26·261·262·31·311·32·321·322·33·331 on ascending relation-numbers,
and *155·23·34 giving the relations of non-homogeneous to homogeneous
relation-numbers. Ascending relation-numbers all exist, and those
that start from the type of , wherever they end[13], are the
correspondents[14] of the homogeneous relation-numbers of the type
of
, and are only some of the homogeneous relation-numbers of
the type in which they end. Descending relation-numbers consist of
together with the homogeneous relation-numbers of the type
in which they end: they are the correspondents of only some of the type
in which they begin, or rather,
is the common correspondent
of all those relation-numbers in the initial type which are not
correspondents of any homogeneous relation-number in the end-type.
These properties are exactly the same as in the case of cardinals, as
might be foreseen by *154·14.
[13]
We say that starts from the type of
and ends in the type of
.
[14]
We call two typically definite relation-numbers
correspondents when they only differ as to the typical
determination, i.e. and
are correspondents.
[Pg 347]
Summary of Section B.
In the present section, we have to consider the kind of addition
of relations which is required in ordinal arithmetic. In cardinal
arithmetic, if is a class of mutually exclusive classes,
has the properties required of their sum, and thus we
do not require a new kind of logical addition before dealing with
arithmetical addition. But in ordinal arithmetic this is not so.
Suppose
and
are the generating relations of two series,
and we wish to add the
-series at the end of the
-series.
Then we wish every term of the
-series to precede every term of
the
-series; thus
is not the generating
relation of the new series, since
gives no
relation between the terms of the
-series and the terms of the
-series. The relation we want is
since this makes every term of the
-series precede every term of
the
-series. Hence we put
It will be seen that
is in general different from
.
If and
have no common terms, the sum of the
relation-numbers of
and
is the relation-number of
(cf. *180).
The addition of a single term to a series requires a new definition,
and cannot be dealt with as a particular case of the addition of two
relations. It might be thought that, just as
gives the result of adding the one term
to the class
,
so
would give the result of
adding the one term
to the series
. But this is not the
case, since, when we add a term to a series, we do not want this term
to precede itself, whereas
is a
relation which
has to itself. What we want is a relation which
every member of
has to
but which
does not have to
itself; thus we take
as our
relation, and put
[Pg 348]
This definition defines the generating relation of the series obtained
by adding
at the end of the
-series; similarly for adding
at the beginning we put
If
is not a member of
, the relation-number of
is the sum of the relation-number of
and
the ordinal 1, which we represent by
. (The ordinal 1 has no
meaning by itself, but only as a summand.)
The sum of a series of series is defined in the same way as the sum
of two series was defined. Let be a serial relation whose
field consists of serial relations. Then the sum of all the series
generated by members of
, when these series are taken in the
order generated by
, must be a relation which holds between
and
whenever either (1)
and
both belong to the
field of one of the series, and
precedes
in this series,
or (2)
belongs to the field of an earlier series than that to
which
belongs. In the first case, we have
,
i.e.
. In the second case, we
have
, i.e.
,
i.e.
. Hence the generating relation of the sum of
all the series is
. Hence we put
The relation
has all the properties which we should
expect of the sum of a series of series.
If a series is to result from the addition of a series of series, it is
necessary that no two of the series should have any common terms. For
if we have
we shall also have
.
Hence instead of a series, we shall have cycles; for it is essential to
a series that no term should precede itself. (What seem to be series
in which there is repetition are always the result of a one-many
correlation with series in which there is no repetition, so that a
term can be counted once as the correlate of one term, and again
as the correlate of a later term.) For this reason, as well as for
many others, it is important to consider relations between mutually
exclusive relations, i.e. between relations whose fields have no
common terms. We put
Then
has much the same utility in
relation-arithmetic as
has in cardinal
arithmetic. We have
which is analogous to the proposition (*84·14)
[Pg 349]
It will be found that in relation-arithmetic the relation
often
appears where
appears in the analogous proposition of
cardinal arithmetic.
Analogous to "" is the relation of double ordinal
similarity. This holds between two relations
and
when they
are ordinally similar relations between ordinally similar relations
with known correlators, i.e. when, if
is an ordinal
correlator of
and
, so that
, then if
is
a member of
, and
is the corresponding member of
,
so that
, we shall have
, and shall be able
to specify a member of
. But as in
cardinals, so here, we have to frame our definition of double ordinal
similarity in such a way as to minimize the use of the multiplicative
axiom. We therefore take as our definition the following:
and
are said to have double ordinal similarity when there is a
one-one relation
which has
for its converse
domain, and is such that
. A relation
which
has these properties is called a double correlator of
and
, i.e. we put
a definition which, as will be perceived, is closely analogous to
that of
in *111. Two relations have double similarity when they have a double
correlator, i.e.
is a double correlator of
and
when
is
a correlator of
and
and
is a correlator of
and
. This might be
taken as the definition of a double correlator, since it is equivalent
to the above definition.
If we assume the multiplicative axiom, we can prove that double
similarity holds between similar relations of mutually exclusive
similar relations, i.e. between two relations of mutually
exclusive relations and
which have a correlator
such that, if
, then
and
are always
similar. In this case,
. Thus
if we assume the multiplicative axiom we have, if
,
,
In the particular case in which the fields of
and
consist of well-ordered relations (i.e. relations generating
well-ordered series), this equivalence can be proved without
the use of the multiplicative axiom, because two similar well-ordered
relations have only one correlator, so that the difficulty of selecting
among correlators does not arise.
Double ordinal correlators have the same importance in proving the formal laws of relation-arithmetic that double cardinal correlators have in cardinal arithmetic. The construction of double correlators in various cases constitutes a large part of relation-arithmetic.
In defining the ordinal product of two relation-numbers, and in
defining exponentiation, we use a relation which has properties
[Pg 350]analogous to those of . This relation
is
, of which the structure is as follows:
Let
,
be two terms having the relation
; then form
the two relations
,
. The
relation
holds between two couples
and
whenever
; thus it arranges couples
whose referents are members of
, and whose relata are
,
in an order similar to
. The relations
and
are (by *150·03) the same as
and
. Thus
arranges
such relations as
in an order similar to
.
Thus
is similar to
, and every
member of its field is similar to
. Thus the relation-number
of
is
, and every member
of its field has the relation-number
. Moreover
, as it is easy to see, is a relation of
mutually exclusive relations. Hence it is suitable for defining the
product of
and
, and we put
In the next section, after we have defined the product of a relation of
relations, we shall use the same relation
for
the definition of exponentiation, putting
These two definitions should be compared with those in *113 and *116.
In virtue of the definition of , the relation
holds between terms which either have one
of the relations of the form
, or belong
respectively to the fields of two relations
,
, where
. Thus the relation
holds between
and
whenever
and
, and also between
and
whenever
.
Thus if, for the sake of illustration,
and
generate finite
series, so that their fields are
then the field of
will consist of the
couples
and their order as arranged by
is that
in which they are written above. Thus the above couples in the above
order constitute the series
, and it is evident that this
series has
terms.
When the factors of a product are not enumerated, but are given as the field of a relation, a new definition of multiplication is required. This definition, which has the advantage of being applicable to infinite products, will be dealt with in the following section.
[Pg 351]
Summary of *160.
In this number, we introduce the definition
which was explained in the introduction to this section. Although the
propositions of this and other numbers in this Part do not require
that
and
should be such as to generate series, yet the
reader will find it convenient to imagine them to be such, since the
important applications of the ideas of this Part are to series. Thus we
may regard the sum of
and
as a relation which holds between
and
when either
precedes
in the
-series,
or
precedes
in the
-series, or
belongs to the
-series and
belongs to the
-series.
The most important propositions of this number are :
*160·14.
*160·21.
*160·22.
*160·31.
which is the associative law, and
*160·4.
which is the distributive law for logical and arithmetical addition;
*160·44.
which is also a kind of distributive law;
*160·47.
whence
*160·48.
whence it follows that if and
are mutually exclusive, the
relation-number of their sum depends only upon the relation-numbers of
and
;
*160·5.
*160·52.
[Pg 352]
*160·01.
*160·1.
*160·11.
*160·111.
*160·12.
*160·13.
*160·14.
Dem.
The above proposition is constantly used. The following propositions
(*160·15—·161) are not used, but are inserted to show that
has the kind of structure that we should expect
of a sum.
Dem.
*160·151.
*160·16.
*160·2.
*160·21.
*160·22.
*160·3.
Dem.
[Pg 353]
*160·31.
Dem.
*160·32.
This definition serves merely for the avoidance of brackets.
*160·33.
*160*34.
*160·35.
*160·4.
Dem.
*160·401.
The above two propositions state the distributive law for logical
and arithmetical addition. The three following propositions give the
generalized form of this law, when replaces
; these propositions are not subsequently used
but are inserted for the sake of their intrinsic interest.
*160·41.
Dem.
*160·411.
*160·412.
Dem.
[Pg 354]
The following propositions lead up to *160·44, which is frequently used.
*160·42.
Dem.
*160·421.
*160·43.
Dem.
Dem.
*160·45.
Dem.
*160·451.
Dem.
*160·452.
Dem.
[Pg 355]
*160·46.
Dem.
*160·47.
Dem.
*160·48.
*160·5.
Dem.
*160·51.
Dem.
[Pg 356]
The above proposition is useful in proving that, if ,
is transitive when
and
are transitive (cf. *201·4).
*160·52.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in dealing with the series of segments of a series (*213·561).
[Pg 357]
Summary of *161.
The addition of a term has two forms, according as it occurs at the
beginning or end of the field of the relation in question. If we add
first and then
at the end, the result is the same as if we
added
(*161·22); if at the beginning, it is the same
as if we added
(*161·221). The propositions of the
present number are all obvious, and offer no difficulties of any kind.
As explained in the introduction to this section, we put
Most of the propositions of this number require the hypothesis
, because if
,
(*161·2·201). This is connected with the fact that there is no ordinal
number 1. Apart from propositions already mentioned, the chief
propositions of this number are the following (we omit propositions
about
when they are merely analogues of propositions
about
):
*161·12.
*161·14.
*161·15.
*161·211.
*161·31.
*161·4.
*161·01.
*161·02.
*161·1.
*161·101.
*161·11.
[Pg 358]
*161·111.
*161·12.
*161·13.
Dem.
*161·131.
*161·14.
The hypothesis is necessary in this proposition,
since without it we have
.
*161·141.
*161·15.
*161·16.
The above proposition is used in the theory of connected relations (*202·412).
*161·161.
The two following propositions are frequently used.
*161·21.
Dem.
Note that
is the relation which orders
and
and
in the order
,
,
.
*161·211.
*161·212.
*161·213.
These definitions serve merely for the avoidance of brackets.
[Pg 359]
Dem.
*161·23.
Dem.
*161·231.
*161·232.
Dem.
*161·24.
Dem.
[Pg 360]
*161·25.
Dem.
*161·26.
Dem.
The following propositions lead up to *161·33.
*161·3.
Dem.
[Pg 361]
*161·301.
*161·31.
Dem.
*161·32.
Dem.
*161·321.
The above proposition justifies addition of 1 or subtraction of 1 in ordinal arithmetic.
The following proposition (*161·4) is much used.
Dem.
*161·41.
*161·42.
*161·43.
[Pg 362]
Summary of *162.
The form of summation defined in *160 cannot be extended beyond a
finite number of summands, since it involves explicit mention of all
the summands. In the present number, we shall be concerned with a
form of summation which is not subject to this restriction. It will
be observed that, since relational summation is not permutative, we
cannot define the sum of a class of relations, for this would
not determine the order in which the summation is to be effected. Our
relations must be given as the field of some relation which orders
them; thus the sum appears not as the sum of a class, but as the sum
of a relation, namely of a relation whose field is the relations to
be summed. In the case of two relations and
, the sum of
, as defined in the present number, will be equal to
; similarly for three, the sum of
will be equal to
, and so on for
any finite number of summands.
As explained in the introduction to this Section, if P is a relation between relations, we put
It is convenient to suppose that
is serial, and that every member
of
is also serial. Then
holds between
and
if either (1) there is a series, in the field of
, in
which
precedes
, or (2)
belongs to a series which is
earlier, in the
-series, than the series to which y belongs. The
following are the chief propositions of this number:
*162·22·23.
*162·26.
*162·3.
*162·31.
*162·34.
*162·35.
This is the analogue of *40·38. (Cf. note to *162·35, below.)
*162·4.
*162·42.
[Pg 363]
*162·43.
It should be observed that the ordinal analogues of propositions about
classes of classes often involve the substitution of (not
) for
. Examples are afforded by *162·34·35, quoted
above.
*162·01.
*162·1.
*162·11.
*162·12.
*162·13.
*162·14.
*162·2.
Dem.
*162·21.
Dem.
*162·211.
*162·212.
Dem.
[Pg 364]
*162·213.
The above proposition is used in *163·22.
The two following propositions are used very often.
Dem.
*162·23.
*162·26.
Dem.
*162·27.
*162·3.
Dem.
This proposition establishes the connection between the two kinds of arithmetical addition of relations.
*162·31.
Dem.
The following propositions lead up to *162·34.
*162·32.
Dem.
[Pg 365]
*162·33.
Dem.
*162·331.
Dem.
*162·332.
Dem.
This is the associative law for arithmetical sums of relations.
The following propositions lead up to *162·35.
*162·341.
Dem.
*162·342.
Dem.
*162·343.
Dem.
[Pg 366]
Dem.
This proposition is important, since it enables us to infer (with a
suitable hypothesis) that if is always like
when
,
then the arithmetical sum of all such relations as
is
like
, being in fact
. In other words,
if, whenever
,
is a correlator of
and
, then
is a correlator
if
and
. This proposition is
analogous in its uses to the proposition
which is *40·38. In general, in obtaining relational analogues of
cardinal propositions,
is to be replaced by
,
by
, and
by
. When these
substitutions are made in
, *162·35
results, except for its hypothesis.
If we regard as a kind of product of
and
, *162·35 becomes
a distributive law. For it asserts that if we multiply each member of
by
, and then sum the resulting products, we get the same relation as
if we first sum
, and then multiply by
. The following application
of *162·35 to the sum of two relations makes its distributive character
more evident.
*162·36.
Dem.
This proposition can be extended to any finite number of summands.
*162·37.
Dem.
*162·371.
*162·372.
[Pg 367]
Dem.
*162·41.
Dem.
*162·42.
Dem.
Dem.
Observe that in *162·43·431, and
must be of different
types, in fact
must be of the type to which members of
belong. *162·43·431 are often useful.
*162.44.
Dem.
[Pg 368]
Dem.
The above proposition is used in *174·162.
[Pg 369]
Summary of *163.
In the present number we have to define mutually exclusive relations,
and to give a few of their properties. Mutually exclusive relations
play much the same part in relation-arithmetic as mutually exclusive
classes play in cardinal arithmetic. Prima facie, there are
various ways in which we might define them. We might define as a
relation of mutually exclusive relations when
or when
or in several other ways. But in fact the most useful property to
choose is the property that any two members of the field have mutually
exclusive fields, i.e.
The principal applications of the subjects studied in this Part are to
series, and in series it is always the fields of the relations
that are important. We want, for instance, to define relations of
mutually exclusive relations in such a way that, if is a serial
relation, and every member of
is a serial relation, then
is a serial relation. For this purpose it is necessary
that
should be contained in diversity, which requires
that
should be contained in diversity, i.e. that
If
is a serial relation, as we are supposing, this is equivalent
to
Again we want to define relations of mutually exclusive relations in
such a way that, if and
are two such relations, and
and
have double likeness (cf. *164), then
is like
; i.e. if we are given a correlator
of
and
, and for every
and
which
correlates, we are
again given a correlator, then
is to be like
.
That is, if
is the class of relations which correlate
pairs of relations
and
, where
, we want[Pg 370]
to be a correlator of
and
. Now this
requires that
should be a one-one relation, which
requires
This is secured by
but except for special classes of relations it is not secured by
since there may be two relations
and
which both belong to
the field of
, but of which neither has the relation
to the
other. Again, the analogy with cardinal arithmetic fails at many points
unless, when
is a relation of mutually exclusive relations,
is a class of mutually exclusive classes. But this is
not secured by any of the other possible definitions we have been
considering. There are further reasons, connected with the arithmetical
product of a relation of relations, for choosing as the definition
From a technical point of view, the properties of a
depend mainly upon the fact that
when
is such a class,
(*84·14); in like manner the properties of a
depend upon
which requires our definition, and is equivalent to it (*163·12). We
thus become able to use the propositions of *81 on selections from
many-one relations, which would not otherwise be the case.
It should be observed that
is not equivalent to
though it implies this. The converse implication will fail if
contains two different relations with the same field. E.g.
take a relation
whose field consists of the four relations
,
,
,
, and suppose
.
Then
, and
. But unless
and
we shall not have
The property by which we define relations of mutually exclusive
relations is a property which only depends on the field, so that we
might equally well put
[Pg 371]But for our purposes this would be less convenient than the definition
of
.
We thus put
*163·01.
We have
*163·11.
*163·12.
*163·17.
Any of the above might have been used to define
. The following propositions are important.
*163·3.
This is the analogue of *84·53.
*163·4·41.
*163·441.
*163·451.
*163·01.
*163·1.
*163·11.
For many purposes, this proposition gives the most useful equivalent of
.
Instead of the above proof, we may use *74·62, which gives us the result in virtue of *33·5.
*163·13.
*163·14.
*163·15.
Dem.
[Pg 372]
*163·16.
*163·17.
*163·2.
*163·21.
Dem.
This proposition is important in connection with the multiplication
of relations, for we shall define as the product of a relation
(whose field consists of relations) a relation whose field is
. Thus by the above proposition, whenever
is a
, the field of its product is the
product (in the cardinal sense) of the fields of its field, just as the
field of its sum is (by *162·22) the sum of the fields of its field.
Dem.
[Pg 373]
*163·3.
Dem.
*163·31.
*163·311.
Dem.
*163·32.
*163·33.
*163·331.
*163·4.
Dem.
*163·41.
Dem.
[Pg 374]
*163·42.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in *251·22.
*163·43.
Dem.
*163·431.
*163·44.
Dem.
*163·441.
The above proposition is used in *173·26.
*163·442.
Dem.
*163·45.
Dem.
[Pg 375]
*163·451.
The above proposition is used in *173·25.
*163·452.
*163·46.
*163·461.
*163·462.
[Pg 376]
Summary of *164.
The subject of this number is of great importance throughout
relation-arithmetic and its applications. Double likeness, or double
ordinal similarity, is a relation which is to hold between and
when (1)
and
are like, (2) correlated members of the
fields of
and
are like, with a specific given correlator
in each case. (It is necessary, in general, to have a given correlator
in each case, to avoid the necessity of the multiplicative axiom
for selecting among correlators.) This definition can be somewhat
simplified by starting from a relation correlating
and
. If
is such a correlator, so that
we want
to be such that it not only correlates the whole of
with the whole of
, but also correlates
each member of
with the corresponding member of
,
i.e. such that, if
is any member of
,
is
the corresponding member of
. This requires
i.e. writing
,
in place of
, it requires
When
and
, we have
by *162·35. Hence double likeness will
subsist if there is a relation
such that
A relation fulfilling this condition will be called a double
correlator of
and
. Thus two relations
and
have
double likeness when there exists a double correlator of
and
, i.e. when
A double correlator of
and
is a relation
which is
a correlator of
and
and is such that
is a correlator of
and
.
[Pg 377]
It will be seen that this definition has the usual analogy to the
corresponding definition in cardinals (*111·01). The two inverted
commas of the cardinal definition are replaced by the semi-colon, and
is replaced by
, and
is replaced
by
or
. The propositions of the present
number consist largely of analogues of the propositions of *111, in
accordance with the above substitutions.
If it were not for the difficulty of choice among correlators, we could
define two relations as having double likeness when they are like
relations of like relations, i.e. when, if and
are
the two relations, they have a correlator
such that, if
,
then
. In this case,
.
Thus we have to consider the relations of the class
to the
class of double correlators, and we have to consider the relation
of the relation "
"
to the relation of double likeness. The propositions to be proved on
this subject in the present number are analogous to the propositions of
*111. But at a later stage (*251·61) we shall show that if the field of
consists entirely of relations which generate well-ordered
series, then the use of the multiplicative axiom ceases to be
necessary in identifying double likeness with the relation
, the
reason being that two well-ordered series can never be correlated in
more than one way.
Our definitions are
*164·01.
*164·02.
The principal propositions of this number are
*164·15.
whence
*164*151.
*164*18.
This is usually the most convenient proposition when a double correlation has to be proved.
*164·201·211·221. Double likeness is reflexive, symmetrical and transitive.
*164·31.
(Cf. note to *164·31, below.)
We then have a set of propositions (*164·4 to the end) on the
identification of
with double likeness by means of the multiplicative axiom. We have
*164·43.
[Pg 378]
That is to say, given that and
are like relations of
like mutually exclusive relations, if we can pick out one correlator
for each pair of correlated members of
and
, then the
sum
of such selected correlators is a double correlator
of
and
. Hence, observing that if
is a double
correlator of
and
,
(*164·15·16), we
arrive at
*164·45.
From *164·43 we deduce also
*164·46.
*164·48.
I.e. in effect, assuming the multiplicative axiom, if two
series and
) can each be divided into
sets of
terms (
,
being
relation-numbers), then the two series are ordinally similar, and
the
sets in the one case have double similarity with the
sets in the other. (Here we have written
,
in place of the
and
of the
enunciation.)
It is by means of the above propositions that ordinal addition and multiplication are connected, as will appear in *166.
*164·01.
*164·02.
*164·1.
*164·11.
*164·12.
*164·131.
Dem.
*164·14.
The two following propositions are required for proving *164·18.
*164·142.
*164·143.
Dem.
[Pg 379]
Dem.
*164·151.
Dem.
*164·17.
This proposition states that when and
have double likeness,
there is a correlator of
and
which couples like with
like relations; i.e. if
is the correlator, then, if
,
and
are ordinally similar. The converse of this
proposition, namely, that if
and
have a correlator which
couples ordinally similar relations, then
and
have double
likeness, can be proved if the multiplicative axiom is assumed, but not
otherwise, except in special cases, such as that of well-ordered series.
The following proposition is used frequently, owing to the fact that,
in the cases we are concerned with, double correlators generally have
the form , where
is some relation
for which we have
.
Dem.
[Pg 380]
*164·181.
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned in proving that double likeness is reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive.
*164·2.
Dem.
Dem.
*164·211.
*164·22.
Dem.
[Pg 381]
*164·221.
Dem.
Dem.
*164·301.
Dem.
This proposition has the merit of reducing the ordinal element in
double likeness to a minimum. The proof of
is a cardinal problem, and what has to be added for ordinal purposes is
merely
.
*164·32.
In this proposition, the various 's need not be
of the same type. Hence "
"
is not an immediate consequence of *164·201.
Dem.
[Pg 382]
*164·33.
Dem.
*164·34.
The following propositions are concerned in showing that, if
and
are like relations, and the correlator of
and
is contained in likeness (i.e. correlates relations which
have the relation of likeness), a correlator being given for each pair
of relations coupled by the correlator of
and
, then the
logical sum of such correlators is a double correlator of
and
, provided
and
are relations of mutually exclusive
relations. That is, assuming
to be the correlator of
and
, and assuming that
whenever
,
let it be possible to choose one correlator out of the class of
correlators
, for every
which
belongs to
. That is, assume that it is possible to make a
selection from the class of classes of correlators. If
is such
a selection, then
will be a double correlator of
and
, if
,
.
The following propositions, down to *164·421, are lemmas for *164·43.
Dem.
*164·41.
Dem.
[Pg 383]
*164·411.
Dem.
*164·412.
*164·413.
Dem.
*164·414.
*164·42.
[Pg 384]
The following proposition, besides being used in proving all subsequent propositions of this number (except *164·432·433, which are mere lemmas for *164·44), is used in *251·6, in the theory of ordinal numbers.
Dem.
*164·431.
Dem.
*164·433.
All the remaining propositions of the number are important.
*164·45.
*164·46.
[Pg 385]
*164·47.
Dem.
[Pg 386]
Summary of *165.
In the present number, we shall give various propositions concerning
the relation , which has the same uses in
relation-arithmetic
has in cardinal
arithmetic. The propositions of this number will be used in the
next number to establish the properties of the arithmetical product
of two relations
and
, which is defined as
.
Again in connection with exponentiation the propositions of the present
number will be useful, since, after the product of a relation of
relations has been defined (*172), we shall define exponentiation by
means of the definition
There will also be occasional uses of the propositions of
this number throughout the theory of series. The relation
is important because its structure is
thoroughly known. It is a
which consists
of
relations, each like
(*165·27); and if
, we can construct a double correlator
of
and
without invoking
the multiplicative axiom. In fact we have
*165·362.
This proposition should be compared with *113·127. In virtue of *164·31, together with various propositions of *165 and *166, it will appear that *165·362 includes *113·127 as part of what it asserts.
In the present number, we begin with a set of propositions on fields. We have
*165·12.
*165·13.
whence
[Pg 387]
*165·14.
which connects the theory of with that of
(*113 and *116). Hence
*165·16.
In *166, we shall define as
;
thus the above will become
We next have a set of propositions concerned with
as a relation, and with the circumstances under which we can infer
or
from data as to
and
. We have
*165·21.
*165·211.
*165·22.
We then have various propositions concerning , of
which the chief are
*165·241.
*165·242.
We have next four propositions which are constantly used, proving that
consists of
relations each
like
. These propositions are
*165·25.
*165·251.
*165·26.
*165·27.
From *165·3 to *165·372, we are concerned with constructing a double
correlator of and
when we are given simple correlators of
with
and of
with
. The result (*165·362) has already been given. Hence we have
*165·37.
and by *164·48 and *165·27 we have
*165·38.
Hence propositions concerning a series of series, each
containing
terms (where
and
are
relation-numbers), which in general require the multiplicative
axiom, can be deduced, assuming that axiom, from propositions[Pg 388] (not
requiring the axiom) concerning
, where
and
. Thus the use of
enables us to minimize the use of the
multiplicative axiom.
*165·01.
*165·1.
*165·11.
*165·12.
*165·13.
*165·131.
*165·14.
*165·15.
*165·16.
*165·161.
Dem.
*165·162.
Dem.
[Pg 389]
*165·17.
Dem.
*165·18.
*165·181.
*165·182.
*165·19.
*165·2.
*165·201.
Dem.
*165·202.
*165·203.
*165·204.
Dem.
[Pg 390]
*165·205.
*165·206.
*165·21.
Dem.
*165·211.
*165·212.
Dem.
*165·22.
Dem.
*165·221.
Dem.
*165·222.
*165·223.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 391]
*165·231.
*165·232.
Dem.
*165·233.
*165·24.
Dem.
*165·241.
*165·242.
Dem.
*165·243.
Dem.
*165·244.
Dem.
[Pg 392]
*165·245.
*165·25.
*165·251.
*165·26.
The following propositions are concerned in proving that, if is
a correlator of
and
and
is a correlator of
and
then
(with its converse domain
limited) is a double correlator of
and
.
This proposition is required subsequently in establishing likenesses.
Dem.
*165·301.
Dem.
*165·302.
Dem.
[Pg 393]
*165·31.
Dem.
*165·311.
*165·32.
Dem.
*165·321.
*165·33.
Dem.
*165·331.
*165·34.
Dem.
[Pg 394]
*165·341.
*165·35.
Dem.
*165·351.
Dem.
*165·352.
Dem.
Dem.
The proof proceeds as in *165·36.
The above three propositions are of great utility in relation-arithmetic.
[Pg 395]
*165·37.
*165·38.
Dem.
[Pg 396]
Summary of *166.
The product is defined as
.
This is a relation which has for its field all the couples that
can be formed by choosing the referent in
and the relatum in
. These couples are arranged by
on the following
principle: If the relatum of the one couple has the relation
to
the relatum of the other, we put the one before the other, and if the
relata of the two couples are equal while the referent of the one has
the relation
to the referent of the other, we put the one before
the other. Thus in advancing from any term
in the
field of
, we first keep
fixed and alter
into
later terms as long as possible; then we alter
into a later term,
move
back to the beginning, and so on. Thus with a given
,
we get a series which is like
, and this series is wholly followed
or wholly preceded by the series with the referent
, where
follows or precedes
.
The propositions of this number are for the most part immediate consequences of those of *165. The most important of them are:
*166·12.
*166·13.
Hence it follows that an ordinal product of a finite number of factors vanishes when, and only when, one of its factors vanishes.
*166·16.
*166·23.
This proposition shows that the relation-number of a product
depends only upon the relation-numbers of its factors.
*166·24.
This proposition connects addition and multiplication (cf. note to *166·24, below).
*166·42.
This is the associative law. The distributive law has two forms:
[Pg 397]
*166·44.
*166·45.
We do not have in general (cf. note before *166·44, below)
We have also a distributive law for the addition of a single term, i.e.
*166·53.
*166·531.
Here again the law does not hold in general for
or
.
*166·01.
*166·1.
*166·11.
*166·111.
*166·112.
*166·113.
*166·12.
*166·13.
*166·14.
*166·15.
*166·16.
Dem.
[Pg 398]
The above proposition is used in the ordinal theory of progressions (*263·62·65).
*166·2.
*166·21.
*166·22.
This proposition gives the correlator for the product when correlators are given for the factors.
*166·23.
This proposition enables us to use to define the
product of the relation-numbers of
and
, for it shows
that the relation-number of
is determinate when the
relation-numbers of
and
are given. We shall therefore (in
Section D of this part) define the product of two relation-numbers
and
as the relation-number of
when
and
.
*166·24.
This proposition exhibits the connection of addition and
multiplication. If we put and
,
then
in the above proposition is the sum of
relations of which each is a
. In virtue of the above
proposition, it follows that (if the multiplicative axiom is assumed)
. In other words, assuming the
multiplicative axiom, the sum of
series (or other relations),
each of which has
terms, has
terms.
*166·3.
The analogous proposition
is only true in general if
*166·31.
*166·311.
*166·312.
[Pg 399]
The following propositions are lemmas for the associative law (*166·42).
*166·4.
Dem.
*166·401.
*166·41.
Dem.
[Pg 400]
This is the associative law for the kind of multiplication concerned in this number.
*166·421.
This definition serves merely for the avoidance of brackets.
The two following propositions give the distributive law. In
relation-arithmetic, this is in general only true in one of its two
forms, i.e. we have
The latter is true for finite series, but not for infinite series or
(except in exceptional cases) for relations which are not serial.
*166·44.
Dem.
*166·45.
Dem.
The following propositions (*166·46—·472) exhibit the failure of the
distributive law in the form ,
and give certain results for special cases. They are not referred to
except in this number.
*166·461.
[Pg 401]
*166·462.
Dem.
*166·463.
*166·464.
Dem.
*166·47.
*166·471.
Dem.
[Pg 402]
The following propositions are concerned with the distributive
law for the addition of a single term to a relation. This law, in
the form in which it holds, is given in *166·53·531 (remembering
). *166·54·541 exhibit the
failure of the other form.
*166·5.
Dem.
*166·51.
*166·511.
*166·52.
*166·521.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 403]
Summary of Section C.
In the present section, we have to consider various forms of a principle which is of the utmost utility in relation-arithmetic. This principle may be called "the principle of first differences." It has been explained and used by Hausdorff in brilliant articles[15]. The results there obtained by its use give some measure of its importance in relation-arithmetic. It has, however, other uses besides those that are concerned with the multiplication and exponentiation of relation-numbers, as, for example, in the ordering of segments and stretches in a series, or of any other set of classes which are contained in the field of a given relation. In the present section, after the first two numbers, we shall be concerned with its arithmetical uses, but other uses will occur later.
The principle of first differences has various forms which, though
analogous, cannot, in the general case, be reduced to one common
genus. The simplest of these is the relation , by
which the sub-classes of
are ordered. This is defined as
follows. If
and
are both contained in
, we
say that
if there are terms belonging
to
but not to
such that no terms belonging to
and not to
precede them; i.e. if, after
taking away the terms (if any) which are common to
and
, there are terms left in
which do not come after
any of the terms left in
, i.e. if
.
Thus the definition is
It will be seen that this relation holds if
.
Thus it holds between any existent member
of
and
, and between
and
any member of
other than
itself. When
is a serial relation (which is the important case for all
the relations in this section),
is transitive
and asymmetrical
, but
not necessarily connected, i.e. there may[Pg 404] be two members
of its field of which neither has the relation
to
the other. This happens whenever
is not well-ordered; but when
is well-ordered,
is connected, and therefore
generates a series.
To illustrate the order generated by in a simple
case, consider a series of three terms,
,
,
. Let us for
the moment write
for the relation
and similarly we will write
for
, and so on. Then
assuming
,
In this series, a class containing
is always earlier than one not
containing
; and of two classes of which both or neither contain
, one containing
is earlier than one not containing
;
and of two classes of which both or neither contain
, and both
or neither contain
, one containing
is earlier than one
not containing
. Thus our relation may be generated as follows:
Begin with
, which is
.
Add before these terms what results from adding
to each;
then we have
, which is
Now add at the beginning what results from adding
to each
of the above four classes, and we have
.
Thus generally, if
,
Thus by adding one term to
, we double the number of terms in
.
Again, if and
are two relations which have no common terms
in their fields, we shall have
while conversely
Hence
so that
.
These propositions illustrate the connection of with
multiplication.
Besides , we often require (though not in this Part)
the relation which is the converse of
.
This relation we call
, so that
This begins with
, and ends with
.
[Pg 405]
Thus we shall have, for example,
Here, if we start from
, which is
, the series grows by adding terms at
the end: we add
to each member of
and put the resulting terms
after
and
; we then add
to each
of the four terms we already have, and add the resulting terms at the
end; and so we can proceed indefinitely.
The relation with its field limited arranges the
segments of P in ascending order of magnitude; if the class
of segments is
,
generates what may be called the natural order among the segments (cf.
*212).
A variant of is afforded by the relation
(*171), which is to hold between two members
,
of
when the first term of
either which does not belong to both belongs to
, i.e.
the "first difference" belongs to
. This relation implies
, and coincides with it if
is well-ordered; but
when
is not well-ordered,
may hold between two
classes which have no first point of difference, e.g. (if
is "less than" among rationals) if
consists of rationals
between 0 and 1 (both excluded) and
of rationals between 1
and 2 (both excluded). The definition of
is
The relation has the interesting property that
its relation-number is found by raising
to the power
(cf. *177). As the field of
is
, this theorem is the ordinal analogue of
(*116·72).
A somewhat more complicated form of the relation of first differences
arises when we have a series of series. Let us suppose, to begin with,
that is a serial relation whose field consists of mutually
exclusive serial relations.
Thus in the accompanying figure, each row represents a series, the
generating relations of these series being , ...
,... But the
series themselves form a series, which may be regarded as generated
by a relation
whose field consists of the relations
, ...
,... (It might be thought more natural to take
,
,
... as the field of
; but this would lead to confusion in the
case when two or more of the series have the same field.) Suppose
we now wish to find a relation which will order the multiplicative
class of the fields of
,
, ..., i.e. the class
. In the case illustrated in the figure, in which
generates a well-ordered series, and all the members of
are serial, and
, we might use
; this relation, with its field limited to
, will then give us what we want. This relation
will, in the case supposed, put[Pg 406] a selected class
before
another selected class
if, where they first differ,
chooses an earlier term than
. But if the series
is not
well-ordered—if it is (say) of the type
(cf.
*263)—there may be no first member of the field of
where
and
differ. This will happen, for example, if
consists of all the first terms, and
of all the second terms.
Our ordering relation can be so defined as to put
before
in this case also, but if it is so defined, the associative
law of multiplication only holds if
is well-ordered. For this
reason, we define our ordering relation so that, in such a case,
comes neither before nor after
. Again, if
is
not a
, a member of a selected class may
occur twice, once as the representative of
, and once as that
of
, if
and
have terms in common. We wish to
distinguish these two occurrences. Hence we proceed as follows: If
and
are two selected classes of
, let there
be one or more members of
in which the
-representative
precedes the
-representative, and which are such that, among all
earlier[16] members of
, the
-representative is identical
with the
-representative.
But a further modification is desirable in order to meet the case
in which two or more of the members of have the same field.
Suppose, for example, we had to deal with a series consisting of all
the series that can be formed out of a given set of terms: in this
case, we should have to distinguish occurrences of any given term not
by the field, but by the generating relation. This requires that we
should make an
-selection from
, not an
-selection
from
. Hence we take two members of
, say
and
, and we arrange them or their domains on the following
principle: We put
before
(or
before
) if there is a relation
in the field of
such
that the
-representative of
, i.e.
, has the
relation
to the
-representative of
, and such that, if
is any earlier member of
, then
is identical with
. That is,
precedes
if
The relation between and
so defined has the properties
required of an arithmetical product; hence we put
This relation is the ordinal analogue of .
The ordinal analogue of
is the corresponding
relation of the domains of
and
, i.e.
;
hence we put
In case is a
, we have
. But when
is not
a
,
and
are
in general not ordinally similar. We can, however, always make a
by replacing the members
,
, etc.
of[Pg 407]
(where
) by
,
etc. In this way, if
occurs twice in
, once as a
member of
, and once as a member of
, the two occurrences
are made to correspond to
and
respectively, and thus we get a new relation which is a
.
If every member of has a first term,
will be the first term of
, and
will be the
first term of
. If further there is a last member of
, i.e. if
, and if this last
member has a second term, the second member of
is obtained
by taking this second term as the representative of
,
and leaving all the other representatives unchanged. In any case,
if
exists, the earliest successors of any member of
are those obtained by only varying the representative in
. Thus, if
exists, those members of
which have a given set of representatives in all members
of
form a consecutive stretch of the series, and this
stretch is like
. If
has an immediate
predecessor, the stretches obtained by varying only the representative
in this predecessor are again consecutive, and form a series like the
said predecessor; and so on. This makes it plain why
has the
properties of a product.
As in the case of cardinals, the definition of exponentiation is
derived from that of multiplication. We put
This is an important relation, which deserves consideration apart from
the fact that it is useful in connection with exponentiation. It will
be found that
This is a form of the principle of first differences which is
appropriate when two relations are concerned, instead of only
one as in . The principle, in this case, is as
follows: Let
,
be any two one-many relations which relate
part (or the whole) of
to the whole of
. That is, each
of the two relations assigns a representative in
to every
term of
, but different terms of
may have the same
representative. Then in travelling along the series
, there is to
be, sooner or later, a term
whose
-representative is earlier
than its
-representative, and terms which come earlier than
in
are all to have their
-representatives identical with
their
-representatives.
The relation may be subjected to various restrictions which
give important results. This subject has been treated by Hausdorff.
For[Pg 408] example, if
(where
), and
is of the ordinal type which Cantor calls
, i.e. the
type of progressions (generated by transitive relations), then if
is any member of
,
is always either
or
.
If we impose the condition that
is to be
except for a
finite number of values of
, the resulting series is of the type
of the rationals in order of magnitude, i.e. the type called
. If we impose the condition that there are to be an infinite
number of values of
for which
, the resulting series is
a continuum, i.e. it is of the ordinal type called
;
in this case, the contained "rational" series consists of those
's
for which there are only a finite number of
's having
.
If we impose no limitation,
is of the type presented by the
real numbers when decimals ending in 9 recurring are counted separately
from the terminating decimals having the same value.
We may generalize , instead of restricting it. To begin with, we
may allow our
and
to have only part of
for their
converse domain, and remove the assumption that there is a first
member of
for which
and
differ; this leads to
the relation
Further, we may drop the restriction to one-many relations. It will be
observed that if
, we have
.
Thus we may consider the relation
This relation has for its field all relations contained in
. We may, if we like, drop even this restriction,
and consider
This represents the most general form of the principle of first
differences as applied to a couple of relations
and
. In
ordinal arithmetic, however,
is sufficiently general for the
uses we wish to make of it.
The formal laws, as far as they are true, can be proved without
excessive difficulty. We have
which connects the two kinds of multiplication;
which is one form of the associative law, of which another form is
[Pg 409]
Also
which is the associative law for "
." We have
But we do not have in general
which obviously would require the commutative law for multiplication,
and therefore does not hold in general in spite of the fact that its
cardinal analogue does always hold.
As regards the connection with cardinals, we have
and we have already had
Moreover the correlators by which similarity is established in
cardinals generally suffice to establish likeness in the analogous
cases in relation-arithmetic. Thus we have
which are all closely analogous to propositions which were proved in
cardinals.
The applications of the propositions of this section are almost wholly to series, and it is convenient to imagine our relations to be serial. But the hypothesis that they are serial is not necessary to the truth of any of the propositions of the present section, and it is a remarkable fact that so many of the formal laws of ordinal arithmetic hold for relations in general.
It should be observed that is not always a series when
is a series and all the relations in the field of
are series.
A series (cf. *204) is a relation
which is (1) contained in
diversity, (2) transitive, (3) connected, i.e. such that every
term of the field of P has the relation P or the relation
to every other term of the field. It is the third condition which
may fail for
, and which in fact does fail whenever
is not well-ordered. Thus suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that
is of the type
, which we will call a
regression, i.e. the converse of a progression (cf.
*263); and suppose that the field of
consists entirely of
couples. Take a selection
which chooses the first term of
every odd couple, and the second term of every even couple ; and take
another selection
which chooses the second term of every odd
couple, and the first term of every even couple. Neither of these two
selections has the relation
to the other, for whatever term
of
we choose, if
is the selection which chooses
the first term of
, there is an earlier term of
(namely
the immediate predecessor of
) in which
chooses the first
term while
chooses the second. Hence there is no such
as
is required for
; and a similar argument holds against
. In such a case,
generates a number of
different series, and by suitable restrictions of the field, one of
these series can be extracted. Exactly similar remarks apply to
.
[15] "Untersuchungen über Ordnungstypen," Berichte der mathematisch-physischen Klasse der Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Feb. 1906 and Feb. 1907. Cf. also his "Grundzüge einer Theorie der geordneten Mengen," Math. Annalen, 65 (1908).
[16]
Here is said to be earlier than
if
has
the relation
to
and is not identical with
.
[Pg 411]
Summary of *170.
The definition to be given in this number of the relation of first
differences among the sub-classes of a given class is by no means
the only one possible, in fact a different definition will be
considered in *171. In the present number, the definition we choose
is this: is said to precede
according to this
definition when
has at least one member which neither
belongs to
nor follows any term belonging to
and
not to
(
and
being both sub-classes
of
). In other words, if we consider the two classes
and
, there are members of
which are not preceded by any members of
. Pictorially,
we may conceive the relation as follows (
being supposed serial):
and
each pick out terms from
, and these
terms have an order conferred by
; we suppose that the earlier
terms selected by
and
are perhaps the same, but
sooner or later, if
, we must come to terms which
belong to one but not to the other. We assume that the earliest terms
of this sort belong to
, not to
; in this case,
has to
the relation
. That
is, where
and
begin to differ, it is terms of
that we come to, not terms of
. We do not assume
that there is a first term which belongs to
and not
to
, since this would introduce undesirable restrictions in
case
is not well-ordered.
A few of the propositions of the present number will be used in the
next number, which deals with a slightly different form of the relation
of first differences, but with this exception the propositions of this
number will not be referred to again until we come to series. Their
chief use occurs in the section on compact series, rational series, and
continuous series (Part V, Section F), especially in *274 and *276,
which respectively establish the existence of rational series (assuming
the axiom of infinity) and the fact that the cardinal number of terms
in a continuous series is the same as the number of classes contained
in the field of a progression, i.e. . The
definitions and a few of the simpler propositions are also used in
connection with the series of segments of a series, since, as explained
above, the segments of a series
are arranged in the series
[Pg 412]generated by
.
The propositions of this number which will be used in dealing with series are the following:
*170·1.
*170·101.
*170·102.
(These propositions merely embody the definitions.)
*170·11.
This form is often more convenient than *170·1.
*170·16.
I.e. every sub-class of has the relation
to every proper part of itself.
*170·17.
*170·2.
This proposition deals with the case where there is a definite first
term y which belongs to and not to
, and whose
predecessors all belong to both or neither.
*170·23.
This proposition is useful in case is well-ordered, since then
must have a minimum if it exists (
and
being supposed sub-classes of
).
*170·31.
This follows from *170·16, as does the following proposition:
*170·32.
*170·35.
*170·38.
*170·6.
Besides the above, the following propositions should be noted:
*170·36.
*170·37.
*170.44.
*170·64.
This proposition shows that every term added to doubles the
number of terms in
; hence it is not surprising that
(when
is well-ordered) has a power of
for its relation-number (cf. *177).
*170.67.
whence
*170·69.
[Pg 413]
*170·01.
*170·02.
*170·101.
*170·102.
Thus means, roughly speaking, that
goes on longer than
, just as
means that
begins
sooner. Thus if
is the relation of earlier and later in
time, and
and
are the times when
and
respectively are out of bed, "
"
will mean that
gets up earlier than
, and
"
" will mean that
goes to bed later
than
.
*170·103.
Dem.
*170·11.
*170·12.
*170*121.
*170*13.
Dem.
[Pg 414]
*170·14.
*170·141.
*170·15.
Dem.
Dem.
*170·161.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 415]
In order that should be serial, we need further that
it should be transitive and connected.
is transitive
if
is transitive and connected. But
may still
not be connected: there may be many distinct families in its field,
though all of them must begin with
and end with
.
For example, if
is a regression, the class which takes every
odd member does not have either of the relations
,
to the class which takes every even member.
In order that
should be serial, we require that
should be not only serial, but well-ordered, i.e. that every
existent sub-class of
should have a first term. When
is
serial but not well-ordered,
will, however, generate
various series contained in it by imposing suitable limitations on the
field.
*170·2.
*170·21.
Dem.
*170·22.
Dem.
*170·23.
Dem.
*170·3.
*170·31.
*170·32.
*170·33.
Dem.
*170·34.
Dem.
[Pg 416]
Dem.
*170·371.
The following propositions lead up to *170·44.
*170·4.
Dem.
[Pg 417]
*170·42.
Dem.
*170·43.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 418]
Dem.
*170·6.
*170·601.
*170·61.
This and the following propositions are lemmas for
Dem.
[Pg 419]
*170·62.
Dem.
*170·63.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 420]
The following propositions are lemmas for *170·67, i.e.
which itself leads to *170·69, i.e.
*170·65.
Dem.
*170·651.
Dem.
*170·652.
Dem.
[Pg 421]
*170·653.
Dem.
*170·66.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 422]
Dem.
[Pg 423]
Summary of *171.
In this number, we shall consider a more restricted form of the
principle of first differences, which is applicable when there is a
definite first member of one class not belonging to the other class.
In this case, if is the first differing member, the part of
which precedes
is to be the same as the part of
which precedes
. If
belongs to
and not
to
, we put
before
; in the converse case,
we put
before
. In case
,
itself is
not to be counted among its own predecessors; thus the predecessors
of
are to be
. Hence the
relation in question will hold between two sub-classes (
and
) of
when there is a
such that
or, what comes to the same thing (owing to
),
This relation between
and
we denote by
"
," where "
" stands for "difference."
Thus our definition is
On the analogy of , we put also
When is well-ordered,
and
coincide
respectively with
and
. Their
properties are closely analogous to those of
and
. Thus e.g. the following propositions remain
true when
is substituted for
:
*170·17·35·36·37·38·44·5·51·52·64·67·68·69.
The only new propositions to be noted in this number are
*171·2.
*171·21.
[Pg 424]
and the following formulae suggesting an inductive identification
of and
in cases to which such
induction is applicable:
*171·7.
*171·71.
These propositions are however superseded (at a later stage) by the
proof that and
coincide if
is
well-ordered (*251·37).
The chief property of is that its relation-number is
to the power
. This will be proved in *177 and
*186·4
*171·01.
*171·02.
*171·1.
*171·101.
*171·102.
*171*11.
*171·12.
*171·13.
*171·14.
Dem.
*171·15.
Dem.
*171·16.
Dem.
[Pg 425]
*171·17.
Dem.
*171·18.
Dem.
*171·19.
Dem.
*171·2.
Dem.
[Pg 426]
*171·21.
Dem.
*171·22.
*171·4.
*171·41.
*171·42.
*171·43.
*171·44.
*171·5.
Dem.
*171·51.
Dem.
[Pg 427]
*171·52.
*171·64.
The proof proceeds by the same stages as the proof of *170·64.
*171·67.
*171·68.
*171·7.
*171·71.
[Pg 428]
Summary of *172.
In this number we have to consider the form of product which is
applicable to any relation of relations, whether mutually exclusive
or not. If our relation were a , we
could take
, and order selected classes from
by first differences. This would give us a relation whose field
would be
. But if any two fields overlap,
this method fails. We might substitute
for
, and order the members of
by first differences; but this method will
not give what we want if two or more members of
have the same
field. In order to avoid any confusion due to repetition, we must,
if
and
, consider
in connection with
, not merely with
. That is, the relations in the field
of the product of
must be such as concern themselves with the
ordered couple
, not merely with
. The simplest
way of effecting this is to consider
. A member
of
, say
, is a relation which picks out a
representative of
from the field of every
which is a
member of
; that is, whenever
,
.
Since we have
, not
, two relations may have the same
field and yet we can distinguish the occurrence of a given term as the
representative of the one from its occurrence as the representative of
the other. Thus no degree of overlapping will cause confusion.
[Pg 429]
The relations which compose are to be ordered by
first differences, but in order to distinguish different occurrences of
a given term, we must give a slightly different form to the principle
of first differences from that employed in *170 or *171. The new form
of the principle is as follows: Consider two relations
and
which are members of
. Let
be a member of
in which
chooses a representative which precedes that
of
, i.e. in which
; and let all earlier
relations than
, i.e. all relations
such that
and
, have
. Then we say that
precedes
. This principle may also be stated as follows: We may divide
the members of
into four classes, not in general mutually
exclusive, namely:
(1) those in which , i.e. in which the
-representative precedes the
-representative;
(2) those in which ,
(3) those in which ,
(4) those in which no one of the above three relations of and
occurs.
Then we shall say that precedes
if there is a member of
class (1) whose predecessors all belong to class (3).
In case all the members of are serial, the fourth of the above
classes is null, and the other three are mutually exclusive. If,
further,
is well-ordered, any two different members of
must be such that one precedes the other in the above-defined
order. Thus in this case the product of a series of series is a series
(cf. *251).
The definition of the product is
Owing to the complication of this definition, the proofs of
propositions of the present number are apt to be long.
Various other definitions might be adopted for , but we have
found the above definition on the whole the best.
We might, for example, drop the condition in the
definition; we could then write our definition in the simpler form:
which, with our definition, is only available when
.
But if we adopt this simplification, we no longer have
which is a very useful proposition, required in the proofs of *183·13,
*185·21 and other important propositions.
On the other hand, we might frame our definition on the analogy
of rather than, as above, on the analogy of
. The definition would then be:
This definition does not assume that there is a first relation
for which the
-representative precedes the
-representative.
Thus it might be thought that it would give better results in cases
where
is not well-ordered. But in fact this is not the case. If
is not well-ordered, it may happen that every
for which
is preceded by one for which
, and
vice versa; in this case, we shall have neither
nor
.[Pg 430] Thus our suggested new definition does not secure
that
shall be a series whenever
and all the members of
are series, and therefore has no substantial advantage over the
simpler definition which we have adopted, and has the disadvantage of
greater complication.
In the present number, we first prove that
(*172·13) and that
(*172·14), so that a product is null if any one of its factors
is null. We then proceed to propositions about
,
, etc. We have
*172·162.
*172·17.
Hence we derive propositions as to the existence of . We have
*172·181.
Thus assuming the multiplicative axiom, a product which has factors none of which are null is not null.
We then consider , and
where
. We have
*172·2.
which is a useful proposition, and
*172·23.
which connects the two definitions of multiplication, showing that they lead to equivalent results for any finite number of factors, i.e. whenever the definition of *166 is applicable.
We next consider and
, proving
*172·32.
with a similar proposition for (*172·321), and
*172·35.
which is a form of the associative law using both kinds of
multiplication. The kind which uses only will be proved in *174.
We have next the proof (with its immediate consequences) that if
and
have double likeness,
. We prove
*172·43.
This proposition should be compared with *114·51, which is its cardinal
analogue. It will be seen that the correlator only differs by the
substitution of for
. From *172·43 we obtain
*172·44.
whence
[Pg 431]
*172·45.
Other propositions about will be given in *174.
*172·01.
*172·1.
*172·11.
Dem.
*172·12.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
*172·141.
[Pg 432]
The following propositions are concerned with ,
, etc. *172·15·151·16·161 are lemmas for
*172·162·17.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 433]
The following proposition is important. It shows that, if
consists of series, if any member of
has no first term,
has no first term, but if every member of
has a first
term, the selection of all these first terms is the first term of
.
Dem.
The following proposition is much used.
Dem.
*172·171.
*172·18.
*172·181.
Dem.
[Pg 434]
*172·182.
*172·19.
Note that we cannot proceed to , because
is meaningless, owing to the fact that the field of
consists of non-homogeneous relations.
*172·191.
Dem.
*172·192.
Dem.
The following proposition is sometimes useful. (It is used in *173·22. *182·2.*185·21.)
*172·2.
Dem.
[Pg 435]
The following propositions are concerned with the nature of the
connection between and
. The
connection is such as might be desired, except when
, in which
case, as shown above,
is like
, and is
therefore not like
.
*172·21.
Dem.
*172·22.
Dem.
The following propositions are lemmas for *172·32.
[Pg 436]
Dem.
*172·31.
Dem.
[Pg 437]
Dem.
The following proposition is a lemma for *172·34, which is required in proving *172·35 (as well as *176·4).
*172·33.
Dem.
[Pg 438]
Dem.
The above proposition is important, being a form of the associative law.
The following propositions are extensions of *172·23. It is obvious that they may be extended to any finite number of factors.
*172·36.
Dem.
*172·361.
*172·37.
Dem.
[Pg 439]
The following propositions are concerned with the construction of a
correlator of with
when we are given a double
correlator of
with
. If the double correlator is
or
, the correlator of
with
is
*172·4.
Dem.
*172·401.
Dem.
*172·402.
Dem.
[Pg 440]
*172·403.
Dem.
*172·404.
Dem.
[Pg 441]
*172·41.
Dem.
The following proposition is important, since it gives the required
correlator of with
.
*172·42.
Dem.
The following proposition is a lemma for *172·43.
*172·421.
Dem.
[Pg 442]
*172·44.
*172·45.
The following proposition shows that if two relations have the same
field, and if the parts of them that are contained in diversity
are the same, they have the same product. Thus e.g.
, in virtue of *91·541.
*172·5.
Dem.
The following proposition is used in *182·42.
*172·52.
Dem.
Thus we shall always have unless there
are members of
which have no referent except themselves.
[Pg 443]
Summary of *173.
In this number, we shall consider the relation between the
domains of relations related by , i.e. we shall
consider
. This relation bears to
a
relation analogous to that which
bears to
. We shall denote it by "
."
When
,
is like
, and is often more convenient than
. When
,
arranges the
multiplicative class of
by first differences, taking first
differences to mean that the earliest member
of
for which
has the
-member earlier than
the
-member in the
-series.
The properties of all result immediately from those
of
, and offer no difficulty of any kind. The most important
of them are:
*173·14.
I.e. if is not null, and no two members of
have
the same field, then the field of
is the product
of the fields of
. Observe that
if
.
*173·16.
*173·2.
*173·22.
*173·23.
*173·3.
*173·31.
*173·01.
*173·1.
*173·11.
[Pg 444]
*173·12.
*173·121.
*173·13.
*173·14.
Dem.
*173·15.
*173·151.
*173·16.
Dem.
*173·161.
*173·17.
Dem.
*173·2.
*173·21.
Dem.
*173·23.
Dem.
[Pg 445]
*173·24.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
*173·27.
Dem.
[Pg 446]
The following proposition gives a correlator of and
when we are given a double correlator of
and
.
*173·3.
Dem.
*173·31.
*173·32.
Dem.
*173·33.
The above proposition is used in proving the associative law for
"" (*174·401).
[Pg 447]
Summary of *174.
In the present number, we have to prove the associative law for
and for
, i.e. we have to prove (with a suitable
hypothesis)
and
.
The first of these requires and either
or
the second requires not only this, but also
. When both
and
are relations of mutually exclusive relations, we call
an arithmetical relation, which we denote by
"
." Arithmetical relations serve exactly
analogous purposes to those served by arithmetical classes in cardinal
arithmetic.
The proof of the associative law for consists in showing that,
under a suitable hypothesis,
(with its
converse domain limited) is a correlator of
and
(*174·221·23). To prove this, we first prove
*174·17.
and
*174·19.
This gives what we may call the cardinal part of the proof, i.e.
it shows that
is a cardinal correlator of the fields of
and
.
We then prove that if
and
belong to the field
of
, they have the relation
when the
relational sums of their domains have the relation
.
Here, in addition to the hypothesis
,
we require that if any relation
has the relation
to itself,
then
is not to have more than one term. Thus we have
*174·215.
The hypothesis is verified if
(*174·216); thus for most purposes it is more
convenient to substitute the simpler hypothesis
for
. We shall, however, have
occasion to use the hypothesis
in
*182·42·43·431, where our
is a relation whose field consists
entirely of relations of the form
, whose[Pg 448] fields are
always unit classes, so that our
satisfies the above hypothesis
even if
is not contained in
.
The proof of *174·215 (above) is effected by first proving
*174·2.
*174·221.
whence we obtain the more convenient proposition
*174·23.
Thus if the hypothesis of *174·221 or of *174·23 holds, the associative
law holds for (*174·241·25).
To prove the associative law for , i.e.
we observe that, since
(*174·23)
we have (*174·41)
Also
,
by *115·46. Hence the associative law follows (*174·43). It will
be observed that in this case the correlator is simply s with its
converse domain limited (*174·42).
As in the case of , "
" is a stronger
hypothesis than we really need: what we need is
.
*174·01.
*174·12.
Dem.
[Pg 449]
*174·13.
*174·16.
Dem.
*174·161.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 450]
*174·18.
Dem.
Dem.
*174·191.
Dem.
*174·2.
Dem.
*174·21.
Dem.
[Pg 451]
*174·211.
Dem.
*174·212.
*174·213.
Dem.
[Pg 452]
*174·214.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
*174·22.
Dem.
[Pg 453]
Dem.
This proposition gives the associative law for . It remains to
prove the associative law for
.
The following propositions are concerned with various properties of
"arithmetical" relations, down to *174·4, where the proof of the
associative law for begins.
*174·3.
*174·31.
*174·311.
*174·32.
*174·321.
*174·322.
Dem.
*174·33.
Dem.
[Pg 454]
*174·34.
Dem.
*174·35.
Dem.
*174·36.
Dem.
[Pg 455]
*174·361.
Dem.
*174·362.
Dem.
*174·363.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 456]
Dem.
This is the associative law for .
*174·44.
*174·45.
Dem.
[Pg 457]
*174·46.
*174·461.
*174·462.
The two following propositions merely sum up previous results.
*174·47.
*174·48.
[Pg 458]
Summary of *176.
The definition of exponentiation is framed on the analogy of the
definition in cardinals, i.e. we put
We put also, what is often a more convenient form,
The relation has for its field (unless
) the
class of Cantor's "Belegungen," i.e. the class
.
It arranges these by a form of the principle of
first differences, namely as follows : Suppose
and
are two
members of
, and suppose there is
in
a term
for which the
-representative
precedes the
-representative
, i.e. for which
, and suppose further that all terms in
which
are earlier than
, i.e. for which
, have
their
-representative and their
-representative identical;
in this case we say that
has to
the relation
. This
may be stated as follows, provided we assume that
and
are
series: Let
and
be two one-valued functions whose possible
arguments are all the members of
, while their values are some
or all of the members of
. Then we say that
has to
the relation
if the first argument for which the two functions
do not have the same value gives an earlier value to
than to
.
Thus for example let be the series
,
,
,
,
, and let
be the series
,
,
,
. Then
and
are to be such
that
or
is defined when, and only when,
is
or
or
or
, and the value of
or
is
or
or
or
or
. Then if
and
,
precedes
; if
, and
,
precedes
; and so on. Thus in this case the first term of
the series generated by
is the one for which
when
has any of the values
,
,
,
. Thus the first term of the series is
,
i.e.
. The next term will be
[Pg 459]
The next is
,
and so on. This makes it evident that our series has the structure
required of a series which is to represent the
th power of
.
The two relations and
are ordinally
similar, since
is one-one when its field is limited to
. This follows from *116·131, together with
If is a correlator of
and
, and
is a correlator
of
and
, then
and
, with their converse domains limited,
are respectively correlators of
with
and of
with
. This
shows that the relation-number of
depends
only upon those of
and
, which is of course essential if
is to afford a definition of exponentiation.
If the multiplicative axiom is assumed, then if is a relation
which is like
, and whose field consists of relations which
are like
, and
, the product
of
is like
. That is, if we put
, so that
consists of
terms each of which has
terms, the product of
has
terms. This gives the connection of multiplication with
exponentiation.
There are two formal laws of exponentiation which hold for
relation-numbers, namely
They both need a hypothesis: the first needs
while the second needs
because it is proved by
means of the associative law (*174·43).
The first of the above formal laws can be generalized, by putting
in place of
, and taking the product
of the various powers
where
,
, ...
, and the products are taken in the
order determined by
. The resulting generalization is
The proof of this proposition results immediately from *174·43 and *162·35.
The proof of the second of the formal laws is more difficult. We
observe, to begin with, that
[Pg 460]
Assuming suitable hypotheses, this, by *162·35,
which is like
,
by *174·43. But
.
Thus our result will follow if we can prove
Now one member of the field of
will be
This is like , because
. Hence
is a series of terms each of which is like
, and the whole series of such
terms is like
. If we assumed the multiplicative axiom, this would
suffice to prove the result. But it is possible to obtain our result
without assuming the multiplicative axiom.
For this purpose, we proceed as follows. The correlator of
is
, by *165·361 and
*172·3. Call this
. Then
This, by the help of two or three lemmas, suffices to prove that
whence the result follows.
The principal propositions of the present number are the following:
*176·1.
*176·11.
These propositions merely embody the definitions.
*176·14.
*176·151.
It will be observed that in relation-arithmetic, ,
whereas in cardinal arithmetic
. The difference is due to
the fact that there is no ordinal number 1 (cf. *153).
[Pg 461]
*176·181.
*176·182.
*176·19.
*176·2.
*176·21. With the same hypothesis, correlates
and
.
*176·22.
*176·24.
This proposition connects multiplication and exponentiation.
*176·31.
*176·311·32·321. Similar propositions for ,
*176·34.
We come next to the formal laws. We have
*176·42.
*176·44.
This is an extension of *176·42.
*176·57.
*176·01.
*176·02.
*176·1.
*176·11.
*176·12.
Dem.
[Pg 462]
The above proposition is used in *176·19. It has the merit of giving a
direct formula for , instead of one which proceeds
by way of
.
*176·13.
*176·131.
Owing to this proposition, propositions stating analogies between
ordinal and cardinal powers mostly require the hypothesis
or its equivalent, because an ordinal power whose
index is zero is itself zero, whereas a cardinal power whose index is
zero is 1.
*176·132.
*176·133.
*176·14.
Dem.
*176·15.
Dem.
[Pg 463]
*176·151.
*176·16.
*176·18.
Dem.
*176·181.
*176·182.
Dem.
The above proposition is often useful, since it gives a direct formula
for , not one which passes by way of
or
.
*176·2.
Dem.
[Pg 464]
Dem.
*176·22.
*176·23.
Dem.
*176·24.
*176·3.
Dem.
*176·31.
Dem.
*176·311.
[Pg 465]
*176·32.
Dem.
*176·321.
*176·33.
*176·34.
Dem.
*176·341.
*176·35.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in the theory of finite ordinals (*261·64).
The following propositions are concerned in proving (with a suitable
hypothesis)
and its extension
[Pg 466]
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 467]
*176·44.
The following propositions are lemmas for
*176·5.
Dem.
*176·501.
Dem.
[Pg 468]
*176·502.
Dem.
*176·503.
Dem.
*176·51.
Dem.
*176·52.
Dem.
*176·53.
Dem.
[Pg 469]
*176·54.
Dem.
*176·541.
Dem.
[Pg 470]
*176·55.
Dem.
*176·56.
Dem.
*176·57.
Dem.
This completes the proof of the second formal law of exponentiation.
[Pg 471]
Summary of *177.
The principal proposition on this subject is
*177*13.
which is the analogue of *116·72, or rather leads to the analogue of
*116·72 as soon as powers of relation-numbers have been defined; for
then it becomes
Another proposition is an extension of *171·69, namely
*177·22.
where we put .
The remaining propositions of this number are lemmas for the above two.
*177·13 shows, for example, that all classes of finite integers can be
arranged in a series of which the relation-number is ,
where
is the relation-number of the series of finite
integers.
is not the relation-number of the continuum,
but is closely allied to it.
*177·1.
In the propositions of *116 referred to, and
appear in place of
and
, but no property of
and
is used in the proof except
.
*177·11.
Dem.
[Pg 472]
*177·12.
*177·2.
*177·21.
The proof proceeds as the proof of *174·24 proceeds. If ,
we shall have, if
,
Hence we easily obtain
whence
whence the result follows easily.
*177·22.
[Pg 473]
Summary of Section D.
In the present section, we shall be concerned with the arithmetical operations on relation-numbers. Their purely logical properties have been dealt with in Section A; in the present section, it is their arithmetical properties that are to be established. These properties result immediately from the arithmetical properties of relations which have been established in Sections B and C. The subjects treated of in the present section are analogous to those treated of in Section B of Part III. with the exception of such as have already had their analogues discussed in Sections B and C of Part IV. The analogy is sufficiently close to render it often unnecessary to give proofs, since these are often step by step analogous to the proofs of corresponding propositions in Part III, Section B.
The two chief requisites in defining the arithmetical operations with relation-numbers are (1) to take due account of types, (2) to construct what may be called separated relations, i.e. relations of mutually exclusive relations derived from and ordinally similar to given relations. Each of these points calls for some preliminary explanations.
The sum of two relation-numbers ,
will be denoted by
"
," in order to distinguish this kind of addition
from
(the arithmetical addition of classes) and
(the addition of cardinals). In defining
,
we have to take account of the following considerations.
Suppose and
are two relations which are of the same type,
and have mutually exclusive fields. Then obviously we shall want
to frame our definition of the sum of two relation-numbers in such
a way that the sum of
and
shall be
. But if
and
are not of
the same type,
is meaningless; and if
and
overlap,
may be too small to have
as its relation-number the sum of the relation-numbers of
and
. Both these difficulties can be met by observing that, if
and
, we must
make such definitions as to have
[Pg 474]
Hence, in defining the sum of the relation-numbers of
and
,
we may replace
and
by any two relations
and
which are respectively like
and
. Therefore what we require
for our definition is to find two relations
and
which
(1) are respectively like
and
, (2) are of the same type,
(3) have mutually exclusive fields. All these three requisites are
satisfied if we put
We then define
as meaning
, and we
define the sum of the relation-numbers of
and
as the
relation-number of
. This procedure is exactly analogous to that
of *110; in fact, we have
In defining the sum of the relation-numbers of a field, we do not have
to consider types, because the members of a field are necessarily
all of the same type. But we do have to consider the question of
overlapping. If a term occurs both in
and in
where
, we want a method of counting x twice over in
forming the arithmetical sum. Thus
cannot be
taken as the sum of the relation-numbers of members of
, unless
. Suppose, for instance, we have three
series
These each have three terms; and we want the sum of their
relation-numbers to be the relation-number of a series of nine terms.
But if we put
and if we further put
so that
places the above three series in the above order, we have
which is not a series, and does not have the relation-number which we
require as the sum of the relation-numbers of
,
,
.
[Pg 475]
What is wanted is a method of distinguishing the various occurrences
of and
and
. For this reason, when
occurs as
a member of the field of
, we replace it by
;
when as a member of the field of
, by
; and
when as a member of the field of
, by
. Thus
the series
is replaced by
;
is replaced by
;
and
is replaced by
.
The sum of these three series then has the relation-number which is
required as the sum of the relation-numbers of
,
,
.
The above process is symbolized as follows. The generating relation
of the series is
; thus the three relations whose sum is to be
taken are
,
,
,
i.e. using the notation of *182, according to which
we put
, our three relations
are
,
,
. But the generating relation of the
series
is
, since
. Thus
is the relation required for defining the sum of the relation-numbers
of members of the field of
; i.e. we put
We will call
the separated
relation corresponding to
.
is
constructed, as above, by replacing every member
of
,
where
, by
; so that if
belongs both
to
and to
, it is duplicated by being transformed once
into
, and once again into
.
For the treatment of products, we do not require
, because
has been so defined
as to effect the requisite separation. We might, however, by the use
of
, have dispensed with
as a
fundamental notion, and contented ourselves with
; for
we have
Thus we might have taken
as the fundamental notion, and
defined
by means of it.
The addition of unity to a relation-number has to be treated
separately from the addition of two relation-numbers, for the same
reasons which necessitate the treatment of and
separately from
. There is no
ordinal number 1, but we can define the addition of one to a
relation-number. If
and
, we must
have
where we write "
" for unity as an addendum. We do not
write "
," because we shall, at a later stage, give a general
definition of
, in virtue of which, if
is an
inductive cardinal,
will be the corresponding ordinal. This
definition entails
, and therefore we use a different
symbol "
" for 1 as addendum. The symbol
is only
defined in its uses, and has no significance except in a use which has
been specially defined.
We define the product as the relation-number
of
, when
and
. The product so defined obeys the
associative law, and obeys the distributive law in the form
but not, in general, in the form
[Pg 476]
The latter form holds when
,
,
are finite
ordinals, as we shall prove at a later stage (*262). The commutative
law also does not hold in general for ordinal addition and
multiplication, but holds where finite ordinals are concerned.
The product of the numbers of the members of , in the order
generated by
, is defined as being
, and
is denoted by
. It will be seen that
is not a function of
, since the value of a
product depends upon the order of the factors; it is also not a
function of
, unless no two members of
have the
same relation-number. The properties of
result from
*172 and *174.
" to the
th power" is denoted by "
"
and is defined as the relation-number of
, where
and
. Its
properties result from the propositions of *176 and *177.
[Pg 477]
Summary of *180.
In order to define the sum of two relation-numbers, we proceed (as
in *110) to construct a relation whose relation-number shall be the
required sum. For this purpose, we put
This definition has the following merits: (1) whatever may be the
types of
and
,
is of the same type as
;
(2) however the fields of
and
may overlap, and even if
, the fields of
and
are mutually exclusive;
(3) these two relations are respectively similar to
and
.
Hence it is evident that, without placing any restriction upon
and
,
we may take the relation-number of
as defining the sum of the
relation-numbers of
and
. Hence we put
From this definition it follows that
is null unless
and
are homogeneous relation-numbers, but that if they
are the homogeneous relation-numbers of
and
, then
is the relation-number of
.
In order to be able to deal with typically ambiguous relation-numbers,
we put, as in *110,
The principal propositions of the present number are
*180·111.
*180·3.
*180·31.
This proposition is essential, since otherwise
would not be a function of
and
, but would depend upon the particular
and
.
*180·32.
[Pg 478]
*180·4.
*180·42.
*180·56.
which is the associative law.
*180·61.
*180·71.
This proposition gives the connection of ordinal and cardinal addition.
It should be observed that, in virtue of *154·9, and
are cardinals when
and
are relation-numbers.
*180·01.
*180·02.
On the purpose of the definitions *180·03·031, see the remarks on the
corresponding definitions in *110 and of the Prefatory
Statement.
*180·1.
*180·101.
*180·11.
*180·111.
Dem.
*180·12.
*180·13.
Dem.
*180·14.
*180·15.
Dem.
[Pg 479]
*180·151.
Dem.
*180·152.
*180·16.
*180·2.
*180·201.
*180·202.
Dem.
In the following propositions proofs are omitted, since they are exactly analogous to proofs of propositions in *110 whose numbers have the same decimal part.
*180·21.
[Pg 480]
*180·211.
*180·212.
*180·22.
*180·24.
*180·3.
*180·31.
*180·32.
*180·4.
*180·42.
*180·43.
*180·53.
Dem.
*180·531.
*180·54.
*180·541.
*180·55.
[Pg 481]
*180·551.
*180·56.
*180·561.
*180*57.
*180·6.
Observe that is an equation
depending upon the peculiar properties of
. We do not in
general have
unless
and
are finite ordinals.
*180·61.
*180·62.
*180·64.
*180·642.
Note that , which will be defined in *181, is
, not
.
The following propositions, being concerned with the relations of relation-numbers and cardinal numbers, have no analogues in *110.
*180·7.
Dem.
*180·71.
Dem.
[Pg 482]
Summary of *181.
The relation-number has, according to our definitions, no
meaning in isolation, because our definitions are framed with a view to
series, and a series cannot consist of one term. But we can add
one term to a series; hence
is required as an addendum.
In order to get our definitions in the most manageable form, we first
construct a relation, which we call
, which
is such that, whenever
exists,
has
one more term in its field than
; the relation-number of this
relation is then defined as
. We add also
a definition
which is purely formal, and serves to minimize exceptions to the
associative law of addition.
The definitions are closely analogous to those of *180. We put
with a similar definition for
.
and
may be of any relative types, and we have always
We put
with a similar definition for
. We also
introduce definitions analogous to *180·03·031.
The principal propositions of this number are
*181·3.
*181·31.
*181·32.
*181·33.
*181·4.
*181·42.
[Pg 483]
The following propositions are formally forms of the associative
law, but they need separate proof on account of the peculiarity of
.
*181·54.
*181·56.
*181·58.
*181·59.
The hypotheses in the above propositions are essential.
*181·6.
*181·62.
These propositions give the connection with cardinals.
*181·01.
*181·011.
*181·02.
*181·021.
*181·03.
*181·031.
*181·04.
Propositions concerning are omitted
in what follows, since they are proved exactly as the analogous
propositions concerning
are proved.
*181·1.
*181·11.
Dem.
*181·12.
*181·13.
Dem.
[Pg 484]
*181·2.
*181·21.
*181*22.
Dem.
*181·24.
*181·3.
*181·31.
*181·32.
*181·33.
The above proposition is used in *253·23·571.
*181·4.
*181·42.
Dem.
*181·43.
The following propositions are concerned with the associative law when
is one of the addenda.
*181·53.
Dem.
[Pg 485]
Dem.
*181·55.
*181·56.
Dem.
[Pg 486]
The last line in the above proof, in which *24·1 is used, is legitimate
because and
may be of any type whatever, and therefore
the fact that
is sufficient to establish
in the sense wanted.
*181·561.
This definition adopts the opposite convention to that usually adopted.
But it is convenient to have ,
and also to have as much similarity as possible between the
results of adding
at the beginning and end of a relation.
Both reasons lead to the adoption of the above convention. (Cf.
*181·57·571, below.)
*181·57.
*181·571.
*181·58.
The proof proceeds in the same way as that of *181·54.
*181·59.
The above propositions show that, except when one of the summands is
zero, the associative law holds for just as if it were a
relation-number.
The following propositions are concerned with relations to cardinal addition.
*181·6.
Dem.
*181·61.
*181·62.
Dem.
[Pg 487]
Summary of *182.
In this number, we have to consider, as a preliminary to the
addition of the relation-numbers of a field, the properties of
the relation , which is defined
as follows. If
is any function of two
arguments in the sense of *38, we put
.
Thus
,
i.e.
.
Hence
is
the relation of
to
when
. Thus the symbol
is only
significant when
is a relation of relations; when this is the
case,
is the relation which results
when, for every
which is a member of
, every member
of
is replaced by
. The result is a
, whose arithmetical properties serve to
define the arithmetical properties of the sum of the relation-numbers
of members of
the next number, we shall put
We shall put later
and we shall find
Thus we might have dispensed with
as a fundamental notion,
using
instead, and putting
But this course is on the whole less convenient than that adopted in
*172 and *173.
The notation is thus required in
connection with ordinal addition, where it is almost indispensable.
It has besides certain minor uses. The object of the notation is to
enable us to exhibit as a function of
an expression of the form
, where
is any descriptive
double function which exists for all possible pairs of arguments. Thus
for example
is a function of
, but the notations
hitherto introduced do not enable us to exhibit it in the form
.
Hence if we wish (say) to deal with the class
[Pg 488]
we cannot write it in the form
unless we introduce a new
notation. We put
whence
.
We introduce the notation generally for all descriptive double
functions which exist for all possible pairs of arguments.
Thus "
" in this number corresponds to
"
" in *38.
In the present number, we shall begin by a few propositions
illustrating possible uses of the notation .
Thus for example if
is a class of relations, we have
hitherto had no simple notation for expressing the class of their
squares. But since
, the class of the squares
of
's is
. The notation is,
however, introduced chiefly in order to be applied to
and
. We therefore proceed almost at once to
propositions on
, and especially on
. We have
*182·16·162.
*182·2.
*182·21.
We next prove (*182·27) that if ,
then
has double likeness to
,
the double correlator being
with its
converse domain limited to
(*182·26). We then prove (*182·33) that if
is a double correlator of
with
, then
(with its converse domain limited)
is a double correlator of
and
, whence we deduce
*182·34.
We next proceed to prove
*182·42.
The proof of this is as follows: In virtue of *182·21 and the
associative law for , we have
[Pg 489]
Now
(*182·413), and
(*172·51).
Hence our proposition results. Hence we arrive at
*182·44.
Finally we have some propositions showing how the notation
can be applied in cardinals.
It is then applied to
, instead of, as
above, to
. We have (*182·5·51·52)
.
Thus the notation of the present number might have been employed in
dealing with cardinal addition (*112) instead of the notation
.
The general notation
was, however, required for
other purposes (cf. *85) and could not have been dispensed with.
In *183 we shall put
and by *182·52 we have
It will be seen that these formulae have the usual kind of analogy.
*182·01.
*182·02.
*182·021.
*182·022.
*182·023.
*182·03.
Thus if is a class of relations, the class of their squares
is
.
*182·031.
*182·032.
*182·033.
*182·04.
Observe that in , we first take
, and then put a circumflex over it. If we first
took
, we could not then place two commas
under it, because
is a relation, not a double
descriptive function, and two commas can only significantly be placed
under a double descriptive function.
[Pg 490]
*182·05.
The relation for the sake of which the above notation is chiefly
introduced is , where
is a
relation of relations. If
relates
and
, then
relates
and
. This is stated in the following proposition:
*182·1.
*182·11.
*182·12.
*182·13.
*182·14.
Dem.
*182·15.
Dem.
*182·161.
Dem.
*182·162.
*182·17.
Dem.
[Pg 491]
*182·18.
Dem.
*182·19.
Dem.
The following propositions lead up to *182·26·27.
*182·22.
*182·23.
*182·24.
*182·25.
Dem.
[Pg 492]
Dem.
The following propositions lead up to *182·33·34.
*182·3.
Dem.
[Pg 493]
*182·31.
Dem.
*182·32.
Dem.
Dem.
The converse of the above proposition is false. For
example, if , we shall have
,
by *182·16·27, but we shall not have
unless
, as appears from *182·16 and
*164·23.
*182·411·412 are lemmas for *182·413. All the following propositions lead up to *182·42, which leads to *182·44.
Dem.
[Pg 494]
Dem.
*182·414.
Dem.
*182·415.
Dem.
The purpose of the above proposition is to enable us to apply
*174·221·231 to , as is done in
*182·42·43·431 below.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 495]
*182·45.
The following propositions are concerned with cardinals. They show how to express the propositions and definitions of *112 in the notation of this number, and they thereby illustrate the analogy of cardinal and ordinal addition.
*182·53.
Dem.
*182·54.
[Pg 496]
Summary of *183.
In this number we have to define and consider the sum of the
relation-numbers of the members of , where
is a relation
of relations. Since relational sums are not commutative, we cannot
define the sum of the relation-numbers of members of a class of
relations
: it is necessary that
should be given
as the field of a relation
, where
determines the order in
which the summation is to be effected.
In order to avoid repetition, we replace by
, so that if
is a member of
,
is replaced by
,
i.e. by
. This relation is like
, and
its field has no members in common with the field of
,
unless
. Hence we are led to the following definition:
*183·01.
This definition is analogous to *112·01, as appears from *182·52, and the propositions of the present number are analogous to some of the propositions of *112.
We have not merely
*183·11.
but also
*183·15.
which is a proposition with a weaker hypothesis than that of *183·11 (cf. note to *182·34).
Important propositions in this number are
*183·13.
*183·2.
I.e. a sum is only zero when there is no summand except (at most) zero. (Cf. *162·4·45.)
[Pg 497]
*183·25.
*183-26.
This proposition connects addition and multiplication.
*183·31.
This proposition connects the two kinds of addition. We have also
*183·33.
The associative law of addition in a very general form is
*183·43.
Finally the connection of ordinal and cardinal addition is given by
*183·5.
*183·01.
*183·1.
Dem.
*183·12.
*183·14.
Dem.
*183·15.
*183·2.
Dem.
[Pg 498]
*183·22.
Dem.
*183·23.
*183·231.
Dem.
*183·24.
Dem.
*183·25.
Dem.
*183·26.
Dem.
[Pg 499]
*183·3.
*183·301.
*183·302.
Dem.
*183·31.
Dem.
*183·32.
Dem.
*183·33.
Dem.
[Pg 500]
*183·331.
*183·42.
Dem.
*183·43.
This is a form of the associative law of addition.
Dem.
*183·5.
Dem.
[Pg 501]
Summary of *184.
The propositions of this number are for the most part analogous to
those of the propositions of *113 which are concerned with .
Those of *113 which are concerned with
have their analogues in *166. We put
*184·01.
*184·02.
*184·03.
We prove that is only zero when one of its
factors is zero (*184·16); we prove the associative law (*184·31), and
the distributive law in the forms
*184·33.
*184·35.
and we prove (*184·4). Also
we extend the distributive law to the case where one of the summands is
, i.e. we prove
*184·41.
*184·42.
and the connection of cardinal and ordinal multiplication is given by
*184·5.
*184·01.
*184·02.
*184·03.
*184·1.
[Pg 502]
The proofs of the following propositions are omitted, since they are analogous to those of the corresponding propositions of *113.
*184·11.
*184·111.
*184·12.
*184·13.
*184·14.
*184·15.
*184·2.
*184·21.
Dem.
*184·3.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 503]
*184·32.
*184·33.
Dem.
*184·34.
Dem.
*184·35.
The proof proceeds as in *184·31.
Dem.
[Pg 504]
*184·41.
Dem.
*184·42.
*184·5.
Dem.
[Pg 505]
Summary of *185.
The subject of this number is analogous to part of the subject of *114.
The propositions concerned are immediate consequences of previously
proved properties of , and offer no difficulty of any kind.
*185·01.
*185·1.
*185·11.
*185·12.
*185·2.
*185·22.
*185·23.
*185·25.
*185·27.
*185·28.
*185·29.
*185·31.
*185·32.
*185·321.
*185·35.
[Pg 506]
*185·4.
*185·41.
The following proposition gives the connection between ordinal and cardinal multiplication.
*185·5.
Dem.
[Pg 507]
Summary of *186.
For " to the
th power," where ordinal powers are
concerned, we use the notation "
." We cannot
use "
" or "
" because these have
been already used for cardinals and classes (*116). We therefore put a
suffix
to "
" to show that it is relational
powers that we are dealing with. We put
The following are the principal propositions of this number:
*186·2.
We do not have , because there is no
ordinal 1.
*186·21.
*186·22.
*186·23.
*186·14.
*186·15.
*186·31.
which connects exponentiation with multiplication.
*186·4. (cf.*177)
*186·5.
which connects ordinal and cardinal exponentiation.
*186·01.
*186·02.
*186·03.
*186·1.
[Pg 508]
*186·11.
*186·111.
*186·12.
*186·13.
*186·14.
Dem.
*186·15.
Dem.
*186·2.
*186·21.
Dem.
[Pg 509]
*186·22.
Dem.
*186·23.
*186·3.
*186·31.
[Pg 510]
*186·5.
Dem.
[Pg 511]
[Pg 513]
A RELATION is said to be serial, or to generate a
series, when it possesses three different properties, namely (1) being
contained in diversity, (2) transitiveness, (3) connexity, i.e.
the property that the relation or its converse holds between any two
different members of its field. Thus is a serial relation if
(1)
, (2)
, (3)
.
The third characteristic, that of connexity, may be written more shortly
i.e.
,
using the notation of *97; and this, in virtue of *97·23, is equivalent
to
In virtue of *50·47, the first two characteristics are equivalent to
When
, we say that
is
"asymmetrical." Thus serial relations are such as are asymmetrical,
transitive, and connected.
It might be thought that a serial relation need not be contained
in diversity, since we commonly speak of series in which there are
repetitions, i.e. in which an earlier term is identical with a
later term. Thus, e.g.
would be called a series of letters, although the letters
and
recur. But in all such cases, there is some means (in the above
case, position in space) by which one occurrence of a given
term is distinguished from another occurrence, and this will be found
to mean that there is some other series (in the above case, the
series of positions in a line) free from repetitions, with which our
pseudo-series has a one-many correlation. Thus, in the above instance,
we have a series of nine positions, which we may call
which form a true series without repetitions; we have a one-many
relation, that of occupying these positions, by means of which
we distinguish occurrences of
, the first occurrence being a as
the correlate of 1, the second being[Pg 514]
as the correlate of 4. All
series in which there are repetitions (which we may call pseudo-series)
are thus obtained by correlation with true series, i.e, with series
in which there is no repetition. That is to say, a pseudo-series has
as its generating relation a relation of the form
, where
is a serial relation, and
is a one-many relation whose
converse domain contains the field of
. Thus what we may call
self-subsistent series must be series without repetitions, i.e.
series whose generating relations are contained in diversity.
For our purposes, there is no use in distinguishing a series from its generating relation. A series is not a class, since it has a definite order, while a class has no order, but is capable of many orders (unless it contains only one term or none). The generating relation determines the order, and also the class of terms ordered, since this class is the field of the generating relation. Hence the generating relation completely determines the series, and may, for all mathematical purposes, be taken to be the series.
When is transitive, we have
Hence all the propositions of Part II, Section E become greatly
simplified when applied to series.
Also, since the field of a connected relation consists of a single family, a series has one first term or none, and one last term or none.
In the case of a serial relation , the relation
(defined
in *121·02) becomes
, i.e. the relation
"immediately preceding." In a discrete series, the terms in
general immediately precede other terms. A compact series, on
the contrary, is defined as one in which there are terms between any
two: in such a series,
.
It very frequently occurs that we wish to consider the relations of
various series which are all contained in some one series; for example,
we may wish to consider various series of real numbers, all arranged
in order of magnitude. In such a case, if is the series in which
all the others are contained, and
,
,
,
... are the fields of the contained series, the contained series
themselves are
,
,
, .... Thus when series are given as
contained in a given series, they are completely determined by their
fields.
In what follows, Section A deals with the elementary properties of series, including maximum and minimum points, sequent points and limits.
[Pg 515]
Section B will deal with the theory of segments and kindred topics; in this section we shall define "Dedekindian" series, and shall prove the important proposition that the series of segments of a series is always Dedekindian, i.e. that every class of segments has either a maximum or a limit.
Section C, which stands outside the main developments of the book, is concerned with convergence and the limits of functions and the definition of a continuous function. Its purpose is to show how these notions can be expressed, and many of their properties established, in a much more general way than is usually done, and without assuming that the arguments or values of the functions concerned are either numerical or numerically measurable.
Section D will deal with "well-ordered" series, i.e. series in which every class containing members of the field has a first term. The properties of well-ordered series are many and important; most of them depend upon the fact that an extended variety of mathematical induction is possible in dealing with well-ordered series. The term "ordinal number" is confined by usage to the relation-number of a well-ordered series; ordinal numbers will also be considered in our fourth section.
Section E will deal with finite and infinite. We shall show that the distinction between "inductive" and "non-reflexive" does not arise in well-ordered series.
Section F will deal with "compact" series, i.e. series in which
there is a term between any two, i.e. in which . In
particular we shall consider "rational" series (i.e. series
like the series of rationals in order of magnitude) and continuous
series (i.e. series like the series of real numbers in order of
magnitude). Our treatment of this subject will follow Cantor closely.
[Pg 516]
Summary of Section A.
In the present section, we shall be concerned with the properties common to all series. Such properties, for the most part, are very simple, and present no difficulties of any kind. Many of the properties of series do not require all the three characteristics by which serial relations are defined, but only one or two of these properties: we therefore begin with numbers in which, though the properties proved derive their chief importance from their applicability to series, the hypotheses are only that the relations in question have one or two of the properties of serial relations. Thence we proceed to the most elementary properties peculiar to series, and thence to the theory of minimum and maximum members of classes contained in a series, and of the successors and limits of classes. We then proceed to the correlation of a series with part of itself. The ground covered is familiar, and the difficulties encountered are less than in most previous sections.
It will be observed that where series are concerned, if
is an existent class contained in
,
is correlative to
(which
is
):
is "predecessors of
some
," and
is "successors
of all
's." If
is an existent class contained in
, the whole of
, with the exception of the last term
of
(if there is such a term), belongs to one or other of
the classes
,
, of which
the first wholly precedes the second. The division of
into
these two classes is the Dedekind "cut" defined by
. But
when only part of
is contained in
, we must replace
by
,
since
if
has any member not belonging to
. Again, if
, we have
.
But what we want is the complement to
, which in this case is null. Hence we must
replace
by
: this is
when
, i.e. when
.
In any other event it is equal to
.
If
[Pg 517] is contained in
and is not null,
.
Thus the Dedekind "cut" defined by a class
, whether or not
this class is contained in whole or part in
, is always the two
classes
Throughout the elementary propositions of this section, we have
been careful to avoid stronger hypotheses than are required: we
have not assumed to be serial, if our conclusion would follow
(e.g.) from the hypothesis that
is transitive and
connected. It will be found that many properties of series depend
upon the fact that, if
,
are two different terms of a
series
, then
(*204·3). Here the
implication
requires that
should be
asymmetrical, i.e. that we should have
,
or
. The implication
requires that
should be connected.
Thus the hypothesis required is not that
should be serial, but
that
should be connected and asymmetrical (*202·5).
Again, consider the proposition that if is a series,
. This relation
is the very useful
relation "immediately preceding"; thus the above proposition is
important, as is the further proposition that if
is a series,
is a one-one relation. It will be remembered that (by
*121) "
" means that
consists of
two terms. It was shown in *121·304·305 that if
is contained in diversity, "
" implies "
" and is
equivalent to the statement that
and
constitute the
whole interval
and are not identical. Also
by *121·254,
. It is evident that, if
is contained in diversity, and
, we
cannot have
, because there is no term other than
and
in the interval
, and we cannot have
or
. Hence if
, we
have
. Hence by what was said
above (*121·305), if
, we shall have
. On the other hand, if
is
transitive, we have
(*201·61).
Combining these two facts, and remembering that if
is transitive,
(*201·18), we find that
if
is transitive and contained in diversity. We find further
(*202·7) that if
is connected,
is one-one. Hence
we need the full hypothesis that
is a series in order to prove
that
is a one-one (*204·7). This is a good example of the
way in which the various separate characteristics that make up the
definition of series are relevant in proving the properties of series.
[Pg 518]
Summary of *200.
Some of the propositions of this number are repetitions or
immediate consequences of previous propositions, especially those
of the propositions of *50 which deal with diversity. But we are
chiefly concerned here with propositions which will be useful in
the theory of series; this leads us to introduce propositions
on and on matters connected
with relation-arithmetic and other topics. It will be seen that
"
" (i.e. "
is asymmetrical") is an
important hypothesis, as is also
, of
the use of which we have already had examples in *96 and *121.
The following are among the most useful propositions in this number:
*200·12.
This is the proposition which makes it impossible to define an ordinal number 1 which shall take its place among relation-numbers applicable to series.
*200·35.
This is a consequence of *200·12.
*200·36.
*200·361.
I.e. if , no term precedes itself or
any of its predecessors, and no term succeeds itself or any of its
successors.
*200·38.
*200·39.
We then have a collection of propositions concerned with relation-arithmetic.
*200·211.
I.e. the property of being contained in diversity is invariant for likeness-transformations;
*200·4.
[Pg 519]
*200·41.
and other such propositions.
We then have a set of propositions concerned with
and
.
The most important are
*200·5.
*200·52.
*200·53.
I.e. if is asymmetrical, the terms which precede part of
do not succeed the whole of
, and vice versa.
*200·11.
Dem.
*200·2.
Dem.
*200·21.
Dem.
The properties of relations are very frequently common to all relations which are like a given relation, and this applies specially to the kinds of properties with which we are most concerned. The above proposition is an illustration of this fact: it shows that the property of being contained in diversity is invariant for likeness-transformations.
*200·22.
Dem.
[Pg 520]
We have, without the need of typical definiteness,
both of which are immediate consequences of *200·211. The converse
implications, however, fail if
is taken in a type in
which
.
*200·3.
*200·31.
*200·32.
*200·33.
*200·34.
*200·35.
Dem.
*200·36.
*200·361.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 521]
*200·38.
*200·381.
Dem.
*200·39.
Dem.
*200·391.
Dem.
The above proposition is useful in the theory of segments.
The following propositions are concerned with the ideas of relation-arithmetic. Analogous propositions will be proved for transitiveness and connection in *201 and *202, whence analogous propositions concerning series will be deduced in *204.
Dem.
This proposition is part of the proof that the sum of two mutually exclusive series is a series.
*200·41.
Dem.
[Pg 522]
The following propositions (*200·421·422·423) are lemmas for *204·53.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
*200·43.
Dem.
[Pg 523]
The following propositions, with the exception of *200·52,
are concerned with and
, i.e. the class of terms
preceding (or succeeding) the whole of
.
*200·5.
Dem.
*200·51.
Dem.
Dem.
This proposition is often used in the theory of well-ordered series.
*200·53.
Dem.
[Pg 524]
The above proposition is frequently used. If is
an existent class contained in
,
and
are the two parts of the Dedekind "cut"
determined by
(excluding the maximum of
, if any).
The above proposition shows that these two parts are mutually exclusive.
*200·54.
Dem.
This proposition is a lemma whose purpose is to avoid the necessity of
introducing the hypothesis or in proofs in which it
is not really necessary. The first use of this proposition occurs in
*206·551.
[Pg 525]
Summary of *201.
There are two main varieties of transitive relations, namely
those that are symmetrical , and those that are
asymmetrical
. Transitive
symmetrical relations have the formal properties of equality:
examples of such relations have occurred above, e.g. identity,
similarity, and likeness. The propositions of the present number,
however, are rather such as will be useful in connection with
transitive asymmetrical relations, since they are intended to be
applied to series.
We denote the class of transitive relations by ""; thus
Many propositions of this number are analogous to propositions whose
numbers have the same decimal part in *200. Such are: If
is
transitive, so is its converse (*201·11), and so is any relation
which is like P (*201·211);
and
are transitive (*201·3·31); if
is transitive, so is
(*201·33). The propositions *201·4—·42,
which deal with the ideas of relation-arithmetic, are also analogous to
*200·4—·42.
Most of the other propositions of this number, however, have no analogues in *200. Among the most important of these are the following :
*201·14.
*201·15.
*201·18.
This proposition is very important, since it effects an immense
simplification in the use of all propositions involving
or
, when these propositions are to be
applied to transitive relations. Owing to the above proposition,
drops out where transitive relations are concerned.
, on the other hand, remains useful: If
,
"
" will mean "
precedes or is
," which, if
generates a series of which
and
are members, is equivalent
to "
does not follow
."
[Pg 526]
We have a series of propositions (*201·5—·56) on and
. The chief of these are
*201·5.
*201·501.
These two propositions express the fact that a predecessor of a predecessor is a predecessor.
*201·52.
Thus if consists of
together with the predecessors of its members.
*201·521.
*201·55.
We have next a set of important propositions on and
. The chief are
*201·63.
*201·65.
On these two propositions, see the notes appended to them below.
*201·01.
*201·1.
Dem.
*201·12.
In virtue of this proposition, being contained in diversity is equivalent (where transitive relations are concerned) to asymmetry. This is not in general the case with relations which are not transitive; thus e.g. diversity itself is contained in diversity, but is symmetrical.
*201·13.
Dem.
*201·14.
Dem.
[Pg 527]
The following propositions (*201·15—·19) are concerned with
and
.
*201·16.
This proposition is important, since it often happens that a series is
given as defined by a one-one relation , as in *122 for example,
and in such cases
is a serial relation in our
present sense. By the above proposition,
is always
transitive; by *96·421,
is connected when confined to
the posterity of a given term, provided
;
by *96·23, if
and
,
is contained in diversity throughout the posterity of
. Thus if
is a one-one,
confined to any
family which has a beginning will be a serial relation.
*201·17.
Dem.
Dem.
This proposition is important, since it simplifies all propositions
concerning and
in case
is transitive.
The following proposition is an instance of this simplification.
The following propositions (*201·2—·22) are concerned in proving that transitiveness is unaffected by likeness-transformations, and therefore belongs to every member of a relation-number or to none.
Dem.
*201·201.
[Pg 528]
*201·21.
Dem.
This shows that transitiveness is a property which is unchanged by likeness-transformations. Hence
*201·212.
*201·22.
Dem.
Dem.
Unless ,
. A relation whose
square is
is transitive, because
is
contained in every relation.
*201·32.
Dem.
Dem.
The following propositions (*201·4—·42) are concerned with the ideas of relation-arithmetic.
Dem.
[Pg 529]
*201·401.
Dem.
*201·41.
Dem.
*201·411.
Dem.
[Pg 530]
The following propositions (*201·5—·56) are concerned with
and
, i.e. with
the predecessors of some part of a class and the predecessors of the
whole of a class.
*201·501.
*201·51.
Dem.
*201·52.
*201·521.
*201·53.
*201·54.
*201·55.
Dem.
The following proposition is a lemma which is used in *205·192 and *206·24.
Dem.
[Pg 531]
The following propositions, to the end of the number, are concerned
with the relation defined in *121. We may regard
as
meaning "immediately precedes." *201·6·61·62 are lemmas for *201·63.
Dem.
Dem.
The above proposition is of fundamental importance. The relation
(defined in *121) plays a great part in the theory of series.
It is the relation[Pg 532] "immediately preceding." Its domain consists of
those terms which have immediate successors; its converse domain,
of those that have immediate predecessors. In well-ordered series,
, while
consists
of all terms (except the first) which do not belong to the first
derivative (cf. *216). In any series,
consists of all the terms which are limits of ascending series, and
. consists of all the terms which are
limits of descending series.
*201·64.
Dem.
When is a series,
is the condition for its being
a compact series, i.e. one in which there are terms
between any two. In virtue of *201·65, this condition is equivalent to
, which states that no term has an immediate
predecessor.
The following proposition is first used in *253·521.
*201·66.
Dem.
*201·661.
Dem.
The above proposition is a lemma for the following.
*201·662.
This proposition is first used in *253·521.
[Pg 533]
Summary of *202.
A relation is said to be connected when either it or its
converse holds between any two different members of its field,
i.e. when, if ,
, we have
.
Thus the field of a connected relation consists of
a single family, unless the relation is null, in which case it has
no families. Conversely, a relation which has one family or none is
connected. Connection is necessary, in addition to transitiveness and
asymmetry, in order that a relation may generate a single series.
If
is a class of transitive or asymmetrical relations,
is transitive or asymmetrical; but if
is a class of connected relations,
is not in
general connected. Hence if
is a class of series,
is not one series, but many detached series. This is one
reason why the arithmetical sum of a relation of relations is not
defined as
, but as
(cf. *162), because the latter, but not in general the former,
is connected when
and all the members of
are connected
(*202·42).
When is connected, if
is any class contained in
, we have
and there is at most one member of
belonging neither
to
nor to
.
This member of
, if it exists, is the maximum of
.
If, further,
(i.e. if
is asymmetrical),
.
Thus when
is both connected and asymmetrical,
and
are each
other's complements, and the two together constitute the Dedekind
cut defined by
being all the
terms that do not follow the whole of
, and
being all the terms that do follow the whole of
.
More generally, if is any class, not necessarily contained
in
, then when
is connected, we have
and when
is asymmetrical, we have
Thus when both conditions are fulfilled, we have (*202·503)
[Pg 534]
The above inclusions and the consequent equality will be constantly
required throughout what follows. The division of into the two
mutually exclusive parts
is the Dedekind "cut" defined by the class
. If
,
the two parts become, as above mentioned,
If, further,
is not null, they become
If
is contained in
and contains all its own
predecessors, they become
In this simplified form, Dedekind "cuts" will be considered later
(*211).
We take as our definition
Some of the propositions of the present number are analogues of
propositions in *200 and *201. Such are: If is connected,
so is
(*202·11); if
is connected, so is any
similar relation (*202·211);
and
are connected (*202·3·31); if
is connected, so is
(*202·33); and various propositions
connected with relation-arithmetic (*202·4—·42). The majority of the
propositions of this number, however, deal with properties peculiar to
connexity. Among the most important of these are:
*202·101.
*202·103.
These are merely alternative forms of the definition.
*202·13.
*202·5.
*202·501.
*202·503.
*202·505.
*202·52.
*202·524.
*202·55.
[Pg 535]
In virtue of this proposition (and others) if is a series
and
is a class (not a unit class) contained in
,
is the generating relation of the series
consisting of the class
in the order which it has in the
series
.
*202·7.
This proposition is to be taken in connection with *201·63. The two
together show that when is a series,
is one-one.
*202·01.
For the definition of , see *97·01.
*202·1.
*202·101.
*202·102.
*202·103.
*202·104.
*202·12.
Dem.
[Pg 536]
The following propositions, down to *202·181 inclusive (excepting
*202·16·161) are concerned with and
.
It often happens that these are connected when
is not so,
e.g. if
is the relation
among inductive
cardinals.
*202·13.
Dem.
*202·131.
*202·132.
*202·133.
Dem.
*202·134.
*202·135.
Dem.
*202·136.
*202·137.
*202·138.
*202·14.
*202·141.
*202·15.
Dem.
[Pg 537]
The above proposition is used in the ordinal theory of finite and infinite (*260·4).
Dem.
Dem.
*202·162.
Dem.
*202·17.
Dem.
[Pg 538]
*202·171.
*202·172.
*202·18.
Dem.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in the ordinal theory of finite and infinite (*261·2).
The following proposition is a lemma for *202·211, which shows that if a relation is connected, so are all similar relations.
*202·21.
Dem.
The proofs of the three following propositions proceed like the proofs of the analogous propositions in *200 and *201.
*202·212.
*202·22.
Dem.
[Pg 539]
Dem.
Dem.
The following propositions (*202·4—·42) are concerned with applications of relation-arithmetic.
Dem.
The above proposition illustrates the reasons for defining
as was done in *160. When
and
are
connected,
is in general not connected: it is
the additional term
which insures connection.
*202·401.
Dem.
[Pg 540]
*202·41.
Dem.
*202·411.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 541]
Dem.
The following propositions (*202·501-·51) are concerned with the
relations of and
.
They are important, and *202·501·503·505 will be often used.
Dem.
*202·502.
Dem.
Dem.
*202·504
Dem.
[Pg 542]
Dem.
Dem.
The following propositions (*202·511—·524) are concerned with
. *202·52 shows that if
,
cannot have more than one first term or more than one last
term, and *202·523 shows that this still holds if only
is connected. *202·511 shows that if
is a connected relation
which has a first term, then if
is any class, there are
predecessors of the whole of
when and only when
is such a predecessor, and when and only when
.
*202·524 shows that if
is connected and has a first
term,
consists of the successors of the first term.
These propositions are much used.
Dem.
[Pg 543]
Dem.
*202·521.
Dem.
*202·522.
Dem.
The following propositions (*202·53—·55) are concerned with relations with limited fields. Such relations are constantly used in the theory of series.
Dem.
[Pg 544]
This proposition is important in series. If and
are
serial relations, and
, they verify the above
hypothesis; hence if
is a series contained in a given series
,
is simply
with its field limited. Thus series
contained in a given series are completely determined by their fields.
Dem.
The above proposition is frequently used. *202·55, which is an immediate consequence of *202·54, is used incessantly.
The following proposition is used in *232·14.
*202·541.
Dem.
*202·56.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in *212·652.
*202·6.
Dem.
The following proposition is a lemma for *202·62, which is itself a lemma for *204·52.
*202·61.
Dem.
[Pg 545]
*202·611.
Dem.
The three following propositions (*202·7—·72) are concerned with .
Of these, *202·7 is important: it shows that if
is connected, no term can have more than one immediate predecessor
or successor. *202·72 is used in *204·71, which is an important
proposition.
Dem.
*202·71.
Dem.
[Pg 546]
*202·8.
Dem.
*202·81.
Dem.
The above proposition shows that if is connected, and any class
is picked out of
, then
arranges
in an
order which is similar to that in which
arranges the correlates
of
.
[Pg 547]
Summary of *204.
In this number we give the definition and a few of the simpler
properties of series. Most of the propositions of this number result
immediately from those of *200, *201, and *202. Our definition is
We have
*204·16.
either of which might have been taken as the definition.
After a few propositions giving other possible forms of the definition of series, we proceed to a set of propositions which follow immediately from those of *200, *201, and *202. Such are
*204·2.
*204·21.
*204·24.
*204·25.
Another important proposition on couples is
*204·272.
so that couples are the only series having unit classes for their domains or converse domains.
We then proceed to a set of propositions on .
We have
*204·33.
Also, if is a
one-one and
(*204·34·35).
We then have some propositions (*204·4—·44) on relations with limited fields. The most important of these are
*204·4.
*204·41.
[Pg 548]
This proposition is important, since it shows that any series contained in a given series is wholly determined when its field is given.
We have next a number of propositions (*204·45—·59) applying
relation-arithmetic to series. The first set of these (*204·45—·483)
are concerned with the proof that if a "cut" is made in a series, the
series is the sum of the two parts into which the cut divides it, where
the sum is taken in the sense of *160 or *161, according as one part
of the cut does not or does consist of a single term. Most of these
propositions do not require the full hypothesis that is a series, but
only some part of it. Thus we have for instance
*204·46.
with a similar proposition for and
(*204·461).
We next prove that if ,
are mutually exclusive series,
their sum
is a series, and vice versa
(*204·5); that if
is a series to which
does not belong,
and
are series, and
vice versa (*204·51); that if
is a series of mutually exclusive
series, its sum
is a series (*204·52); that if
,
are series, so is
(*204·55); that if
is
a series of series,
is contained in diversity and is
transitive (*204·561), while if
is also well-ordered, i.e.
such that every existent sub-class of
has a first term, then
is a series (*204·57); and that if
and
are
series, and
is well-ordered, then
and
are series (*204·59). These propositions are essential to ordinal
arithmetic, but they will not be referred to again until we reach that
stage (Sections D and E of this Part).
We have next a collection of propositions (*204·6—·65) on
for various values of
, and
finally three propositions on
. Two of these are much used,
namely
*204·7.
*204·71.
*204·01.
*204·1.
*204·11.
*204·12.
*204·121.
[Pg 549]
*204·13.
Dem.
*204·14.
*204·15.
Dem.
*204·151.
*204·16.
We have also
For, by *200·37, since
, it
follows that
A relation such as ,
where
, satisfies
, but not
. On the other hand,
satisfies
, but not
.
*204·2.
*204·21.
*204·22.
*204·23.
*204·24.
*204·25.
*204·26.
The three following propositions deal with couples. Couples
often require special treatment, owing to the fact that,
if is a couple,
, so that
, whereas in any other case,
if
is[Pg 550] a series,
.
Hence the following propositions are often required.
*204·27.
Dem.
*204·271.
Dem.
*204·272.
*204·32.
Dem.
*204·33.
Dem.
[Pg 551]
The three following propositions only require ,
but are required for application to series, and are
therefore convenient in the form here given.
*204·331.
*204·34.
*204·35.
This proposition shows that the series of segments which have upper
limits is like the original series, for a segment whose upper limit is
is
, and the series of such segments is
.
The following propositions (*204·4—·44) are concerned with relations with limited fields.
*204·41.
In virtue of the above two propositions, the series contained in a given series are the relations resulting from limitations of the field; the process of limiting the field is merely the process of selecting a part of the original series without changing the order.
*204·42.
*204·421.
*204·43.
Dem.
[Pg 552]
The following propositions (*204·45—*204·483) are concerned with the division of a series into two parts, one of which wholly precedes the other. The case where one of the parts consists of a single term requires special treatment, and so does the case where both parts consist of single terms, i.e. where the series is a couple.
Dem.
*204·46.
Dem.
*204·462.
*204·463.
Dem.
*204·47.
Dem.
[Pg 553]
*204·48.
Dem.
*204·481.
*204·482.
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned with the application of relation-arithmetic to series.
[Pg 554]
Dem.
Dem.
*204·54.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 555]
*204·551.
Dem.
*204·56.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 556]
In order to prove that is connected, we require a further
hypothesis, namely that
is well-ordered, i.e. that
every class contained in
and not null has a first term.
*204·562.
Dem.
*204·58.
Dem.
*204·581.
Dem.
[Pg 557]
The two following propositions are lemmas for *204·62.
Dem.
*204·61.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 558]
*204·63.
Dem.
*204·64.
Dem.
The following proposition is used in *234·101.
Dem.
On this proposition, compare the remarks preceding *201·6.
*204·72.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in *274·23.
[Pg 559]
Summary of *205.
The minimum points of a class with respect to a relation
are those members of
which belong to the field of
but to which no members of
have the relation
;
that is, they are those members of
which belong to
but have no predecessors in
. Similarly the maximum points
of
are those members of
which belong to
but have no successors in
. Both these notions have been
already defined in *93, but they were there only used for the special
purpose of studying generations. Their chief utility is in connection
with series, and it is in this connection that we shall now
consider them. Many of the properties of maxima and minima in series do
not demand the whole hypothesis "
," but only "
."
This is the case, in particular, with the fundamental
property of maxima and minima in series, namely that each class has at
most one maximum and one minimum. The minimum of a class, if it exists,
is the first term of the class, and the maximum, if it exists, is the
last term. The maxima with respect to
are the minima with respect
to
; hence properties of maxima result immediately from
the corresponding properties of minima, and will be set down without
proof in what follows.
It will be seen that the maxima and minima of depend only
upon
: the part of
(if any) which is not
contained in
is irrelevant.
In accordance with the definitions of *93, the class of minima of
is denoted by
,
where
the definition being
Thus
is a relation contained in
. When
is connected, we have
,
i.e. (by *71·12)
It follows that, if
is a set of classes which all have
minima,
is a selective
relation for
, i.e.
[Pg 560]
Owing to this fact, the existence of selections can sometimes be proved
in dealing with series (especially with well-ordered series), in cases
where such proof would be impossible if no serial arrangement were
given.
The definition of is so chosen as to exclude
from
whatever
part of
is not contained in
, and to make
, i.e.
, provided
. For
these two reasons we have to reject two simpler definitions which might
otherwise be thought preferable. One of these would give
which might be obtained by putting
This agrees with our definition whenever
,
but not otherwise, since it includes in
any part of
not
contained in
. Hence it necessitates the hypothesis
in many propositions which, with our definition, do not
require this hypothesis, and in particular in the proposition
so that instead of having (as with our definition)
we should only have
For these reasons, this definition is less convenient than the one we
have adopted.
The other definition which suggests itself is one which will give
If this definition were adopted, we might dispense
with a special notation altogether, using
,
in place of
,
.
This definition, however, has the drawback that, if
and
,
so that we have
This necessitates the addition of the hypothesis
(as in *204·45 above, for example) in cases where,
with our definition, no such hypothesis is required. If we take
, instead of
, as the class
of minimum points, we secure
when
and
, but not when
. Thus we still have exceptions to
provide against which do not arise with the definition we have adopted.
[Pg 561]
The first few propositions of this number have already been proved in *93, but are repeated here for convenience of reference.
The propositions of this number are numerous and much used. Among the
elementary properties of and
with
which the number begins, the following should be noted:
*205·12.
*205·123.
*205·14.
*205·15.
*205·16.
*205·18.
*205·19.
*205·194.
Owing to this proposition, we can sometimes dispense with the
hypothesis in propositions about minima which
would otherwise require this hypothesis.
*205·197.
Our next set of propositions (*205·2—·27) introduces the hypothesis
that is connected, or transitive and connected. The chief of them
are
*205·21.
I.e. if the minimum of exists, it precedes every other member of
.
*205·22.
I.e. the terms which come after some part of are
those that come after its minimum (when the minimum exists).
*205·25.
We have next the fundamental proposition:
*205·3.
whence
*205·31.
which leads to
*205·33.
This proposition is useful in the theory of well-ordered series.
Observe that "" means that
consists of classes which have minima.
[Pg 562]
We have next a set of propositions (*205·4—·44) dealing with the
relations of to
and
; next we have propositions on the
relations of the minima of two different classes, of which the most
useful is
*205·55.
We have next various propositions on ,
of which the chief is
*205·65.
I.e. the predecessors of the whole of a class contained in
are the predecessors of its minimum (if it has one).
A useful proposition is
*205·68.
I.e. if is a hereditary class, its minima with
respect to
are the same as its minima with respect to
.
We prove next that if has a maximum, so has
(*205·7), and that if
, only a unit class can
have its maximum identical with its minimum (*205·73).
*205·8—·85 are concerned with relation-arithmetic. The chief proposition here is
*205·8.
I.e. in any correlation, the minima of the correlates of a class are the correlates of the minima.
We end with two propositions on relations with limited fields. The more useful of these is
*205·9.
*205·1.
*205·101.
*205·102.
*205·11.
*205·111.
*205·12.
*205·121.
*205·122.
[Pg 563]
*205·123.
*205·13.
*205·131.
*205·14.
*205·141.
*205·15.
*205·151.
*205·16.
*205·161.
*205·17.
Dem.
*205·18.
Dem.
*205·181.
Dem.
*205·182.
Dem.
[Pg 564]
*205·183.
Dem.
*205·19.
Dem.
*205·191.
Dem.
*205·193.
*205·194.
Dem.
[Pg 565]
*205·195.
*205·196.
Dem.
*205·197.
Dem.
In the remainder of the present number, when a proposition has been
proved for , we shall not state the corresponding
proposition for
, unless it is specially important.
When propositions concerning
are required for
reference in the sequel, we shall refer to the corresponding
propositions for
, in case no reference exists for
.
*205·*21.
*205·211.
Dem.
*205·22.
*205·23.
Dem.
*205·24.
*205·241.
[Pg 566]
*205·25.
Dem.
The following proposition is used in the theory of well-ordered series (*250·2).
*205·251.
*205·252.
*205·253.
*205·254.
*205·255.
Dem.
*205·256.
*205·26.
Dem.
*205·261.
Dem.
[Pg 567]
*205·262.
Dem.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in *250·7.
Dem.
[Pg 568]
The above proposition is of great importance in the theory of maxima and minima.
*205·31.
*205·32.
*205·33.
Dem.
*205·34.
The following proposition is used in *260·17.
*205·35.
Dem.
*205·36.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in *230·53.
*205·37.
The following proposition is used in *257·21.
*205·38.
Dem.
[Pg 569]
*205·381.
Dem.
The three following propositions lead up to *205·42, which is used in *261·26.
Dem.
*205·401.
Dem.
The following proposition, besides being required for *205·41, is used in *250·151.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 570]
The following proposition leads up to *205·44.
*205·43.
Dem.
The following propositions deal with the circumstances under which the minimum of one class is identical with, or earlier than, that of another.
*205·5.
Dem.
*205·501.
Dem.
*205·51.
Dem.
*205·52.
Dem.
[Pg 571]
*205·53.
Dem.
*205·55.
Dem.
*205·56.
Dem.
*205·561.
*205·6.
*205·601.
*205·61.
*205·62.
*205·63.
[Pg 572]
*205·64.
Dem.
*205·65.
Dem.
*205·66.
*205·67.
Dem.
[Pg 573]
*205·68.
Dem.
*205·681.
Dem.
*205·71.
Dem.
*205·72.
Dem.
*205·731.
*205·732.
Dem.
[Pg 574]
The following propositions lead up to *205·75, which shows that the
minimum of a class belongs to unless the part of the
class contained in
is
.
*205·74.
Dem.
*205·741.
Dem.
*205·742.
Dem.
Observe that is not in
general equivalent to
, since
the latter implies
, while the former does not.
The following proposition is important.
Dem.
[Pg 575]
*205·81.
Dem.
*205·82.
The two following propositions are used in *251·13.
*205·83.
Dem.
*205·831.
Dem.
The two following propositions are used in *251·14.
*205·832.
Dem.
*205·833.
Dem.
[Pg 576]
The following proposition is used in *251·25.
*205·84.
Dem.
*205·841.
Dem.
The following proposition is used in *251·2.
Dem.
*205·9.
*205·91.
Dem.
[Pg 577]
Summary of *206.
A "sequent" of a class is a minimum of the terms that come
after the whole of
; that is, we put
Thus the sequents of
are its immediate successors. If
has a maximum, the sequents are the immediate successors
of the maximum; but if
has no maximum, there will be no
one term of
which is immediately succeeded by a sequent
of
; in this case, if
has a single sequent,
the sequent is the "upper limit" of
. Whenever
is
connected, and therefore whenever
is serial, every class has one
sequent or none with respect to
, by *205·3.
It will be seen that the sequents of are the same
as the sequents of
, and therefore that
depends only upon
:
if
has terms not belonging to
, they are
irrelevant.
For the immediate predecessors of a class , we put
We have
, so that propositions
about
result from those about
by
merely writing
in place of
; they will therefore not
be given in what follows.
Among the elementary properties of with which this
number begins, the following are the most important:
*206·13.
This merely embodies the definition.
*206·131.
*206·134.
[Pg 578]
*206·14.
Thus if has a first term, this is the sequent of the null class,
or of any other class which has no members in common with
.
*206·16.
This follows at once from *205·3. It leads to
*206·161.
Thus if is a connected relation, no class has more than one
sequent. This is not in general the case with relations which are
not connected, even where the idea of sequents is quite naturally
applicable. Take, e.g., the relation of descendent to ancestor,
and let
be the class of monarchs of England. Then
will be such parents of
monarchs as were not themselves monarchs.
*206·171.
This proposition states that is a sequent of
if the
whole of
precedes
, but every term that
precedes
either belongs to
or precedes some term of
. When
is a series and
has no maximum, we
have
i.e. the sequent of
, if any, is a term whose
predecessors are identical with the predecessors of members of
. This is the case of a limit (cf. *207).
We have next a set of propositions (*206·211·28) concerned
with and
. When
is transitive
and connected, and
is an existent class contained in
and having a sequent, we shall have
That is, the predecessors of the sequent are the members of
and the predecessors of members, while the sequent and its successors
are the successors of the whole of
. The various parts of
this statement require various parts of the hypothesis. Thus we have
*206·211.
*206·213.
*206·22.
*206·23.
[Pg 579]
If is transitive, the value of
is unchanged if we add to
any set of
terms contained in
(*206·24); thus in particular,
(*206·25). Thus we can fill up any gaps in
, and take the
whole series up to the end of
, without altering the sequent.
We have next a set of propositions (*206·3—*206·38) on the sequent of
, i.e. of the segment defined by
. If
is a series,
is the maximum of
if
has a maximum, the sequent of
if
has a sequent but no maximum, and non-existent if
has
neither a maximum nor a sequent (*206·35·331·36).
Our next set of propositions (*206·4—·52) concerns the sequents of
unit classes, especially of , and of
classes of the form
. We have
*206·4.
*206·42.
whence the three following propositions:
*206·43.
*206·45.
*206·46.
From the above propositions it results that, when is a series,
any member of
is the sequent of the class of its predecessors,
is the sequent of
if either exists,
and the sequent of a class which has a maximum is the immediate
successor (if any) of the maximum, i.e.
*206·5.
We then have a set of propositions (*206·53—·57) on the sequent
of , i.e.
the sequent of the predecessors of the whole of
.
These propositions are specially useful in connection with
"Dedekindian" series, i.e. series in which every class
has either a maximum or a sequent (*214). These propositions all
require the full hypothesis that
is a series. In this case,
,
i.e. the sequent (if any) of the predecessors of the whole of
is the minimum (if any) of
. Moreover
by definition the maximum of
,
if any, is the precedent of
. Hence
has
either a minimum or a precedent if
has either a sequent or a maximum (*206·54). Moreover the
sequent and maximum of
are respectively (if they exist)
the sequent and maximum of the predecessors of all the successors
of the whole of
(*206·551). Hence we arrive at
the conclusion that the assumption that every class of the form
has either a maximum or
a sequent is equivalent both to the[Pg 580] assumption that every class has
either a maximum or a sequent (*206·56) and to the assumption that
every class has either a minimum or a precedent (*206·55). It follows
that these two latter assumptions are equivalent (*206·57), i.e.
that a series is Dedekindian when, and only when, its converse is
Dedekindian (*214·14).
We deal next (*206·6—*206·63) with correlations, showing that if two relations are correlated, the sequents of the correlates of any class are the correlates of the sequents, i.e.
*206·61.
We end with a set of propositions (*206·7—·732) showing that the
sequent of a class is unchanged if we remove from the class any
term other than its maximum (*206·72); that if a class has terms in
, and has both a precedent and a sequent, the precedent has the
relation
to the sequent (*206·73), and that the precedent is
not identical with the sequent (*206·732). These propositions are in
the nature of lemmas, whose use is chiefly in the theory of stretches
(*215).
*206·01.
*206·02.
*206·1.
*206·101.
We shall not enunciate any other propositions on
(unless for some special reason), since the above proposition enables
them to be immediately deduced from the corresponding propositions on
.
*206·11.
Observe that when is not null,
, so that
the factor
on the right is unnecessary; but when
,
we have
, so that
the factor
becomes relevant. Owing to this factor, the sequents
of
are
, so that if
exists,
is the sequent of
.
*206·12.
[Pg 581]
*206·131.
*206·133.
*206·134.
Dem.
This formula for is usually
more convenient than *206·13·132.
*206·14.
Dem.
*206·141.
Dem.
*206·142.
*206·143.
*206·144.
*206·15.
*206·16.
*206·161.
Thus in a series, or in any connected relation, no class has more than one sequent.
[Pg 582]
*206·17.
Dem.
The following propositions give simplified formulae for
in various special cases.
*206·171.
Dem.
*206·172.
Dem.
[Pg 583]
The propositions *206·173·174 deal with limits. When a class
has no maximum, i.e. when
,
its sequent (if any) is called its limit. By the
above propositions, the limit is a term
such that
precedes
, but every predecessor of
precedes some
member of
(*206·173); it is also a term
whose predecessors are identical with the predecessors of
(*206·174). The subject of limits will be explicitly treated in *207.
*206·18.
*206·181.
*206·2.
Dem.
*206·21.
Dem.
*206·212.
Dem.
*206·213.
Dem.
*206·22.
*206·23.
Dem.
[Pg 584]
Dem.
*206·26.
Dem.
*206·27.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 585]
*206·31.
Dem.
In the hypothesis of *206·32, we have both
and
. So long as
is not
contained in diversity, these are both necessary. For example, suppose
we take
Then
is transitive and connected, but not contained in diversity.
We have
Also
Thus in this case
exists, but
does not
exist. When
is serial, i.e. when
is contained
in diversity, in addition to being transitive and connected,
the existence of
involves that of
, and therefore the hypothesis
, which appears in *206·32,
becomes unnecessary.
*206·33.
Dem.
[Pg 586]
*206·34.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 587]
The condition
is the definition of what may be called "Dedekindian" series,
i.e. series in which, when any division of the field into two
parts is made in such a way that the first part wholly precedes the
second, then either the first part has a last term or the second part
has a first term. (When these alternatives are also mutually exclusive,
the series has "Dedekindian continuity.") If
is any class,
is the segment of
defined by
. In
virtue of the above proposition, every segment of a Dedekindian series
has a sequent. The sequent of a class having no maximum is what is
commonly called a limit. Thus in a series having Dedekindian
continuity (in which segments never have maxima), every segment has a
limit.
*206·37.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 588]
Dem.
*206·401.
*206·41.
*206·42.
Dem.
*206·43.
*206·44.
*206·45.
*206·451.
Dem.
[Pg 589]
*206·46.
Dem.
*206·47.
Dem.
*206·48.
Dem.
*206·5.
Dem.
*206·51.
Dem.
[Pg 590]
Dem.
Dem.
*206·531.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 591]
Dem.
Dem.
This proposition is important, since it shows that when a serial relation satisfies Dedekind's axiom, so does its converse. Thus if all classes which have no maximum have an upper limit, then all classes which have no minimum have a lower limit, and vice versa.
Dem.
[Pg 592]
*206·61.
Dem.
*206·62.
Dem.
*206·71.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 593]
Dem.
*206·731.
Dem.
Note that ""
is not the same proposition as
.
The former involves
,
while the latter does not, in virtue of the conventions as to
descriptive symbols explained in *14.
Dem.
[Pg 594]
Summary of *207.
A term is said to be the "upper limit" of
in
if
has no maximum and
is the sequent of
.
In this case,
immediately follows the class
, though
there is no one member of
which
immediately follows.
Sequents which are limits have special importance, and it is convenient
to have a special notation for them. We write "
"
for the upper limit of
; or, if it is more convenient,
"
". (This is more convenient when
is
replaced by an expression consisting of several letters, or by a letter
with a suffix.) The lower limit of
will be the
immediate predecessor of
when
has no minimum;
this we denote by
.
The following propositions on limits for the most part follow immediately from the propositions of *206 on sequents.
Our definition is so framed that the limit of the null-class is
the first member of our series (if any). This departure from
usage is convenient in order that, whenever our series contains
any limiting point in the ordinary sense, the series
of limiting points may exist, i.e. in order that
may exist whenever there
are existent parts of CʻP which have upper limits. The series
is the "first derivative" of
. The definition of a limit is
Besides the limit, we require, for many purposes, a single notation for
the "limit or maximum." This we denote by "," putting
Similarly for the lower limit or minimum we use "
,"
putting
We have
(*207·101) and
(*207·401). Hence it is
unnecessary to prove propositions concerning lower limits, since they
result immediately from propositions concerning upper limits.
In virtue of our definition of a limit, limits
if
is a sequent of
and
has no maximum
(*207·1). Thus if
has a maximum, it has no limit (*207·11),
but if it has no maximum, the class of its limits is the class of
its sequents (*207·12). Thus the existence of the class of limits is
equivalent[Pg 595] to the existence of the class of sequents combined with the
non-existence of the class of maxima, i.e.
*207·13.
*207·2—·232 consist of various formulae for . We have
*207·2.
I.e. the whole of precedes
, but any
predecessor of
precedes some member of
.
*207·231.
I.e. the limit of , if it exists, is the term whose
predecessors are identical with the predecessors of some part of
.
We have also
*207·232.
This proposition should be compared with *205·54, which (slightly
re-written) is
From the two together we arrive at
*207·51.
which serves to illustrate the utility of "."
We have
*207·24.
I.e. if is connected, a class cannot have more than one
limit; also
*207·25.
I.e. any terms which have some 's beyond them may be
added to
without altering the limit.
We next have a set of propositions (*207·251—·27) proving that if a
class has a limit, any single term of the class may be removed without
altering the limit (*207·261), and that in any case, provided the
class is not a unit class, its minimum (if any) may be removed without
altering the limit (*207·27). We then prove (*207·291) that if is
a series, and
is a class which has a limit, the predecessors of
the limit are the class
.
We then have a set of propositions (*207·3—·36) on the limit of
and kindred matters. If
has no immediate
predecessor, the limit of
is
, and vice
versa (*207·32·33). Hence
*207·35.
I.e. the limit-points of are those which have no immediate
predecessors.
[Pg 596]
We next turn our attention to "." This again is
one-many, provided
is connected (*207·41). We have by the
definition
*207·42.
*207·43.
*207·44.
*207·45.
Also we have
*207·46.
which is a very useful proposition, as is also *207·51 (given above).
A useful proposition in dealing with classes of classes contained in a series is
*207·54.
I.e. if every member of has a limit, the limit or
maximum (if any) of the limits is the limit or maximum, and in fact the
limit, of
.
We have next a set of propositions (*207·6—·66) on correlations,
proving that the limit, or the , of the correlates is
the correlate of the limit or
, i.e.
*207·6.
*207·64.
The last three propositions (*207·7—·72) are lemmas for use in the theory of stretches (*215·5·51).
*207·01.
*207·02.
*207·03.
*207·04.
We shall not give further propositions on lower limits, unless for some special reason, since all of them result from propositions on upper limits by means of *207·101.
[Pg 597]
*207·121.
*207·13.
*207·14.
The above proposition is important because
is the characteristic of "Dedekindian" series, i.e. of such as
fulfil Dedekind's axiom.
*207·15.
*207·16.
*207·17.
*207·18.
Dem.
*207·21.
Dem.
*207·22.
[Pg 598]
This is very often the most convenient form for
. It states that a limit of
is a member
of
such that
wholly precedes
, but every predecessor of
precedes some
member of
.
*207·23.
Dem.
*207·231.
*207·24.
Dem.
*207·25.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 599]
*207·26.
*207·262.
*207·263.
Dem.
*207·28.
*207·281.
*207·282.
*207·29.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 600]
Dem.
*207·31.
Dem.
*207·34.
Dem.
*207·35.
Dem.
[Pg 601]
Dem.
In virtue of this proposition, all limits are limits of classes
of the form . In this respect, limits (in
general) differ from segments. If we call
the segment
defined by
, there will in general be segments not of the
form
. These, however, will be the segments
which have no sequents, and therefore no limits; thus their existence
does not introduce limits not derivable from classes of the form
.
*207·4.
*207·42.
*207·43.
*207·44.
*207·45.
*207·46.
Dem.
[Pg 602]
*207·47.
Dem.
*207·48.
*207·481.
*207·482.
Dem.
*207·5.
*207·52.
*207·521.
Dem.
*207·53.
Dem.
[Pg 603]
*207·54.
Dem.
*207·55.
Dem.
*207·61.
*207·62.
*207·63.
Dem.
*207·64.
*207·65.
[Pg 604]
Dem.
*207·71.
[Pg 605]
Summary of *208.
The propositions of this number are chiefly important on account of their consequences in the theory of well-ordered series (*250 ff.) and in the theory of vector-families (*330 ff.). When two well-ordered series are ordinally similar, they have only one correlator; and a well-ordered series is not ordinally similar to any of its segments. Of these two propositions, the first is an immediate consequence of *208·41, and the second is an immediate consequence of *208·47.
Propositions concerning correlators of two relations and
are obtained from propositions concerning correlators of
with
itself, by means of the fact that, if
,
are two correlators
of
and
,
is a correlator of
with
itself. Again, correlators of
with itself are considered, in
this number, as a special case of correlators of
with parts of
itself. This latter is a notion which will prove important for other
reasons than those for which it is used in our present context. If
is connected, and
correlates
with part of itself (so
that
),
will contain terms of three
kinds, (1) those for which
, (2) those for which
,
(3) those for which
. Our propositions result from the
non-existence (under certain circumstances) of maxima or minima of
classes (2) and (3).
The following definition defines "correlations of P with parts (or the
whole) of itself." The letters "" stand for "ordinal
correlation." For a cardinal correlation, should occasion arise, we
should use "
," i.e. we should put
so that
.
For the present, we are concerned with the corresponding ordinal
notion; thus we require
This is secured by putting
[Pg 606]
It will be observed that if is what we called
a "non-reflexive" class (cf. *124),
,
and
. When
is non-reflexive, the same is true of
; and when
is
reflexive,
is also reflexive, in the sense that it contains
proper parts similar to itself, though if
is well-ordered, such
proper parts cannot be segments of
, but must extend to the end of
.
The class of correlators of with the whole of itself, i.e.
, is a sub-class of
, and
is specially important. This class differs widely in its properties
from the corresponding cardinal class. If
has more than one
member, the class
(which is the
"permutations" of
in the usual elementary sense) always
has more than one member. But the class
(which consists of such permutations of
as keep the order
unchanged) will consist of the single term
,
unless
contains classes which have neither a minimum nor a
maximum, in which case there will be many correlators of
with
itself. As a simple illustration, take the series of negative and
positive integers in their natural order. Then if
is any one
of these integers,
is a correlator of the whole series with
itself. If we take only the positive integers,
is no longer
a correlator of the whole series with itself, since all integers less
than
are omitted from the correlate.
The first important use of the propositions of this number is in the beginning of the theory of well-ordered series (*250). The propositions there used are
*208·41.
I.e. if is connected and asymmetrical, and every existent
sub-class of
has either a minimum or a maximum,
and
cannot have more than one correlator.
*208·42.
*208·43.
I.e. if every existent sub-class of has a minimum, a
correlator of
with part of itself can never move terms backwards.
Thus for example, to take a simple instance, an infinite series
consisting of some of the natural numbers in order of magnitude cannot
have its
th term less than
.
*208·45.
I.e. if is connected and every existent sub-class of
has both a maximum and a minimum, no proper part of
is
similar to
. This proposition is important in the theory of finite
series and finite ordinals.
*208·46.
[Pg 607]
I.e. if every existent sub-class of has a minimum, a
part of
which is similar to
must go up to the end of
,
i.e. must not wholly precede any member of
.
*208·47.
This is an immediate consequence of *208·46.
The proof of the above propositions proceeds simply by showing that
if and
, then
,
so that
is not the earliest term for which
,
since
is an earlier term for which the same thing holds.
Hence
can have no minimum; and similarly
can have no maximum (*208·14). So far we
require no hypothesis as to
. Assuming now
,
we show similarly that if
correlates the whole of
with itself,
can have no maximum and
can have no minimum.
Propositions about correlators of with
follow from the
above by taking two correlators
and
, and applying the above
propositions to
, which is a correlator of
with the whole of itself.
*208·01.
*208·1.
Dem.
*208·11.
Dem.
*208·12.
*208·13.
Dem.
*208·131.
[Pg 608]
Dem.
Thus the proof that has no minimum, and
no maximum, requires no hypothesis as to
. The proof that
has no maximum, and
no minimum, requires the hypothesis
. This proof results from
the following propositions.
Dem.
*208·21.
Dem.
*208·211.
[Pg 609]
*208·22.
Dem.
Observe that, in virtue of *208·111, the above hypothesis gives
, so that
. Hence we are led to *208·3.
Dem.
*208·31.
*208·32.
*208·4.
Dem.
[Pg 610]
The above proposition is of great importance in the theory of well-ordered series.
*208·42.
*208·43.
*208·431.
*208·44.
Dem.
In virtue of this proposition, if is a finite series, no proper
part of
is ordinally similar to
. (It will be shown later
that a finite series is one in which every existent contained class has
both a maximum and a minimum.) The following proposition gives a more
explicit form of the above result.
*208·45.
Dem.
The following propositions are useful in the theory of segments of well-ordered series, since they show that a well-ordered series is never ordinally similar to any of its segments.
Dem.
[Pg 611]
*208·461.
Dem.
[Pg 612]
In this section, our chief topic will be sections and
segments. This topic will occupy *211, *212 and *213, and
*210 will consist of propositions whose chief utility lies in their
application to segments. In *214, we shall consider Dedekindian
series, which are intimately connected with segments, owing to the
fact that one of the chief propositions in the subject is that
the series of segments of a series is Dedekindian. In *215, we
shall consider "stretches," which consist of any consecutive piece
of a series, and are constituted by the product of an upper and
lower section. Finally, in *216, we shall consider the derivative
of a series, or of a class contained in a series: the
former is the series of limit-points of the series, i.e.
, the latter is the class of
limits of existent sub-classes of
, i.e.
.
A class is called a section of when it is contained in
, and contains all the predecessors of its members, i.e.
is a section of
if
.
Thus a section consists of all the field up to a certain point.
It may consist of all the predecessors of
, i.e. it
may be of the form
; or again, it may
consist of these together with
, in which case it is of the
form
; or again, it may be not
definable by means of a single sequent or maximum, but be of the form
, where
is a class without a limit or maximum.
The class of sections of
is denoted by
. A
section of
will be called an "upper section" of
.
The idea of a segment is slightly less general than that of a
section. We define a segment of as any class of the form
, i.e. as any member of
.
Provided
is transitive, segments are contained among sections.
But even in a series sections are not, in general, contained among
segments: if
is a series, and if
is a member of
which has no immediate successor,
will be a section but not a segment.
If a segment has a maximum, it must also have a sequent. Segments which
have no maximum form a specially important class of segments: these are
classes such that
; they form the class
[Pg 613]
.
The properties of sections and segments considered as classes of
classes are many and various: they are considered in *211. In *212,
we pass to the consideration of the series of sections and segments.
These series are
and
(cf.
*170). The series of such segments as have no maximum is
. We put
It then appears that
so that it is unnecessary to introduce a special notation for the
series of sections.
Whenever is connected and transitive,
turns out to be
equivalent to logical inclusion combined with diversity (with the field
limited to
). That is to say (*212·23),
Hence it follows (*212·24) that
We have also (*211·6·17)
Hence it easily follows that whenever
is connected,
is a series. Similarly
will be a
series if
is transitive and connected.
The fact of connection, which is required in order that
or
may be a series, results from
In order to deal with such cases generally, we study, in a preliminary
number (*210), the consequences to be deduced from the hypothesis
We find that, with this hypothesis, putting
if
(*210·13), and thus in the same circumstances
is a series (*210·14).
The interesting point about such series is their behaviour with
regard to limits. Assuming that is not a unit class (so
as to insure
, if
is any sub-class
of
, the logical product
is the minimum of
if it is a member of
(*210·21), and the
lower limit of
if it is a member of
but not
of
(*210·23). Similarly
is the maximum of
if it is a member of
(*210·211), and the upper
limit of
if it is not a member of
but is a
member of
(*210·231). Thus if
is such that,
whenever
, we have[Pg 614]
,
it follows that every sub-class of
has either a maximum or a
limit, i.e. the series
is Dedekindian. Now each of the three classes
,
,
verifies
this condition, i.e. the sum of any sub-class of any one of
these classes belongs to the class in question (*211·63·64·65). (This
holds without any hypothesis as to
.) Hence we arrive at the
result that
(i.e. the series of sections)
is a Dedekindian series whenever
is connected and
is
not null (*214·32), while
(i.e. the series of
segments) is a Dedekindian series whenever
is transitive and
connected and not null (*214·33), and
(the series of
segments having no maximum) is a Dedekindian series whenever it exists
and
is connected (*214·34). These propositions are important, and
are the source of much of the utility of sections and segments.
For many purposes, especially in ordinal arithmetic, it is necessary
to consider sections not as classes, but as series. That is to say, if
is a member of
, we want to deal with
rather than with
. The series of
all such terms as
might be supposed to
be
. But here a limitation is
necessary owing to the fact that, if
exists,
and
are both sections, and
and
are both
, so
that
will be a relation which
will have to itself. In order to avoid this, we first
exclude
from the sections to be considered, and thus put
Then
is the series of segments considered as series.
Provided
is a series, the relation
holds between any two members
and
of its field
when, and only when,
. The subject
of
is considered in *213; the utility of the
propositions of this number will not appear until we come to ordinal
arithmetic.
The subject of Dedekindian relations is next considered (*214). We
define a Dedekindian relation as one such that every class has either
a maximum or a sequent. A Dedekindian series must have a first and a
last term, since the first term must be the sequent of , and
the last must be the maximum of the field. A Dedekindian series may be
discrete, or compact (i.e. such that there is a term between
any two, i.e. such that
), or partly one and partly
the other. A finite series must be Dedekindian: a well-ordered series
is Dedekindian if it has a last term. But the chief importance of the
Dedekindian property is in connection with compact series. A compact
Dedekindian series is said to possess "Dedekindian continuity"; such
series have many important properties. They are a wider class than
series possessing Cantorian continuity; these latter will be considered
in Section F of this Part.
[Pg 615]
Summary of *210.
In the theory of series it frequently happens that we have to deal
with a class of classes such that, of any two, one is contained in the
other. I.e. if is the class of classes, we have
Instances of this are afforded by the various classes of sections, to
be considered in *211. When fulfils the above condition,
the classes composing
can be arranged in a series by the
relation of inclusion (combined with inequality), i.e. by the
relation
or, what comes to the same,
If
is any relation such that
,
the above relation of inclusion is equal to
(For the definition of
, see *170.) Thus under the
above circumstances,
is a
series, whatever
may be.
The importance of such relations of inclusion, as generators of series,
is in connection with the existence of maxima and minima or limits. If
we put
where
satisfies the above condition, then if
and if
,
is
the maximum or the upper limit of
with respect to
,
according as
is a member of
or not. Similarly
if
, p
is the minimum or lower
limit of
, according as
is a member of
or not. Hence if
is such that the sum of any
sub-class of
is a member of
, every sub-class of
has either a maximum or an upper limit; and if the product
of every sub-class of
is a member of
, every
sub-class of
has either a minimum or a lower limit.
In order that every sub-class of should have a minimum or
a lower limit, it is sufficient that the sum of every sub-class of
should be a member[Pg 616] of
. For, if
is
any sub-class of
, consider those members of
which
are contained in
, i.e.
If
, the sum of these classes =
,
and is the lower limit or minimum of
. But if
, then every member of
which is not
contained in
is also not
contained in
, and is therefore not contained in some
member of
. Hence
is the lower limit of
.
It is owing to these propositions that segments of series are of such great importance in connection with limits.
The hypothesis that if ,
is a
member of
, will usually fail to be verified in the case when
, since in this case
. But
all the results desired can be obtained from the hypothesis that, if
,
.
This hypothesis is equivalent to the other except in the case of
, in which case it requires
, which
is much more often verified than
, which was
required by the other hypothesis.
The principal propositions of this number are the following:
*210·1.
*210·11.
*210·12.
*210·13.
*210·2.
*210·21.
*210·211 gives an analogous proposition for and
. We shall not here mention such analogues, unless
for some special reason.
*210·23.
*210·232.
*210·251.
*210·252.
*210·254.
*210·26.
*210·28.
Thus if is a class of not less than two classes such that,
of any two of its members, one must be contained in the other, and if
is the relation[Pg 617]
confined to members of
, then
is a series (*210·12)
in which, provided the sums of sub-classes of
are always
members of
, every class has either a maximum or an upper
limit, and every class has either a minimum or a lower limit (*210·28).
The reader will observe that, if ,
,
any finite sub-class of
must contain its own sum and
product as members. For example, if we have two classes
and
, if
, then
and
; if we have three
classes
,
,
, and
,
then
and
;
and so on. Thus the hypothesis
is only required in order to enable us to deal with infinite
sub-classes of
.
Dem.
*210·11.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 618]
*210·121.
Dem.
*210·122.
Dem.
*210·123.
Dem.
*210·124.
Dem.
[Pg 619]
Thus under the hypothesis of *210·1,
does not depend upon
, so
long as
. Also we have
*210·15.
*210·16.
Dem.
*210·17.
Dem.
*210·2.
Dem.
[Pg 620]
Observe that
is either
or
,
according as
is or is not a member of
.
*210·201.
*210·202.
*210·203.
*210·22.
*210·221.
*210·222.
*210·223.
Dem.
[Pg 621]
In virtue of *210·21·23, every class which is contained in ,
and whose product is a member of
, has either a minimum or
a lower limit; and in virtue of *210·211·231, every class which is
contained in
, and whose sum is a member of
, has
either a maximum or an upper limit.
*210·232.
*210·233.
*210·24.
*210·241.
*210·242.
Dem.
Dem.
This proposition is more useful than *210·25, because its hypothesis is
much oftener verified. In order that the hypothesis of *210·25 may be[Pg 622]
verified, we must have , since
; hence we must also
have
. But the hypothesis of *210·252 only
requires, as far as
is concerned, that we should have
.
*210·253.
*210·254.
*210·26.
Dem.
*210·261.
*210·262.
Dem.
The same remark applies to this proposition as to *210·252.
[Pg 623]
*210·27.
Dem.
*210·271.
*210·272.
Dem.
Thus when either of the hypotheses of *210·281·282 is fulfilled, the
series is Dedekindian both upwards and downwards.
*210·29.
*210·291.
[Pg 624]
Summary of *211.
The theory of the modes of separation of a series into two classes,
one of which wholly precedes the other, and which together make up the
whole series, is of fundamental importance. When one out of a pair
of such classes is given, the other is the rest of the series; we
may therefore, for most purposes, confine our attention to that one
of the two classes which comes first in the serial order. Any class
which can be the first of such a pair we shall call a section
of our series. If is the series, we shall denote the class of
its sections by "
." If
is a section of
, we shall call
(which is the second class of our
pair) the complement of
. The class of complements of
sections is
which is identical with
(*211·75).
In order that a class may be a section of , it is necessary and
sufficient that it should be contained in
and should contain
all its own predecessors; thus we put
We have also, by *90·23,
Among sections, a specially important class consists of classes which
are composed of all the predecessors of some class, i.e. classes
of the form , i.e. classes which are members of
. Whenever
is transitive,
;
hence
is a section according to
the above definition. When
is a series, the complement of
(when
exists and is contained in
) is
The members of are called segments of the
series generated by P. In a series in which every sub-class has a
maximum or a sequent,
(*211·38), i.e. the predecessors of a class are always the
predecessors of a single term, namely the maximum of the class if it
exists,[Pg 625] or the sequent if no maximum exists. But if there are classes
which have neither a maximum nor a sequent, the predecessors of such
classes are not coextensive with the predecessors of any single term.
Thus in general the series of segments will be larger than the original
series. For example, if our original series is of the type of the
series of rationals in order of magnitude, the series of segments is
of the type of the series of real numbers, i.e. the type of the
continuum.
Among segments, a specially important class consists of those which
have no maximum. In this case, if is such a segment, we have
; and since (provided
is transitive)
we also have, for all segments,
, the
segments having no maximum are those for which
,
i.e. they are the class
.
In compact series, all segments belong to this latter class, but
in general only those segments belong to it which correspond to a
"Häufungsstelle." In all cases in which the existence of a limit is not
known, the segment fulfils the functions of a limit; that is to say,
in those places in the series where a limit might be expected, we have
a segment having no limit or maximum, which takes the same place in
the series of segments as would be taken by the limit in the original
series if the limit existed. Segments having no limit or maximum are
limiting points in the series of segments, and every class of segments
which has no maximum in the series of segments has a limit in that
series.
We have thus three classes to deal with, namely
Of these the second is contained in the first when
is transitive
(*211·15), and the third is contained in the first and second
(*211·14). The second consists of those members of the first which have
either a sequent or no maximum (*211·32); the third consists of those
members of the first which have no maximum (*211·41). If every member
of the third class has a limit, i.e. if
then every class has either a sequent or a maximum, i.e. the
series is Dedekindian; and the converse also holds (*211·47).
When is connected, of any two sections one must be contained
in the other (*211·6). Moreover, if
is contained in any
one of the three classes
,
,
, then
is a member
of that class (*211·63·64·65). Hence the propositions of *210 become
available. It is thus that the existence of limits in series of
segments or sections is proved: the maximum or upper limit of any
class
consisting of segments or sections is
,
and the minimum or lower limit is the sum of the segments that are
contained in every
.
[Pg 626]
We begin, in this number, with elementary properties of
. The sections of
are the segments of
(*211·13) and the sections of
(*211·17). We have
*211·26.
We then proceed to the elementary properties of segments, i.e.
of (*211·3—·38). We have
*211·3.
*211·301.
*211·302.
*211·351.
We then proceed to elementary properties of segments having no maximum,
i.e. of (*211·4—·47). We
have
*211·42.
*211·44.
*211·451.
Our next set of propositions (*211·5—·553) is concerned with compact
series, i.e. with the hypothesis . We have
*211·51.
*211·551.
I.e. a series is compact when, and only when, no class has both a maximum and a sequent.
We come next to the application of the propositions of *210 (*211·56—·692). These propositions proceed from
*211·56.
(Here "" may be substituted in the
hypothesis: cf. *211·561.) The propositions of this set, which are very
important, have been already mentioned.
Our next set of propositions (*211·7—·762) are concerned with the complements of sections and segments. Some of these propositions have been already mentioned; others of importance are:
*211·7.
*211·703.
*211·726.
[Pg 627]
*211·727.
*211·728.
The remaining propositions are mainly occupied with relation-arithmetic. The most important of them is
*211·82.
That is, given any series contained in , if something can be added
to make it into
, its field is a section of
, and vice versa.
*211·01.
*211·1.
*211·11.
*211·12.
Dem.
Dem.
In virtue of the above proposition, the properties of
can be deduced from those of
or
by substituting
for
.
*211·131.
Dem.
[Pg 628]
*211·132.
Dem.
*211·133.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
*211·16.
Dem.
[Pg 629]
The following propositions are useful in dealing with
sectional relations, i.e. relations of the form
, where
. Unit
sections often need special treatment, owing to the fact that for them
we do not have
.
*211·18.
Dem.
*211·181.
Dem.
*211·182.
*211·2.
Dem.
*211·21.
Dem.
[Pg 630]
*211·22.
Dem.
*211·23.
Dem.
*211·24.
Dem.
*211·26.
Dem.
*211·27.
Dem.
[Pg 631]
*211·271.
Dem.
*211·272.
Dem.
*211·28.
Dem.
*211·281.
Dem.
[Pg 632]
*211·282.
*211·283.
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned with .
This is to be compared with two other classes, namely
and
. The members of
which
do not belong to
are those which have a maximum
but no sequent, i.e. (if
is a series), those classes which
consist of a term
together with all its predecessors, where x
has no immediate successor. In series in which every term except the
last has an immediate successor,
will be the only member of
, if the series has a last term; if
the series has no last term,
.
The members of which are not members of
are those that have no sequent, i.e.
those that have no upper limit (for a member of
which has no sequent has also no maximum). These are the members
of
corresponding to a "gap," i.e. to a
Dedekind section in which neither the earlier terms have a maximum
nor the later terms a minimum. Hence in a Dedekindian series,
; and conversely,
if
, the series is
Dedekindian. These properties of
are proved in
the following propositions.
*211·301.
*211·302.
Dem.
*211·311.
[Pg 633]
*211·312.
Dem.
*211·313.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 634]
The above proposition and the two following propositions enable us
in certain cases to prove propositions concerning the relations of
and
without assuming that
is transitive. An example of the use of these propositions occurs
in *211·754, where the hypothesis assumes
.
If we used *211·31 and its consequences instead of
*211·314 and its consequences, the hypothesis of *211·754 would have to
assume
.
*211·315.
Dem.
*211·316.
*211·317.
Dem.
*211·321.
*211·33.
Dem.
*211·34.
Dem.
[Pg 635]
*211·35.
Dem.
*211·351.
Dem.
*211·36.
Dem.
[Pg 636]
*211·361.
Dem.
*211·371.
*211·372.
Dem.
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned with ,
i.e. with those sections of
which
have no maximum. If
is compact (i.e. if
),
. If
is also a Dedekindian series,
.
This is the mark of Dedekindian continuity, since it states that, if
has no maximum, there is an
for which
, and this
is the upper limit of
has no maximum, so that the series is compact.
Dem.
[Pg 637]
Dem.
*211·411.
Dem.
*211·42.
Dem.
*211·43.
Dem.
*211·431.
*211·44.
*211·45.
Dem.
*211·451.
Dem.
[Pg 638]
*211·452.
*211·46.
Dem.
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned with certain consequences of
the hypothesis . This hypothesis is important because it is
the defining characteristic of compact series.
Dem.
*211·51.
Thus in compact series there is no distinction between the two sorts of segments.
*211·52.
Dem.
*211·53.
Dem.
[Pg 639]
The condition
is the Dedekindian definition of continuity. In virtue of the above
proposition, this is equivalent, in a series, to compactness combined
with Dedekind's axiom, namely
*211*54.
Dem.
*211·541.
Dem.
*211·55.
*211·551.
*211·552.
The following propositions are concerned in showing that
,
, and
all verify the hypotheses of *210, if taken as the
of that number.
Dem.
[Pg 640]
*211·562.
*211·62.
In the hypothesis of *211·61, it is necessary that should be
transitive as well as connected. Take, for example,
Then
is connected, but not transitive; also we have
Hence
.
Thus connection is not sufficient in the hypothesis of *211·61.
Dem.
This proposition shows that verifies the hypothesis
of *210·251, with the exception of
, which
requires
.
*211·631.
Dem.
*211·632.
Dem.
*211·633.
[Pg 641]
This proposition shows that verifies the hypothesis of
*210·252, with the exception of
, which
requires
.
Dem.
Dem.
*211·66.
Dem.
*211·661.
Dem.
The following propositions sum up the above results in relation to
the hypotheses of *210. The relation with its
field limited to sections or segments, which occurs in the following
propositions, is important, and will be considered at length in the
following number.
*211·67.
[Pg 642]
*211·671.
*211·68.
*211·681.
*211·69.
*211·691.
The following propositions are concerned with the relations
of sections and segments of to sections and segments of
. When
,
,
and vice versa. Also, if
is connected, the maximum of
(if any) is the precedent with respect to
(i.e. the
sequent with respect to
of
, and the
sequent of
(if any) is the minimum with respect to
(i.e. the maximum with respect to
) of
.
Hence the relations to be proved follow easily.
Dem.
*211·701.
Dem.
[Pg 643]
*211·702.
*211·703.
*211·71.
Dem.
If is a section of
, we shall call
the complement of
. By the above proposition, if
is a section of
having a maximum, its complement is a section of
which is a member of
.
*211·711.
*211·712.
Dem.
*211·713.
Dem.
[Pg 644]
Dem.
The above hypothesis is not sufficient to secure
,
as may be seen by putting
We then have
.
Thus
.
It will be seen that
,
so that it is useless to add
to
the hypothesis of *211·714. A sufficient addition is
, as is proved in the following proposition.
*211·715.
Dem.
*211·72.
*211·721.
Dem.
[Pg 645]
*211·722.
Dem.
We have always, if ,
The converse inclusion does not always hold, as appears (on writing
in place of
) from the note to *211·714. To
secure the converse implication, it is sufficient to assume
or
or
.
*211·723.
Dem.
*211·724.
Dem.
*211·725.
[Pg 646]
*211·726.
Dem.
*211·727.
*211·728.
Dem.
*211·729.
*211·73.
Dem.
*211·74.
Dem.
[Pg 647]
The following propositions sum up our previous results.
*211·751.
Dem.
In the above proposition, "" is necessary in
order that
may be contained in
,
and "
" is necessary in order that "
"
may imply "
." Hence the
full hypothesis "
" becomes necessary.
*211·752.
Dem.
*211·753.
Dem.
*211·755.
*211·756.
*211·757.
[Pg 648]
*211·76.
Dem.
*211·761.
Dem.
*211·8.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in *232·352 and *234·242.
The following propositions lead up to *211·82, which is used in *213·4. *211·83·841·9 are also used in *213.
*211·81.
Dem.
[Pg 649]
*211·811.
Dem.
*211·812.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 650]
*211·84.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 651]
Summary of *212.
The series of segments or sections of a series may be ordered by the
relation of inclusion, after the manner considered in *210. Since, as
was shown in *211, sections and segments have the properties assigned
to in the hypothesis of *210, the resulting series are
such that every class has either a maximum or a sequent, and either a
minimum or a precedent; i.e. the series of segments or sections
are Dedekindian. Most of the properties of the series of sections and
of the series of segments which have no maximum, only require that the
original relation should be connected. The properties of the series
of segments in general
require also that the
original relation should be transitive.
We denote the series of segments by , putting
We then have, in virtue of *210·13 and *211·61,
*212·23.
In like manner, for the series of segments which have no maximum, we put
and we have
*212·22.
We do not need a special notation for the series of sections, since, in
virtue of *211·13, it is or
.
Thus, by *212·23,
*212·24.
We begin the number with various propositions on the fields, etc. of these relations, and on the conditions for their existence. We have
*212·132.
*212·133.
*212·14.
[Pg 652]
*212·152.
*212·17.
*212·172.
Of the next set of propositions (*212·2—·25), several have already been mentioned. An important proposition is
*212·25.
for this shows that the series of segments contains a series similar to
.
We take up next the application of the propositions of *210 to
the series of sections and segments. We show that if ,
and
are series
(*212·3), and that if
is also transitive,
is a
series (*212·31). We have
*212·322.
*212·34.
so that every class of sections has both an upper limit or maximum and a lower limit or minimum (*212·35).
We then prove similar propositions for and
, except that in place of *212·34 we have
*212·431.
*212·53.
The reason of the difference from *212·34 is that the product of
an existent class of segments may not be a segment. Suppose, for
example, the segments are all those that contain a given term ,
where
has no immediate successor; then their logical product is
, which is a section but not a
segment.
We have next (*212·6—·667) a number of propositions on the limits and
maxima of sub-classes of in the series
. The interest of this subject lies in its relation to
irrationals. If
is a class contained in
and having
no limit or maximum,
is contained in
, and has a limit in
. We may call
this limit an irrational segment. There is no irrational term in
, because in
there is no limit to
; but the
limit, in
, of
may be
called irrational, because it corresponds to no term in
. It
should be observed that (as will be proved in Section F) if
is
similar to the series of rationals,
is similar to the
series of real numbers.
The most useful propositions in this subject are:
*212·6.
[Pg 653]
*212·601.
*212·602.
*212·61.
*212·632.
*212·661.
This shows that every limit in the series of segments is a limit of
a class of what we may call rational segments (i.e.
segments of the form ), namely it is the limit
of
.
*212·667.
This shows that the segments (other than ) which are limits
of classes of segments are the segments (other than
) which
have no maximum in
.
The number ends with a set of propositions (*212·7—·72) on the
relations of the sections and segments of two correlated series. If
is a correlator of
with
, then
(with
its converse domain limited) is a correlator of
with
,
with
and
with
(*212·71·711·712). Hence
*212·72.
This proposition is used in the next number, and also in *271.
*212·01.
*212·02.
*212·1.
*212·11.
Dem.
*212·12.
Thus has the same connection with
as
has with
.
When
is transitive,
also
has the same connection[Pg 654] with
as
has
with
. The following proposition makes these facts
more explicit.
*212·121.
Dem.
*212·122.
*212·123.
*212·13.
*212·131.
Dem.
*212·132.
Dem.
*212·133.
Dem.
[Pg 655]
*212·134.
*212·14.
Dem.
*212·141.
Dem.
*212·142.
Dem.
*212·15.
*212·151.
The converse implication does not hold in this case. For the existence
of , it is necessary that
should contain
classes having no maximum.
[Pg 656]
*212·152.
*212·153.
Dem.
*212·154.
Dem.
*212·155.
*212·156.
Dem.
*212·16.
Dem.
*212·161.
Dem.
*212·162.
Dem.
[Pg 657]
*212·17.
Dem.
*212·171.
*212·172.
*212·173.
*212·18.
Dem.
*212·181.
The above proposition is used in *252·43.
*212·21.
*212·22.
[Pg 658]
Dem.
The following propositions, down to *212·55, consist of applications
of the propositions of *210, where the of that number
is replaced by
,
, or
, and the
is replaced by
, i.e. by
,
, or
. The propositions
which follow are important, since the use of segments, especially in
connection with continuity, depends largely upon them.
*212·32.
We write , instead of putting
below the line, because, when we have to deal with
an expression not consisting of a single letter, it is inconvenient to
write it as a suffix, especially when it contains a suffix itself, as
in this case.
*212·321.
*212·322.
*212·33.
Dem.
[Pg 659]
*212·331.
Dem.
*212·36.
Dem.
*212·4.
*212·401.
*212·402.
*212·41.
[Pg 660]
The cases considered in *212·411 and *212·42 are not mutually
exclusive, since if , we have
.
*212·421.
Dem.
*212·43.
Thus with regard to the lower end of a class chosen out of
, we have three cases to distinguish: (1) if
,
is the minimum; (2) if
,
is the
lower limit; (3) if
,
is the lower limit.
Dem.
*212·44.
[Pg 661]
*212·45.
Dem.
The proofs of the following propositions are exactly analogous to those
of the corresponding propositions on .
*212·5.
*212·501.
*212·502.
*212·51.
*212·52.
This proposition includes *212·511, since, if
, we have
*212·53.
The proof proceeds as in *212·431.
*212·54.
The following propositions are concerned with the relations of maxima,
limits and sequents in and
respectively. The
series
, which is ordinally similar to
,
is contained in
; and if
has a maximum or
limit in
, the maximum or limit of
in
is
or
. In this way, a series
(namely
) which has the same ordinal
properties as
can be placed in a certain Dedekindian series
(namely
) in such a way that the classes which have
limits in
are those whose correlates have[Pg 662] limits which are
members of
, while those whose correlates
have limits which are not members of
are those which have neither a maximum nor a limit in
. These
relations are important in many connections. For example, if
is
of the type of the rationals,
is of the type of the
real numbers:
corresponds to
the irrationals, and classes contained in
but having a limit not belonging to
correspond to series of rationals having an irrational limit.
In the original series
, there are no irrational limits;
but if
is a class in
and having no limit,
has an irrational limit in
.
Dem.
*212·601.
*212·602.
Dem.
*212·61.
*212·62.
Dem.
[Pg 663]
*212·621.
Dem.
*212·63.
*212·631.
Dem.
*212·632.
Dem.
[Pg 664]
*212·633.
Dem.
*212·65.
Dem.
*212·651.
Dem.
[Pg 665]
Dem.
*212·653.
Dem.
*212·66.
Dem.
[Pg 666]
*212·661.
Dem.
*212·662.
*212·663.
Dem.
*212·664.
Dem.
*212·665.
Dem.
*212·666.
Dem.
[Pg 667]
Dem.
*212·701.
*212·702.
Dem.
[Pg 668]
Summary of *213.
If is a section of
,
is
called a sectional relation of
; and if
is a
segment of
,
is called a segmental
relation of
. If
is serial, sectional
relations may be arranged in a series by the relation of inclusion
(*213·153). That is, if we call the series of sectional relations
, we shall so define
as to secure
that if
is serial,
The natural definition to take would be
But this has the disadvantage that if
,
Thus
does not imply
; and when
is serial,
is not serial, because
.
In order to obviate this inconvenience, we confine ourselves to
sections which are not null, putting
With the above definition, we have (*213·151·152), if
,
and
.
The relation is very useful in dealing with
well-ordered series; in this case, we have (as will be shown later)
It will be seen that, if
, whenever
exists,
(*213·158); and whenever
exists,
(*213·155).
We have, if ,
Hence
(*213·246·242).
If is serial, the sectional relations of
are all relations
such that by adding something to them they become
, i.e.
they are
[Pg 669]
Hence their relation-numbers are those that can be made equal to that
of
by being added to. This fact is important in connection with
the theory of greater and less among relation-numbers.
The propositions of this number are rendered complicated by the necessity of taking account of the possibility of a section being a unit class. This necessitates a good many propositions which are merely lemmas; but in the end the complications mostly disappear.
We begin with propositions on the field, etc., of .
We have
*213·141.
*213·142.
*213·16.
*213·161.
*213·162.
We then prove:
*213·17.
If is finite, it follows from the above that
is not similar to
; but if
is infinite and has
a beginning and is well-ordered, we find
*213·172.
We then have a set of propositions (*213·2—·251) chiefly concerned
with the sections of , where
. Besides
those already mentioned, the following are important:
*213·24.
*213·243.
*213·25.
Our next set (*213·3—·32) is concerned with and
. We have
*213·3.
*213·32.
We then have three propositions (*213·4·41·42) showing that a sectional
relation of is one which becomes
by being added to. We
proceed to a set of propositions (*213·5—·58) on
,
and
, leading to
*213·57.
*213·58.
[Pg 670]
*213·01.
*213·1.
*213·11.
*213·12.
Dem.
*213·121.
Dem.
*213·122.
*213·123.
*213·124.
[Pg 671]
*213·125.
Dem.
The hypothesis , in the above
proposition, restricts
more than is necessary for the truth
of the conclusion. What we really require is
,
i.e.
. This holds
if either (1) the field of
does not consist of a single family,
or (2) there is a member of
which does not have the relation
to itself. Thus the only case excluded is that of a
single cyclic family. The hypothesis
may be substituted for
in most of the
subsequent propositions of this number in which
occurs in the hypothesis. We have,
however, preferred the hypothesis
,
as it gives a more immediate application to the case of
,
which is the case in which the propositions of the present number are
important.
*213·126.
Dem.
*213·13.
Dem.
*213·131.
*213·132.
[Pg 672]
*213·133.
*213·134.
*213·14.
*213·141.
*213·142.
*213·143.
*213·144.
*213·145.
*213·146.
Dem.
*213·15.
Dem.
[Pg 673]
Dem.
*213·154.
Dem.
*213·156.
*213·157.
Dem.
*213·16.
Dem.
[Pg 674]
*213·161.
Dem.
*213·162.
Dem.
*213·163.
Dem.
*213·164.
*213·17.
Dem.
[Pg 675]
*213·171.
Dem.
*213·172.
*213·18.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 676]
*213·21.
Dem.
*213·22.
*213·23.
*213·24.
Dem.
[Pg 677]
*213·241.
Dem.
Dem.
*213·243.
Dem.
*213·244.
Dem.
[Pg 678]
*213·245.
Dem.
*213·247.
*213·25.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
*213·301.
*213·302.
Dem.
*213·31.
Dem.
[Pg 679]
Dem.
Dem.
*213·51.
Dem.
[Pg 680]
*213·52.
Dem.
*213·53.
Dem.
[Pg 681]
*213·531.
Dem.
*213·54.
Dem.
[Pg 682]
*213·541.
Dem.
*213·55.
Dem.
As in *213·54,
*213·56.
Dem.
[Pg 683]
*213·57.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 684]
Summary of *214.
We call a relation "Dedekindian" when it is such that every class has either a maximum or a sequent with respect to it. As a rule, the hypothesis that a relation is Dedekindian is only important in the case of serial relations. Dedekindian series have considerable importance, especially in connection with limits.
When is transitive, the hypothesis that
is Dedekindian
is equivalent to the hypothesis that every section of
has a
maximum or a sequent (*214·13); it is also equivalent to the assumption
that every segment of
has a maximum or a sequent (*214·131),
i.e. to the assumption that every segment of
which has no
maximum has a limit, i.e. to
When
is a series, the hypothesis that it is Dedekindian is
equivalent to the hypothesis that every segment has a sequent
(*214·15), i.e. to the hypothesis that the class of segments
is the class
(*214·151). If
is a
Dedekindian series, so is
, and vice versa (*214·14).
Whenever
is connected and not null,
is
a Dedekindian series (*214·32), and so is
if it
exists (*214·34); whenever
is transitive and connected and not
null,
is a Dedekindian series (*214·33). All these
propositions have been virtually proved already: almost the only thing
new in the present number is the definition, which is
*214·4—·43 give properties of series which have Dedekindian continuity. We have
*214·4.
*214·41.
[Pg 685]
I.e. in a series, Dedekindian continuity is equivalent to the assumption that the classes which have a maximum are the same as the classes which have no sequent.
*214·42.
This proposition is important in dealing with Dedekind "cuts."
*214·43.
*214·5 shows that a Dedekindian relation has a beginning and an end;
the following propositions deal with when
is
Dedekindian.
*214·6 shows that a relation which is similar to a Dedekindian relation is Dedekindian.
We call a relation "semi-Dedekindian" if it becomes Dedekindian by the addition of one term at the end; the definition is
*214·02.
*214·01.
*214·02.
*214·1.
*214·101.
*21·411.
*214·12.
*214·132.
*214·141.
[Pg 686]
*214·2.
*214·21.
*214·22.
*214·23.
Dem.
*214·24.
*214·241.
*214·3.
*214·31.
*214·41.
*214·42.
Dem.
[Pg 687]
Dem.
The following propositions are no longer mere restatements of previous results.
Dem.
*214·51.
Dem.
[Pg 688]
*214·52.
*214·53.
Dem.
*214·531.
Dem.
*214·532.
Dem.
[Pg 689]
*214·54.
Dem.
Dem.
*214·7.
*214·71.
*214·72.
*214·73.
[Pg 690]
The proof of the following proposition is given in a somewhat compressed form, since, if given with the usual fullness, it would require various lemmas not required elsewhere.
*214·74.
Dem.
*214·75.
[Pg 691]
Summary of *215.
A stretch of a series is any piece taken out of it, and not
having any gaps; that is, it is a class contained in the series, and
containing all terms which come between any two of its terms. Thus it
is defined as
We denote the class of stretches by "," where
"
" stands for "stretch" or "Strecke." A stretch which
has no predecessors is a section of
; one which has no successors
is a section of
. The properties of stretches are chiefly
important in connection with compact series. In discrete series,
stretches are the same as intervals.
If is transitive, stretches of
are the products of sections
of
and sections of
, i.e. of upper and lower
sections of
(*215·16). If
is connected, and
is
a lower section,
an upper section, then if the two have a
stretch
in common, we have
A slightly more general form of this proposition is
*215·165.
A specially important case is when and
have just one term
in common. In this case we have
*215·166.
[Pg 692]
When has more than one term, if the upper limit
or maximum of
and the lower limit or minimum of
both exist, the latter precedes the former (*215·52); if
and
have no common part, but together exhaust the field of
, we have either
or
, assuming
(*215·54). Hence if
has no immediate
successor, it must be identical with
. Thus we
have
*215·543.
The above propositions will be useful in Section C (*231 and *233).
*215·01.
*215·1.
*215·11.
*215·13.
*215·14.
Dem.
*215·15.
Dem.
*215·161.
Dem.
[Pg 693]
*215·162.
Dem.
*215·163.
Dem.
*215·164.
Dem.
*215·165.
Dem.
[Pg 694]
*215·166.
Dem.
*215·17.
Dem.
*215·18.
Dem.
*215·19.
Dem.
*215·2.
Dem.
[Pg 695]
*215·21.
Dem.
*215·22.
Dem.
*215·23.
Dem.
[Pg 696]
*215·24.
Dem.
*215·25.
Dem.
*215·3.
Dem.
[Pg 697]
*215·31.
Dem.
*215·32.
Dem.
*215·33.
*215·4.
Dem.
*215·41.
Dem.
[Pg 698]
*215·42.
Dem.
[Pg 699]
*215·53.
Dem.
Dem.
*215·541.
*215·542.
*215·543.
[Pg 700]
Summary of *216.
If is any class, and
is any series, the
derivative (or first derivative) of
with
respect to
is the class of limits of existent sub-classes of
, i.e.
.
That is, a term
belongs to the derivative of
if a set
of terms exists which is contained both in
and in
,
and has
for its limit. The derivative of
with respect
to
will be denoted by
.
In general, there will be members of not contained in
, and members of
not
contained in
.
is said to be dense in
if all its terms except the first (if there is a first) belong to
, that is, if all its terms except the first are
limits of existent classes contained in
.
is said
to be closed in
if every existent sub-class of
which has no maximum has a limit which belongs to
,
i.e. if every existent sub-class of
has a limit or a
maximum, and the derivative of
is contained in
.
If
is both dense and closed, it is called perfect.
In this case, all its terms are limits of classes chosen out of
, and every class chosen out of
has a limit or
maximum in
.
The second derivative of is
,
i.e.
, and so on.
(Derivatives of infinite order cannot be dealt with till a later
stage.) If
is serial, the second derivative of
is
always contained in the first (*216·14).
If is a Dedekindian series,
is closed whenever
. In order to secure a Dedekindian
series, it is sometimes convenient to replace
by the ordinally
similar series
, which is contained in
the Dedekindian series
. Then
is replaced
by
, and
is closed if
the derivative of
with respect to
is contained in
. The
relation of the derivative of
in
to the derivative of
in
has been treated
in *212·6 and following propositions. This subject is resumed below
(*216·5 ff.).
The derivative of the series P will be defined as the series of its
limit-points, and denoted by . Thus we put
[Pg 701]
If is a series, the derivative of a class
consists of
those members
of
which are such that members of
exist in every interval which ends in
, i.e.
*216·13.
We have
*216·2.
*216·3.
*216·32.
We prove (*216·4—·412) that the properties of with respect
to
, as regards being dense, closed, or perfect, belong to
with respect to
if
is a correlator
of
with
.
We next consider the relation of in
to
in
(*216·5—·56).
The point of these propositions is that
is
Dedekindian, so that a class is closed in
if
it contains its first derivative. (It is usual to define
a class as closed whenever it contains its first derivative;
but this involves the tacit assumption that the series
is
Dedekindian. If
is the series of real numbers, this assumption
is of course verified.) We prove (*216·52) that the derivative of
in
is
,
i.e. is the class of segments defined by such existent
sub-classes of
as have no maximum; we show that
is dense, closed, or perfect in
according
as
is dense, closed, or
perfect in
(*216·53·54·56), and that
and
are closed if
contains its first derivative (*216·54).
We end with various propositions on (*216·6—·621), of which
the chief is
*216·611.
This subject will be resumed in connection with well-ordered series in *264.
*216·01.
*216·02.
*216·03.
*216·04.
*216·05.
[Pg 702]
*216·1.
*216·101.
Dem.
*216·11.
Dem.
*216·111.
*216·12.
*216·13.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 703]
*216·15.
*216·16.
Dem.
*216·2.
Dem.
*216·21.
[Pg 704]
*216·22.
*216·23.
Dem.
*216·3.
*216·31.
Dem.
*216·32.
*216·33.
Dem.
*216·34.
[Pg 705]
*216·35.
Dem.
*216·36.
*216·37.
*216·371.
*216·38.
Dem.
*216·381.
*216·382.
Dem.
*216·401.
Dem.
[Pg 706]
*216·41.
Dem.
*216·411.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 707]
*216·51.
Dem.
Dem.
*216·521.
Dem.
[Pg 708]
Dem.
Dem.
*216·55.
Dem.
*216·601.
Dem.
[Pg 709]
*216·602.
Dem.
*216·603.
Dem.
*216·61.
*216·611.
Dem.
*216·612.
Dem.
*216·62.
Dem.
[Pg 710]
Summary of *217.
The purpose of the present number is to prove *217·43, which is
required in the theory of real numbers (Part VI, Section A), where
will be the series of positive ratios including zero,
will
be the series of negative ratios in the order from zero to -
(both excluded),
the real number zero, and
and
two different series either of which may be taken as the series of
negative and positive real numbers. In virtue of *217·43, these two
series are ordinally similar.
*217·1.
*217·11.
*217·12.
*217·13.
*217·14.
*217·15.
*217·16.
Dem.
*217·17.
*217·18.
[Pg 711]
Dem.
*217·2.
Dem.
*217·21.
Dem.
*217·22.
Dem.
*217·23.
Dem.
*217·24.
*217·25.
[Pg 712]
*217·3.
*217·301.
Dem.
*217·31.
Dem.
*217·32.
Dem.
*217·33.
Dem.
*217·34.
Dem.
[Pg 713]
*217·35.
Dem.
*217·36.
Dem.
*217·37.
*217·38.
*217·4.
*217·41.
[Pg 714]
*217·411.
*217·42.
[Pg 715]
The purpose of this section is to express in a general form the definitions of convergence, the limits of functions, the continuity of functions, and kindred notions, and to give such elementary consequences of these definitions as may seem illustrative.
In the definitions usually given in treatises on analysis, it is
assumed that both the arguments and the values of the function are
numbers of some kind, generally real numbers, and limits are taken with
respect to the order of magnitude. There is, however, nothing essential
in the definitions to demand so narrow a hypothesis. What is essential
is that the arguments should be given as belonging to a series, and
that the values should also be given as belonging to a series, which
need not be the same series as that to which the arguments belong. In
what follows, therefore, we assume that all the possible arguments
to our function, or at any rate all the arguments which we consider,
belong to the field of a certain relation , which, in cases where
our definitions are useful, will be a serial relation; we assume
similarly that the values of our function, at least for arguments
belonging to
, belong to the field of a relation
, which,
in all important cases, will be a serial relation. The function itself
we represent by the relation of the value to the argument; that is, the
relation of
to
is to be
, so that, if the function
is one-valued,
. (If the function is not one-valued,
is any member of
.) Thus we may speak
of
as the function,
as the argument-series, and
as
the value-series.
To take an illustration: Suppose we are given a set of real numbers
,
, ...
, ..., where
may be
any finite integer. Here
is a function of
; the
argument-series is that of the finite integers in order of magnitude,
the value-series is that of the real numbers (or any part of this
series which contains all the values
,
, ...
, ...). The function
is the relation of
to
, so that
. In this case, calling
the argument-series
and the value-series
(as will be done
throughout this section), we have
,
,
[Pg 716]
, ...
, ..., and
= the series
,
, ...
, .... The series which arranges
,
, ...
, ... in the order of their
own magnitudes, instead of the order of magnitude of their suffixes,
is
or
.
This will not be equal to
unless the function is one which
continually increases, i.e. one for which
.
In general, the propositions of the present section are only
important when and
are series. If our assertions are
not to be trivial, we must have
and
, i.e. there must be arguments
in
which lead to values in
. It will also generally
happen that the function is one-valued, i.e. that
.
But the above conditions, though necessary to the importance of
our propositions, are in general much narrower than the hypotheses that
are necessary for the truth of our propositions.
The present section is wholly self-contained, that is to say, its propositions are not referred to in the sequel. We have, in this section, carried the subject as far as seemed suitable for the present work; its further development belongs to treatises on analysis.
We begin (*230) with a general conception which is involved in the
notion of convergency. We shall say that the values of a function
converge (or, simply, that the function itself converges) into the
class , if for late enough arguments the values always belong
to the class
, i.e. if there is a term
such
that, if
,
, or, to avoid assuming that
is one-valued,
. Thus the
values of the function converge into the class
if
If a term
is one such that, from
onward, all values belong
to
, we write
(where
"
" stands for "convergent"), i.e. we put
When there is such a
, i.e. when the function converges
into the class
, we write "
,"
i.e. we put
"
" may be read "
is
-convergent
into
." This means that for arguments sufficiently late in
the
-series, the value of the function is always a member of
. Thus e.g. if
, and
,
, and if
,
.
We next consider (*231) limiting sections and ultimate
oscillations of functions. For this purpose, we proceed as
follows. If , then
is
a section of the
-series such that, for sufficiently late
arguments, the values of the function must belong to
.
Hence if we take all possible values of
for which
, and take the logical product of all the
resulting sections
, we get a section containing all
the "ultimate" values of the[Pg 717] function; moreover this is obviously
the smallest section which has this property, because, if we take any
section
which contains all the "ultimate" values, we have
, and
, and therefore
the logical product in question is contained in
. The logical
product in question is
In order to avoid trivial exceptions which arise when
, we define the "limiting section" as
This "limiting section" we denote by
, where
the letters "
" stand for "section." Thus we put
is the class of those members
of the series
which are such that, given any argument however
late, there are still arguments as late or later for which the value
of the function is not less than
. In like manner,
,
which we will call the "limiting upper section," consists of those
members
of the series
which are such that, given any
argument however late, there are still arguments as late or later
for which the value of the function is not greater than
.
Thus the product of
and
is the smallest stretch which contains all the "ultimate" values of
the function, i.e. it is the stretch consisting of those terms
which are such that, however late an argument we take, there
are arguments as late or later for which the value of the function is
not greater than
, and also arguments for which it is not less
than
. Thus the product of
and
represents what we may call
the "ultimate oscillation" of the function. We shall denote it by
, putting
We may express
in a form not involving
, namely (*231·12)
This formula for may be elucidated
by the following considerations. If
is any member of
, then
consists
of all arguments from
onwards. Hence
.
i.e.
,
consists of all values of the function for arguments from
onwards. Hence
consists of all
members of the
-series which are equalled or surpassed by values
of the function for arguments equal to or later than
. Now if a
term
belongs to the class
for every argument
, it is a term such that, however far up the
argument-series
we go, we shall still find values as great as
or greater than
. When this is the case, we may say that
is[Pg 718]
-persistent. In this case,
may be regarded as not
greater than the "ultimate" values of the function. Now the class of
arguments concerned is
. Hence the class of
-persistent terms is
where the factor
may be added in order to accommodate the
formula to the trivial case where
(the
only case in which the factor
makes any difference). Thus the
class of
-persistent terms is the limiting section. Similarly the
-persistent terms are the limiting upper section. These
are the terms which are not less than the "ultimate" values of the
function. Thus the product
is the terms
which are neither greater than all ultimate values, nor less; hence it
is the class of ultimate values, which may be appropriately called the
"ultimate oscillation."
It will be seen that , being the product
of an upper and lower section, is itself a stretch: we may call it
(alternatively) the "limiting stretch." It consists of all members
of the
-series such that the function does not, however
great we make the argument, become and remain less than
, nor yet
become and remain greater than
. If
consists of a single term, that term is the limit of the function
as the argument travels up the series
. (This is, of course,
in general different from the limit of the values of the function
considered simply as a class of members of
, i.e. it is
different from
.) If
does not consist of a single term or none, we shall have two limits
to consider, namely
and
, which give the two
boundaries of the ultimate values of the function. When the class
is null, the function may be regarded as
having a definite limit: in this case,
and
are the two parts
of an "irrational" Dedekind cut, i.e. a cut in which the
first portion has no maximum and the second no minimum. Thus
is the condition for a
definite limit of the function as the argument grows indefinitely.
The above gives the generalization of the limit of a function when
the argument may be any member of . In order to
obtain limits for other classes of arguments, it is only necessary,
as a rule, to limit the field of
to the class of arguments in
question, i.e. to replace
by
(cf.*232). In order, however, to avoid vexatious and trivial
exceptions arising when
, it is more convenient
to replace
by
. Thus the
section of
defined by the class of arguments
is
). We put
This definition is useful because we very often wish to be able to
exhibit the limiting section defined by
as a function of
. The section
is such
that, if
is any member of it, and
is any argument belonging
to
, there is in
an argument equal to or later
than
, for which the function[Pg 719] has a value equal to or later than
. Thus
is such that the function does not ultimately become
less than
as the argument increases in the class
. The
limit or maximum of such terms as
is the limit or maximum of the
ultimate values of the function as the argument approaches the top of
. The class of ultimate values is
If the function has a definite limit as the argument increases in
, the class of ultimate values must not contain more than one
term.
Our next number (*233) deals with the limit of a function for a
given argument. The limit or maximum of the class of ultimate values
is not necessarily the value for the limit of . It will
be found, however, that, with a suitable hypothesis, the limiting
section
depends only upon
, and if
has no maximum, it depends only upon
.
Thus if
and
both
have the same limit, they define the same limiting section. Hence if
is the limit of
, the limiting section of
is
. The upper
limit of this is the upper limit of the ultimate values as the argument
approaches
from below. We put
We have thus four limits of the function as the argument approaches
, namely
If
is a continuous function, these four are all equal to
;
but in general they are different from each other and from
.
The subject of the continuity of functions is dealt with in *234. When
, each is the limit of the function for
the argument
for approaches from below. It should be observed
that if
is defined for a set of arguments which are dense in
, i.e. if
, then
and
are defined for all arguments in
.
[Pg 720]
Summary of *230.
In the present number, we have to consider the notion of a function
converging into a given class, or, as we may express it, the notion
that the value of the function "ultimately" belongs to the given class.
If is the function in question,
the given class,
and
a series to which the arguments belong, we say that "
is
-convergent into
" if there is an argument
such that, for all arguments from
onward (in the
-order),
the value of the function is an
. That is,
is
-convergent into
if
A term
which is of this nature is said to belong to the class
. Thus
is
-convergent
into
if the class
is
not null. Hence we have the following pair of definitions:
In all the cases that have any importance, will be a one-valued
function (i.e. a one-many relation),
will be a series,
and
will be a class having no maximum in
. For, if
has a maximum in
, then
the classes into which
converges are simply those to which the
value for this maximum belongs. The following propositions, though
only important under the above circumstances, are in general
true under much wider hypotheses.
It is possible to generalize still further the notion of convergence,
so as to apply to any property which belongs to when confined to
sufficiently late arguments. For this purpose, we have to consider
where
is to be confined
to terms later than or equal to some term
. If, under these
circumstances,
always
belongs to the class
, we may say that
ultimately
becomes a
. We may put
[Pg 721]
This is the general conception of which is a
particular case; in fact,
will have to be used when the ultimate properties
of the function with which we are concerned are not properties of its
values; but when they are properties of its values,
enables us to deal with them more easily than
.
In this number, we prove the following propositions among others:
*230·171.
*230·211.
*230·253.
*230·4.
*230·42.
*230·53.
In virtue of this proposition, the case when
is uninteresting, and in
order to obtain interesting interpretations of our propositions,
it is necessary to suppose that
has no maximum.
Similarly when, in later numbers, we consider
,
we shall only obtain interesting results when this has no maximum,
which requires that
should be a compact series
and
should be dense in
. These assumptions are,
however, not usually required for the truth of our propositions.
*230·01.
*230·02.
*230·1.
*230·11.
*230·12.
Dem.
[Pg 722]
*230·13.
Dem.
*230·131.
*230·14.
Dem.
*230·141.
*230·142.
*230·15.
*230·151.
*230·152.
*230·16.
Dem.
*230·161.
*230·17.
Dem.
[Pg 723]
*230·171.
Dem.
*230·21.
*230·211.
*230·22.
*230·221.
*230·23.
Dem.
*230·231.
*230·24.
*230·25.
Dem.
*230·251.
Dem.
*230·252.
*230·253.
[Pg 724]
*230·31.
Dem.
*230·311.
Dem.
*230·32.
Dem.
*230·321.
Dem.
*230·4.
Dem.
*230·41.
Dem.
*230·42.
Dem.
[Pg 725]
*230·421.
*230·51.
Dem.
*230·511.
Dem.
*230·512.
Dem.
*230·513.
Dem.
[Pg 726]
*230·514.
Dem.
*230·52.
Dem.
Dem.
*230·54.
Dem.
[Pg 727]
Summary of *231.
In the present number we are concerned with the limiting section
defined in a series , to which the values of a function
belong, as the arguments to the function increase in the
argument-series
. That is, we are concerned with the section
consisting of those terms
of
which are such that,
however great the argument to
becomes, there are still values
at least as great as
. Such terms as
may be said to be
-persistent;
is
-persistent if the function does not
ultimately become and remain less than
. The class of persistent
terms is called the limiting section. The limiting section
may be defined as follows. If
is any class into which
is
-convergent, then the section
is such
that the values of the function are ultimately contained in it. The
product of such terms as
is the smallest section
having this property. Hence if
be any member of this section,
then ultimately (i.e. for arguments far enough along the
series) the values of the function
do not persistently remain
less than
in the
series. Thus the product of such terms as
is the limiting section, and we may therefore put
where the letters "
" are intended to suggest "section."
(The factor
on the right is superfluous except when
, i.e. when
.)
We will call the limiting section of , i.e.
, the "limiting upper
section." It will be seen that if
is a member of
, then the function does not ultimately
become and remain, as far as some of its arguments are concerned,
greater than
, that is, however great we make the argument, we
still find values not greater than
. Hence if
belongs to
both
and
,
we find values not less than
and values not greater than
however great we make the argument. This class,
,
may therefore be regarded as the class of ultimate values of the
function. We will call it the "ultimate oscillation" of the function,
since, as the argument approaches
, the value of the function
ultimately oscillates in this stretch of
, and no smaller stretch
has the same property. We will denote this class by "
,"
where "
" is intended to suggest "oscillation."
is a stretch in
, because it is
the product of two sections. Hence we shall also call it the "limiting[Pg 728]
stretch." When the function has a definite limit as the argument
approaches
, the limiting stretch must not contain more than
one term.
Limits of functions for arguments in the middle of
,
which will be considered later, are derived from the
limits considered in the present number by limiting the field of
to predecessors of
.
In this number we prove the following propositions among others:
*231·103.
*231·12.
*231·13.
*231·141.
*231·191.
*231·192.
*231·193.
This proposition is frequently used in the present section.
In all ordinary circumstances, we shall have ,
so that if the upper and lower limiting sections do not have more than
one term in common (i.e. if
, they define a Dedekind cut in
. The following propositions
are concerned with this fact:
*231·202.
*231·21.
*231·22.
Note that "" is the hypothesis that for arguments belonging
to
, the values belong to
.
*231·24.
*231·01.
*231·02.
[Pg 729]
*231·1.
*231·101.
*231·102.
*231·103.
*231·11.
*231·111.
*231·112.
Dem.
*231·113.
If is a one-valued function (i.e. a one-many relation),
and if we write
for
, and
for
, we have
That is,
belongs to
if, for any
argument
in
, we can find an argument
greater than
or equal to
, for which the value is greater than or equal to
.
This is usually the most convenient formula for .
*231·121.
Dem.
[Pg 730]
*231·13.
*231·131.
*231·132.
Dem.
*231·133.
*231·134.
*231·14.
*231·141.
Dem.
*231·142.
Dem.
*231·143.
*231·144.
*231·15.
Dem.
[Pg 731]
*231·151.
*231·152.
The hypothesis is verified not only when
, but also under certain more general hypotheses. Two such
hypotheses, namely
are considered in the following propositions.
*231·153.
Dem.
*231·154.
Dem.
*231·155.
Dem.
*231·156.
Dem.
[Pg 732]
*231·16.
*231·161.
*231·17.
Dem.
*231·171.
*231·18.
Dem.
*231·181.
Dem.
[Pg 733]
*231·182.
Dem.
*231·19.
Dem.
[Pg 734]
*231·191.
*231·192.
*231·193.
This proposition is of fundamental importance.
*231·2.
Dem.
This proposition is fundamental in the theory of limiting segments.
*231·201.
*231·202.
Dem.
[Pg 735]
*231·21.
Dem.
*231·23.
Dem.
*231·24.
Dem.
*231·25.
*231·251.
*231·252.
[Pg 736]
*231·4.
Dem.
*231·41.
Dem.
[Pg 737]
Summary of *232.
In the preceding number, we considered the ultimate oscillation
of a function when the argument grows without limit. If, in the
propositions of the last number, we confine the field of to
, where
, the ultimate
oscillation becomes the ultimate oscillation as the argument
approaches
from below. If the ultimate oscillation consists
of a single term, this is the limit of the function as the argument
approaches
from below. If, instead of confining the argument
to
, we confine it to any other class whose
limit is
, we shall, under a very usual hypothesis, obtain
the same value for the ultimate oscillation as if we confined it
to
. And more generally, under a similar
hypothesis, if
and
are two classes of arguments
which define the same section (i.e. such that
),
then, whether or not this section has a limit, the ultimate sections
and the ultimate oscillation are the same for
as they
are for
. Hence we are led to consider first the result
of confining the field of
, not to
,
but to any class
. In order not to have to exclude
explicitly the case in which
, we deal with
, not
. Hence
we are led to the following definitions:
*232·01.
*232·02.
Most of the propositions of the present number are immediate
consequences of corresponding propositions in *231. The most important
application of the propositions of the present number is to the case
where is of the form
,
being
a member of
. We may, in this case, take
in place of
any other class of arguments
(e.g. a progression of arguments
,
, ...
, ...) having
for its limit, without altering the
limiting sections or the ultimate oscillation. Hence the limit of the
function for a given argument (if it exists) may be determined by
choosing any selection of arguments having the given argument as their
limit (cf. *233·142, below).
[Pg 738]
From the definition of we
obtain immediately
*232·11.
We prove that
(*232·131), and that if
, the
two limiting sections and the ultimate oscillation are all equal to
(*232·15). Also we have
*232·14.
Thus the substitution of for
in our definitions has
the effect of making them applicable to unit classes, and of enabling
us to substitute the hypothesis
for
.
But when
is transitive and connected (and therefore when
is
a series), the substitution of
for
in the definitions
makes no difference unless
is a unit class. This case is
trivial, since the only interest of our definitions is when a has no
maximum in
.
From *231·22 we obtain
*232·22.
We have next a set of propositions concerned in discovering
circumstances under which two classes and
which
determine the same section in
(and therefore have the same limit,
if any) give the same values for the two limiting sections. For this
purpose, it is only necessary to discover circumstances under which
we may substitute
for
.
When this can be done, the ultimate oscillation of the function as the
argument approaches the limit of a can be determined by taking any set
of arguments having this limit. We have
*232·301.
*232·32.
Thus if the function has a limit as the argument approaches the limit
of , it also has a limit as the
argument approaches the limit of
.
*232·33.
whence
*232·34.
We have also
*232·341.
[Pg 739]
Hence we arrive at the conclusion that, if
is a series, and
is the limit of the function for the
class a
, if
is a
member of
, it is
its maximum (*232·352), while if
is not a member of
, it is its sequent (*232·356),
assuming
,
which, as we saw (*233·22), is generally the case, and
assuming also
. On the other hand, if
has no maximum,
is
the minimum of
; and if
has a maximum other than
,
this is
(*232·357·358). This latter case is impossible unless
has an immediate predecessor. Hence we arrive at the following
proposition:
*232·38.
Applying this to a series having Dedekindian continuity, we know
that , and that the
and
always exist. Hence
*232·39.
That is to say, if the value-series has Dedekindian continuity,
and contains all values for arguments in
, then, provided the
function has a definite limit for the class
,
this is its limit also for the class
; that is
to say, any collection of arguments having the same limit or maximum as
a given section will give the same limit for the function.
*232·01.
*232·02.
*232·1.
*232·101.
*232·11.
Dem.
[Pg 740]
*232·12.
*232·121.
Dem.
*232·13.
From the above propositions it follows that the values of
,
,
and
depend only upon
; thus if
is not contained
in
, the part not contained in
is irrelevant.
*232·151.
*232·2.
Dem.
*232·21.
*232·22.
*232·23.
Dem.
[Pg 741]
*232·24.
Dem.
*232·3.
Dem.
*232·301.
Dem.
*232·31.
Dem.
*232·32.
*232·33.
Dem.
[Pg 742]
*232·341.
*232·35.
*232·351.
Dem.
*232·353.
Dem.
*232·354.
*232·355.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 743]
Dem.
*232·36.
*232·361.
Dem.
*232·37.
*232·38.
[Pg 744]
Dem.
*232·5.
*232·51.
*232·511.
*232·52.
*232·53.
Dem.
[Pg 745]
Summary of *233.
There are four limits of a function as the argument approaches some
term in the argument-series, namely the upper and lower limits
of the ultimate oscillation for approaches from below and above
respectively. If the ultimate oscillation for approaches to
from below reduces to a single term, i.e. if
,
that one term is the limit of the function for approaches to
from below. If this one term is also the ultimate oscillation
for approaches from above, we may call it simply the limit of the
function for the argument
. This may or may not (when it exists)
be equal to the value for the argument
. It is characteristic
of continuous functions that the limit exists for
every argument, and is always equal to the value for that argument.
Continuous functions will be considered in *234.
The upper limit or maximum of the ultimate oscillation as the argument
approaches is the upper limit or maximum of the ultimate section.
Hence if we put
the four limits of the function as the argument approaches
will be
It will be seen that
is a function of
. It may happen that, if we put
in
place of
, the function will have a definite
limit as the argument increases in
, although
has
no limit or maximum. Thus if, for example,
consists of the series
of rationals, and
of the series of real numbers, if
is a class of rationals not having a rational limit, we may regard
the limit of the function (if it exists), as the argument increases
in
, as the value of the function for the irrational limit
of
. In this way we can extend the domain of definition of a
function. In order to be able to deal with the cases in which
has no limit, we put
If
is a Dedekindian series,
always exists. If we take
to be any segment of
, we
thus get a new function, derived from
, but having segments of
instead of members of
as its arguments. Thus if
had[Pg 746] rationale for its arguments, this new function will have real
numbers for its arguments. (Real numbers may be regarded as segments of
the series of rationals.)
The function is a particular case of the above; thus
we take as our definition
or, what comes to the same thing,
The following propositions of this number are important:
*233·15.
*233·16.
*233·2—·25 are applications of the more important of the propositions
*232·34—·39, showing circumstances under which the limit of the
function for the class is the same as for the class
.
*233·4 and following propositions apply the earlier propositions
of *233 to the case where is replaced by
, and therefore
is replaced by
. We have
*233·43.
*233·433.
*233·45.
I.e. in a series having Dedekindian continuity, the necessary
and sufficient condition that the two limits of the function as the
argument approaches from below should be equal is that the
ultimate oscillation should not have more than one term.
[Pg 747]
We have next a set of propositions (*233·5—·53) on the possibility of
replacing by a class
having
for its limit, without altering the limits of the function. We have to
begin with
*233·5.
in virtue of *207·291. Thence by earlier propositions of this number,
*233·512.
whence we obtain
*233·514.
Thus if ,
are series, and
is the limit of the function
for the argument
(
being a term which has no immediate
successor or predecessor),
is the limit of the function for any
class of arguments whose limit is
. Hence we arrive at the
proposition
*233·53.
Thus if has Dedekindian continuity, and
is a class
of arguments having a limit, and if the ultimate oscillation as the
argument approaches this limit has not more than one term, the limit of
the function for the class
exists, and is equal to the limit
of the function for the argument
.
*233·01.
*233·02.
*233·1.
*233·101.
*233·102.
*233·103.
*233·11.
*233·111.
*233·12.
Dem.
[Pg 748]
*233·13.
*233·14.
*233·141.
Dem.
*233·15.
*233·16.
Dem.
[Pg 749]
*233·17.
Dem.
*233·171.
Dem.
*233·172.
Dem.
*233·173.
*233·174.
Dem.
*233·21.
[Pg 750]
Dem.
*233·23.
*233·24.
*233·241.
*233·401.
*233·402.
*233·41.
Dem.
*233·42.
*233·421.
Dem.
*233·422.
[Pg 751]
*233·424.
*233·425.
*233·426.
*233·43.
*233·431.
*233·432.
*233·433.
*233·434.
*233·435.
*233·44.
*233·45.
[Pg 752]
*233·501.
Dem.
*233·51.
*233·511.
*233·512.
*233·513.
*233·514.
*233·515.
*233·516.
*233·52.
[Pg 753]
Summary of *234.
In the present number we are concerned with the definition and analysis of the continuity of functions. The following definition of continuity is given by Dini[17]:
"We call it [the function] continuous for , or in the
point
, in which it has the value
, if, for every positive
number
, different from 0 but as small as we please, there
exists a positive number
, different from 0, such that, for
all values of
which are numerically less than
,
the difference
is numerically less than
. In other words,
is continuous in the point
where it has the value
, if the limit of its values to the
right and left of
is the same and equal to
...."
By the second form of the above definition, the function of
previous numbers is to be called continuous at the point
if
The first form of the definition can also be so stated as to be free
from any reference to number, and derivable from the ideas dealt with
in the previous numbers of the present section. For this purpose,
instead of "a positive number
" we take an interval in which
is contained, say
. Similarly the "values of
which are numerically less than
" are replaced by
arguments in a certain interval containing
.
By *233·423, if the limits of the function as the argument approaches
are to be all equal,
must not be the maximum or minimum
of
. We therefore take the interval containing
to
be an interval in which the end-points are not included, say
.
Thus our definition becomes
We require further, what is tacitly assumed in Dini's definition, that
is a member of
which has no immediate predecessor or
successor, i.e.
[Pg 754]
In order to deal more easily with the above definition, we analyse it
into the product of four factors, which concern respectively and
,
and
,
and
,
and
. In the first place, it is obvious that (A) is the
product of
and a factor obtained by substituting
for
in (
). If
, and
, (
) is the product of
and a factor obtained by writing
for
and
for
in (
); and in virtue of
,
(
) becomes
i.e. if
is transitive,
Hence the function is continuous for the argument a if a satisfies
() and the three other hypotheses resulting from replacing
by
, or
by
, or
and
by
and
. If we substitute
for
, and
for
,
(
) becomes
Hence continuity can be studied by studying the hypothesis
(), and replacing
by
and
by
.
The hypothesis () is an interesting one on its own account.
We put
Thus "
" means that
is a member of the
value-series such that, if
is any later member, the function
ultimately becomes less than
. If we put further
then, if
is a member of
, the function
ultimately becomes less than any later member of
, and greater
than any earlier member. Hence
is the limit of the function as
the argument increases indefinitely. Hence, if we substitute
for
, and if
,
is the limit of the function as the argument approaches a from
below, i.e.
(This is proved in *234·462.) Hence, putting
in place of
,
the function is continuous from below at the point
if
[Pg 755]
and is continuous from above if
These results, and various others connected with them, are proved
below. The equivalence of Dini's two definitions is proved in *234·63.
It will be observed that practically nothing in the theory of
continuous functions requires the use of numbers.
We use the symbol "" for the class of arguments
for which the limit of the function for approaches to a from
below is
. Thus, in virtue of what was said above, we may put
Then a function is continuous at the point
if a belongs to the
two classes
and
. Hence
we put
The function
is continuous with respect to
and
if it
is continuous for all arguments in
. Thus we put
Our propositions in this number begin with the properties of
and
. We have
*234·103.
Thus the hypothesis enables us to use
propositions of previous numbers having the hypothesis
.
The identification of our definitions with the usual definitions of continuity of functions proceeds by means of the proposition
*234·12.
We have a collection of propositions dealing with the relations of
to
and
.
is
an upper section of
(*234·131);
is the
complement of
, i.e. of
without its maximum (if any). This is
expressed in the following proposition:
*234·174.
We thus arrive at
*234·182.
[Pg 756]
Thus is contained in
(*234·201), and therefore has not more than two terms (*234·202). If
has one term, this is the only member
of
(*234·203). If
has two
terms, they have the relation
(*234·242); hence if
is a compact series, and
is not null, its only
member is both
and
(*234·25),
while conversely, if
and
are
equal, each is the only member of
(*234·251).
We now apply the above results to the limits of a function as its
argument approaches the limit of a class . This is done, as
before, by substituting
for
.
We arrive at the proposition (*234·33) that if
has Dedekindian
continuity, and
is not
null, its only member is both
and
, i.e. is
the limit of the function as the argument increases in
.
We then take for the particular value
, so that we become concerned
with what happens when the argument approaches a from below. For the
comparison of our definition of continuity with such definitions as the
one quoted from Dini above, we have
*234·41.
I.e. if is neither the first nor the
last member of the
-series,
belongs to
when, and
only when, given any interval
, however small, in which
is contained, there is an argument
earlier than
, such that
the value of the function for all arguments earlier than a but not
earlier than
lies in the interval
.
We deduce from previous propositions that, with the usual hypothesis as
to , if
is a Dedekindian series,
and if
is a series and
is a unit
class, its only member is both
and
,
i.e. is the limit of the function for approaches to
from
below (*234·43). The following proposition sums up our results:
*234·45.
[Pg 757]
Thus is,
in a compact series, the necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of a definite limit of the function as the argument
approaches
from below.
Without assuming , if
is a member of
, and
if
has no immediate predecessor or successor, so that in the
neighbourhood of
the series is compact, we still have
(*234·462).
We next consider . By the definition we have
*234·5.
Thus is an argument for which the function has a single value
which has no immediate predecessor or successor in
, and which,
in virtue of *234·462, is the limit of the function as the argument
approaches
from below (*234·52). The cases when
or
require special attention; excluding these cases,
we arrive at
*234·51.
This proposition is analogous to *234·41.
We prove (*234·562) that if ,
are series, and
is any class of arguments for which all the values belong to
,
and if
has a limit at which the function is continuous from
below, then the limit of the function, as the argument increases in
, is the value of the function at the limit of
.
We next consider , which is defined as
. We show that if
is a series whose field contains
and
is transitive, and
is connected, and
is neither
nor
,
then if
belongs to the class
,
is the
limit of the function for the argument
for approaches either
from below or from above (*234·62). If
is compact, the converse
also holds (*234·63). Our definition of a point of continuity is thus
identified with the second form of Dini's definition quoted above. It
is identified with the first form by the following proposition: In the
circumstances of *234·62, if
, we
have (*234·64)
i.e.
is a point of continuity when, and only when, the
value
for the argument
is a member of the
-series
having no immediate predecessor or successor, and if
is
contained in the interval
, then,[Pg 758] however small this
interval may be, two arguments
,
can be found such that
a lies between them, and the values for all arguments from
to
(both included) lie in the interval
.
We end with a few propositions on continuous functions. The last of
these (*234·73) states that, if is a compact series and
is transitive and connected, then
is continuous with respect to
and
when, and only when, it has arguments in
, and
for all such arguments
we have
i.e. the value for every argument is the limit for that argument
for approaches either from above or from below.
*234·01.
*234·02.
*234·03.
*234·04.
*234·05.
*234·1.
Dem.
*234·102.
Dem.
*234·103.
Dem.
[Pg 759]
*234·104.
Dem.
*234·105.
Dem.
When , the above proposition is not
necessarily true: it may fail if
.
It is to be observed that and
are functions of
, so that they are unchanged when
is substituted for
. Hence the hypothesis
is as effective, with regard to them,
as the hypothesis
. This is stated in the following
proposition.
*234·106.
*234·107.
Dem.
*234·11.
[Pg 760]
*234·111.
Dem.
*234·12.
Dem.
*234·121.
*234·122.
*234·13.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 761]
*234·14.
Dem.
*234·141.
*234·142.
Dem.
*234·15.
Dem.
*234·16.
*234·161.
Dem.
*234·162.
Dem.
[Pg 762]
*234·17.
Dem.
*234·171.
Dem.
*234·172.
Dem.
*234·173.
*234·174.
Dem.
*234·175.
[Pg 763]
*234·18.
Dem.
In virtue of this proposition, and
are complementary sections of
, i.e.
they constitute a Dedekind cut in
.
*234·181.
Dem.
*234·182.
Dem.
[Pg 764]
*234·183.
*234·2.
Dem.
*234·201.
*234·204.
*234·21.
Dem.
*234·23.
Dem.
[Pg 765]
*234·24.
Dem.
*234·241.
Dem.
Dem.
*234·243.
Dem.
*234·244.
Dem.
[Pg 766]
Dem.
*234·26.
*234·27.
Dem.
*234·271.
*234·272.
[Pg 767]
The remaining propositions of the present number are for the most
part immediate consequences of those already proved. In order to
obtain, from propositions already proved, propositions concerning
the limit of a function as the argument approaches the limit of
some class of arguments , we only have to substitute
for
. In order to obtain the limit
of a function as the argument approaches a given term
, we take
in place of
.
*234·3.
*234·301.
*234·31.
*234·311.
*234·312.
*234·32.
*234·321.
*234·322.
*234·329.
*234·331.
[Pg 768]
*234·34.
*234·35.
*234·351.
*234·352.
*234·4.
*234·42.
*234·421.
*234·422.
*234·439.
*234·44.
[Pg 769]
*234·441.
*234·45.
*234·46.
*234·461.
*234·5.
*234·51.
Dem.
*234·521.
*234·522.
Dem.
[Pg 770]
*234·53.
Dem.
*234·54.
Dem.
*234·55.
*234·56.
Dem.
*234·561.
[Pg 771]
That is, if is any class of arguments having a limit at
which the function is continuous, then the limit of the function, as
the argument approaches the limit of the set of arguments, is the value
of the function for that limit.
*234·6.
*234·61.
Dem.
*234·7.
*234·71.
Dem.
*234·72.
[Pg 772]
Dem.
[17] Theorie der Functionen einer veränderlichen reellen Grösse, Chap. IV. § 30, p. 50.
CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES
All items in the Errata, from all three volumes, have been added and corrected accordingly.
The author's notation as *102·72·73 is an abbreviation for *102·72 and *102·73 respectively.
The lemmas *113·01 (page 302): *120·450 (page 209); *122·436 (page 268) *122·473 and *126·122 (page xxxiii); *124·62 (page 279); *151·45 (page 315); *165·372 (page 387) although they were mentioned by the authors, they have not been described in the corresponding sections.
From Section C, the authors use the lower case “a” as a
limit and the Greek letter as a class.
The alt texts for the illustrations in this book have been created by the Post-Processor.